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Abstract 
 
Following the 2008/9 global financial crisis and ensuing economic uncertainty, the 
roll out of austerity politics has seen significant welfare retrenchment and a 
recalibration of the state-citizen relationship which can arguably be characterised by 
a process of “punitive Neoliberalism.” Nevertheless, the impacts of austerity politics 
are proving to be geographically uneven: spatially, there is significant evidence that 
the northern and western parts of Britain, particularly towns and cities therein, are 
especially prone to the punitive impacts of neoliberal austerity politics, while socially, 
some parts of society (e.g. the young, the disabled) find themselves exposed to the 
worst effects of austerity. Conducted under the period of a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat UK Coalition Government (2010-2015) this thesis starts by considering the 
degree to which punitive austerity policies are economically necessary or driven by 
political ideology. Alongside this it determines whether austerity politics is a 
(re)new(ed) approach to welfare provision and the state-citizen relationship. The 
empirical parts of the thesis examine the tactics and strategies utilised by those 
conducting (the state), implementing (welfare providers and employers), and 
recipients (people and employees) of welfare-to-work policies, before considering 
what adaptations, innovations, co-operation, resistance and coping strategies are 
being employed by these stakeholders in response to austerity politics. In the final 
part, I argue that whilst many of the neoliberalised policies devised by the Coalition 
Government have been a renewal and reinvention of those already in place, this is 
part of a broader trend which is marked by the emergence of a more “punitive 
Neoliberalism” associated with a ‘work-first welfare’ regime. 
 
Key words: Austerity; welfare reform; work-first welfare; punitive Neoliberalism; 
state-citizen relationship; in-work conditionality; England. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – Nascent Geographies of Welfare 
in the Age of Austerity 
 
1.1 Austerity and welfare-to-work – something new or more of the same? 
The financial crisis of 2008-9 is portrayed as a pivotal moment for many states and 
their citizens, marking the onset of an economic collapse not seen since the 1970's, 
and possibly even the 1920's (Boyer, 2012). Yet unlike previous economic crises, 
such as the Great Depression of the 1920's and 1930's which preceded the 
formation of Welfare States, or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) crisis of the 1970's which triggered neoliberal workfarism, it is 
arguable whether the events of 2008-9 are leading to a similar ‘new’ approach to 
welfare. It appears certain that welfare geographies, by which I mean the changing 
state-citizen relationship, as well as geographies of welfare, by which I mean the 
spatial complexion of welfare reliance and provision, are changing as a result of the 
2008-9 financial and economic crisis. However, it remains uncertain whether this is 
sparking (re)new(ed) welfare geographies/geographies of welfare. It is this 
uncertainty that this thesis seeks to explore. 
One thing which is for sure is that the global economic downturn that followed the 
2008-9 global financial crisis has further challenged the state’s legitimacy as a 
guarantor for its citizens and further exposed many aspects of welfare policies to the 
scrutiny of the market-driven capitalist ideology associated with Neoliberalism (Peck, 
2010). Many governments have either decided, been forced, or through a 
combination of decision and enforcement responded to the crises by implementing 
policies of fiscal rationalisation in order to curb rising public sector debts, preserve 
economic wellbeing, and, they hope, lead to a return to growth. However, there are 
those on the political left who vehemently oppose such policy discourses, insisting 
that they merely serve to intensify the fiscal crisis. They advocate alternative 
methods, such as lowering debt levels at a more sustainable rate coupled to 
proactive social policies, or even more simplistic ‘tax and spend’ regimes which 
dismiss the role of public debt in the process of economic recovery altogether 
(Callinicos, 2012; Clarke and Newman, 2012). Indeed, Krugman (2010:1) notes that: 
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“somehow it has become conventional wisdom that now is the time to slash 
spending, despite the fact that the world’s major economies remain deeply 
depressed. This conventional wisdom is not based on either evidence or 
careful analysis. Instead, it rests on…figments of the policy elite’s imagination 
- specifically, on belief in what I’ve come to think of as the invisible bond 
vigilante and the confidence fairy.” 
For a number of states, servicing debt has become increasingly difficult and near 
impossible in some cases, following the financial crisis of 2008-9. Taking the 
example of the United Kingdom (UK), by February 2015 public sector net spending 
was still greater than income to the tune of £6.9bn. Indeed, whilst the deficit in 2013-
14 was one third less than at its peak in 2009/10, public sector debt has continued to 
increase, and by February 2015 amounted to £1468.5bn, or 79.6% of UK Gross 
Domestic Product (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2015). 
What is clear is that it was left to the state in countries that were at the centre of the 
crisis to bail out the financial institutions (though some point out this was still a 
choice rather than the absolute necessity it was portrayed as being). In the UK, this 
amounted to £133bn cash outlay, with a total guaranteed outlay of £1,162bn 
between 2007 and 2010 (National Audit Office, 2015), whilst Greece has, since 
2010, been subject to a €259bn bailout from the European Union (EU) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (European Union, 2015). This compares with the 
USA, where the Federal Government allowed Lehman Brothers to go bust by 
refusing to bail it out of its $613bn debt (Marketwatch, 2008) – a decision coming 
after the US Treasury took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008 as 
the subprime mortgage crisis threatened their viability. 
Such events have inevitably put immense strain on basic public expenditure 
requirements and have led to what is being termed “austerity politics” (Peck, 
2012:633). Moreover, it is putting the state-citizen relationship under the microscope 
once again, as people examine what the state is providing (an empirical question), 
and debate what the state should be providing (a normative question), for its citizens 
(Mooney, 2011). As a consequence, it can be said that a ‘new politics of austerity’ 
has come to the forefront of government discourse as the preferred response to debt 
and spiralling government spending, with the primary intention of many being to cut 
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their ballooning fiscal deficits to more manageable and sustainable levels. MacLeavy 
(2011:355) defines this ‘new’ form of austerity as an attempt to: 
“garner public support for the reduction or withdrawal of welfare entitlements 
through appeals to frugality, self-sufficiency and fiscal prudence. In 
particular…the recasting of the former Labour Government’s work incentives 
and welfare disincentives amidst mounting pressures on public expenditure.” 
Coupled to this is a more distinctive workfare dialogue (MacLeavy, 2011; 2014), but 
there is an ongoing debate as to whether this ‘new’ dialogue is something 
qualitatively new or a new phase in a much longer process of neoliberal welfare 
reform? 
The impacts of this more stringent workfare regime discourse appear to be highly 
contingent and geographically uneven over time and space, often to the detriment of 
those parts of society who are already suffering most from what is transpiring to be a 
prolonged economic downturn (MacLeod and Jones, 2011; Martin, 2012). This in 
turn leads to an interesting nexus of (re)new(ed) geographies of welfare and welfare 
geographies in the UK and beyond. 
A number of questions therefore arise over the nature of austerity politics and the 
accompanying welfare-to-work rhetoric which has emerged over the past seven 
years. In particular, it is important to ask whether the policy responses to this latest 
economic crisis are entirely new, a continuation of previous ideas and approaches, 
or whether they signify a renewal (by this I mean a hardening) of extant approaches? 
In the same way, are the responses of citizens and communities affected different 
from before, and are there any contradictions presenting themselves as a result of 
austerity measures being enforced? 
 
1.2 The United Kingdom as a lens on ‘austerity politics’ and welfare reform 
This research project sets out to critically analyse the fundamental implications of 
austerity from the perspective of welfare-to-work discourses as they have been 
designed and implemented in the UK post-crisis. The first question which must be 
answered is why the UK? It could be contended that the socio-economic plight of the 
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UK state is far from unique, not only on the global scale but even within Europe. 
Similarly, it has not been one of the countries least hit or hardest hit since the 
financial crisis (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009; Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). Instead, this 
research project has chosen to focus on the UK because of the stark contrast 
between London and the South East region – Europe’s biggest financial centre and 
one of the world’s most important finance hubs and a centrepiece for wider global 
economic and social flows and processes (Sassen, 1991; Allen et al., 1998; Massey, 
2007), and the largely public sector-dependent post-industrial regions of northern 
and western Britain (Gardiner et al., 2013; Martin, 2013; Hildreth and Bailey, 2013). 
For many, the UK is the birthplace of social welfare and the paternalistic relationship 
between the state and its citizens (Beveridge Report, 1942; Powell, 2000). For these 
reasons the UK can offer particularly revealing insights into (re)new(ed) welfare 
geographies and how nascent geographies of welfare are being articulated under the 
auspices of an austerity-driven welfare-to-work prerogative. 
However, in order to analyse these issues in as much detail as possible, the UK as a 
whole encompasses a spectrum which is too large for the purposes of this project. 
Indeed, Lowndes and Pratchett (2012:24) have noted how “it is at the local level that 
most of the social and welfare issues that arise from cuts and unemployment will be 
experienced.” Equally, it has been well documented that areas heavily reliant on the 
public sector for jobs and services are suffering disproportionately as a consequence 
of austerity politics (Kitson et al., 2011). To this end, empirical research was focused 
on the towns and cities of North West England. The North West was chosen 
because it displays some of the most pertinent characteristics and conditions for 
austerity and welfare-to-work to be implemented and experienced. In 2011 when the 
research began, the North West was the region with the greatest proportion of local 
authorities classified as deprived (Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), 2011), with 15 of the 50 English boroughs with the most 
constituents at risk of poverty located in the region – most being inner city areas 
(Guardian, 2012). The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 also revealed that 7 of the 
28 most deprived cities in England were in the North West region (Centre for Cities, 
2011a). More broadly, cities have been identified by academics as key sites of 
welfare provision, and so are likely to be the locations where nascent welfare 
geographies will be most prominent. In this context, Brenner and Theodore 
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(2002:367) have indicated that “the retrenchment of National Welfare State 
regimes … [has] imposed powerful new fiscal constraints upon cities.” 
 
1.3  Research aims 
The aim of this thesis is to examine whether or not there has been a qualitative shift 
in the welfare-to-work discourse following the crisis in capitalism triggered by the 
2008-9 financial crisis. The overriding aim is to discover if what we are witnessing is 
simply a reinvention or re-articulation of the neoliberal paradigm which has preceded 
it. Moreover, this means uncovering whether in fact what is now being contingently 
experienced across a number of spatial scales is something altogether innovative 
and new, or whether what we are seeing is the emergence of new aspects but 
contained within broadly the same direction of travel (Brenner et al., 2010). Given 
these initial conceptual and theoretical groundings, three core research questions 
frame the project: 
 To what extent is austerity influencing the nature of welfare provision? 
 What political strategies and their associated material effects are 
emerging in response to austerity? 
 How are the least insulated cities acting as locations of co-operation 
and resistance to such strategies and policy processes? 
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 adopts a chronological approach to 
UK state welfare provision from its inception in the mid-1940’s up to the mandate of 
the 2010-2015 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government. This chapter 
pinpoints the primary features denoting each period of welfare reform. In so doing it 
identifies the major economic and social policies and processes characterising each 
era. This chapter enables me to unpack issues relating to the key question 
surrounding whether or not there has been a qualitative shift in the policies of welfare 
provision following the recent financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn. 
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Chapter 3 then examines new theoretical frameworks for conceptualising welfare 
geographies post-financial crisis. A scalar framework is used to reveal the uneven 
nature of welfare reforms at global, national, regional and local levels. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used. This includes a detailed analysis of the 
methods utilised and applied in the design and execution of the research project in 
order to answer these questions. The chapter also addresses issues concerning 
research ethics, positionality and reflexivity. 
The second part of the thesis addresses the research questions outlined earlier in 
three empirical chapters, each one focusing specifically on answering one of the 
research questions laid out. 
Chapter 5 looks at the current raft of austerity policies and their influence on the 
discourse of welfare-to-work. It places particular emphasis on assessing whether the 
policies are an economic necessity as the Coalition Government suggests, or a 
politically conscious decision based on ideology. The chapter is structured so that it 
looks at whether these processes are new or renewed in comparison to those seen 
previously, elucidates whether these policies are economically necessary or part of a 
politically driven narrative, before finally identifying some contradictions which have 
emerged. 
Chapter 6 examines the tactics and strategies being utilised by different stakeholders 
in the welfare-to-work process. The chapter is broken down by the perspectives of 
each key stakeholder. It begins by observing the tactics and strategies employed by 
those conducting welfare-to-work policies, principally the state. It then goes on to 
look at those charged with implementing welfare-to-work policy, most notably welfare 
providers and employers, with a particular emphasis on assessing the privatisation of 
welfare services. Finally, the chapter scrutinises those tactics and strategies utilised 
by the recipients of welfare-to-work policies, namely people and employees, and in 
particular how such policies are applied to their individual circumstances and hence 
how they respond and deal with the impacts which result and which they experience 
in their daily lives. 
The final empirical chapter is Chapter 7, which addresses the specific array of 
responses to austerity and welfare-to-work policies, both from those implementing 
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the reforms and those who experience them. The chapter begins by addressing how 
stakeholders - local authorities, private companies and voluntary organisations - are 
adapting to changes brought about by austerity and welfare reform. It then goes on 
to look at how they are also being innovative to overcome the consequences of 
austerity politics. The chapter analyses how key stakeholders are co-operating to 
mitigate the impacts of welfare reform, particularly from the perspective of 
overcoming resource constraints in order to respond to and meet welfare-to-work 
objectives effectively. Following on from this, the penultimate section draws attention 
to forms of resistance aimed at rebuking austerity and welfare reform agendas and 
lessening their impacts. The final part of the chapter focuses on the coping strategies 
citizens and employees are using to respond and develop strategies to manage 
welfare reform more effectively in their everyday lives. 
Chapter 8 resolves my questions by connecting my findings, principally from the 
interviews undertaken, with the academic and policy literatures. It uncovers a 
number of additional questions which have arisen in the research process and which 
might usefully be used to formulate future research projects that can extend and 
deepen our understanding of this topic. Crucially, the chapter will also elucidate the 
unique contribution to the existing knowledge base and the connections with 
established theory and literature around austerity politics and welfare-to-work that 
the thesis makes, and what the implications of such a contribution are going forward. 
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Chapter 2: Nascent Welfare Geographies – (Re)new(ing) 
Prosperity Through Austerity? 
 
This research is focused on identifying whether there has been a qualitative shift in 
both the geographies and politics of welfare provision following the 2008-9 financial 
crisis. To begin to address this main research aim, the purpose of this chapter is to 
identify the key periods and shifts in welfare geographies since the advent of Welfare 
States in advanced capitalist countries in the second quarter of the 20th Century. 
This is necessary if we are to decipher whether or not we are currently witnessing a 
qualitative shift sparked by the 2008-9 financial crisis and ensuing global economic 
downturn. The notion of a qualitative shift is important because a number of 
academic and political commentators are relating current political-economic shifts to 
those which accompanied the collapse of the Atlantic Fordist-Keynesian institutional 
compromise in the 1970’s, and before that the Great Depression of the 1920’s and 
1930’s which prompted the formation of the Keynesian Welfare National State 
(Jessop, 1993; 2002). Moreover, and in the UK context, the notion of a shift in 
welfare policy, provision and the geographies of welfare has particular pertinence to 
the shift which has arguably occurred under the auspices of an ‘austerity package’ of 
policy measures outlined and implemented by the 2010-2015 Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Government (HM Government, 2010). This in particular has important 
implications for the state-citizen relationship, that is, the always contested and 
negotiated bedrock of how modern democratic societies operate (Pykett, 2012; 
Painter and Pande, 2013). 
To achieve this, the chapter will be structured according to the generally accepted 
periods of welfare geographies, specifying the characteristics of each period and the 
qualitative shifts which have taken place from one period to the next. Section 2.1 will 
therefore focus on the ‘Golden Age of the Welfare State’ – from its infancy in the 
inter-war and immediate post-war years through the forty years of political 
consensus. Specific emphasis is then placed on the widely accepted qualitative shift 
from traditional Keynesian-style welfare policies of the mid-20th Century to the 
emergence of workfare in the final quarter of the 20th Century. Accounting for this 
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qualitative shift, Section 2.2 traces the emergence of a ‘welfare-to-work’ discourse, 
but in particular, will identify and characterise different elements to this discourse 
with reference made to the different political standpoints adopted by various UK 
Governments from the late-1970’s (and the advent of Thatcherism) to the ‘Third 
Way’ policies of New Labour which immediately preceded the financial crash of 
2008-9. It will outline the various different phases this system went through, as well 
as contending how these were arguably part of the same wider agenda as opposed 
to completely different notions in their own right. The final part of this chapter, 
Section 2.3, will focus more acutely upon the current political-economic era of 
‘austerity’. An emerging academic literature is developing around notions of post-
Neoliberalism (Peck et al., 2009; Hodkinson and Robbins, 2013), as well as a ‘new’ 
politics of austerity (MacLeavy, 2011; Ladi and Tsarouhas, 2014) and stricter 
welfare-to-work conditionality, particularly for those in low paid forms of employment 
(Newman, 2011; Etherington and Daguerre, 2015). Henceforth, this section 
interrogates whether these contributors are suggesting a qualitative shift in the 
welfare geographies and the state-citizen relationship, or are we are seeing a 
reinforcement of more substantial long-term processes of neoliberal restructuring, 
welfare-to-work albeit through a new discourse of austerity. 
 
2.1 The Welfare State and its ‘Golden Age’ 
Prior to World War Two, there was no effective structure for welfare provision through 
the state. For the most part, citizens were reliant upon themselves and their families, 
as well as a growing number of charities, to access welfare services (Carpenter and 
Speeden, 2007, in Carpenter et al., 2007). Whilst it cannot be ignored that there 
were extremely basic forms of welfare provision provided by the state prior to this, 
they were minimal and sporadic at best. However, post-World War Two this all 
changed, with a dedicated system of provision implemented by governments to 
establish conditions enabling an adequate standard of living for all citizens (Pierson, 
1998). These countries included those in Western Europe, as well as those in North 
America, New Zealand, Australia and Japan. This new system of welfare provision 
entailed a number of key traits including free healthcare and universally available 
child benefits, as well as employment support for those out of work (Jones and 
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Lowe, 2002) - a policy especially pertinent given the large number of soldiers 
returning from the end of World War Two. Furthermore, it defined for the first time 
that the state had a specific responsibility to provide the basic necessities for 
attaining a minimum standard of living for its citizens and returning soldiers, who as 
constituents of the state had a preordained right to such provision (Goodwin and 
Painter, 1996). In essence this was the first significant qualitative shift in ideology 
seen in advanced countries; there was a definitive shift to enforce the responsibilities 
of states, and concomitantly emphasis upon the basic rights and needs of their 
citizens and former military personnel. 
The conceptual basis of the Welfare State in the UK has its origins in the early 
1940’s, when Lord Beveridge published The Report of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services (otherwise known as the 
Beveridge Report). This was to shape the attitudes of British Governments for years 
to come. In his 1942 report, Beveridge identified five ‘evils’ (squalor, idleness, want, 
ignorance and disease) which he believed were effectively choking social progress 
and stunting the potential for greater economic growth. He proposed a radical 
overhaul and reformation of the primitive social welfare system already in place in 
order to address these issues. His solution was to replace it with a fully-embedded 
system of welfare. In his report, Beveridge stated that: 
“the main feature of the Plan for Social Security is a scheme of social 
insurance against interruption and destruction of earning power and for 
special expenditure arising at birth, marriage or death. The scheme embodies 
six fundamental principles: flat rate of subsistence benefit; flat rate of 
contribution; unification of administrative responsibility; adequacy of benefit; 
comprehensiveness; and classification…Based on them and in combination 
with national assistance and voluntary insurance as subsidiary methods, the 
aim of the Plan for Social Security is to make want under any circumstances 
unnecessary” (Beveridge Report, 1942:9). 
The cessation of World War Two and the subsequent election victory of the Labour 
Party in 1945 saw the recommendations of the Beveridge Report widely 
implemented. With them came the inception of the nascent Welfare State in the UK, 
accompanied by a swathe of new political legislation and policy processes, such as 
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the birth of the National Health Service in 1948. This was the beginning of a new 
relationship between the state and the individual citizen; the state defined the 
individual as having certain societal responsibilities to fulfil, but which would only be 
attained via state provision of core services such as education, health care and 
social security (Jessop, 1993). Thus, the national welfare system became inherently 
focused on citizen rights to an adequate standard of living and it was the 
responsibility of the state to ensure such welfare provision to all citizens in a 
redistributive manner ‘from cradle to grave’ (Beveridge Report, 1942). 
The Keynesian Welfare National State, as the public welfare system became known, 
had several key features, the foremost of which surrounded the ideology of state 
intervention ensuring sustained and stabilised economic growth. By embodying a full 
employment rhetoric, the Fordist system of mass production and consumption traits 
associated with continued internationalisation of the world economy through the 
Keynesian Welfare State, could be suitably maintained and progressively 
strengthened (Mishra, 1999). Indeed, Keynesian-based welfare would create a ‘floor’ 
in the downward spiral caused by an economic downturn, creating conditions for a 
“minimum level of consumption regardless of economic activity” (Painter, 2002:161). 
As corollaries of this principle, through investment in a full employment ideology, the 
state could then recycle its economic surpluses back into the national system to 
target improvements in the standard of living of citizens, public services, and 
infrastructural integrity amongst others. Furthermore, it marked the point at which 
specific boundaries of citizenship were created to dictate the responsibilities imposed 
on the state for sustaining its citizens (Raco, 2009). 
During this period of Keynesianism, the UK economy went through a ‘Golden Age’ of 
macroeconomic stability and growth (Pierson, 1998), and this boom in economic 
productivity was accompanied by extensive social progress, primarily through the 
widespread expansion of the Welfare State and other public sector enterprises. 
Piachaud (2012) has noted that a large percentage of the population were lifted out 
of poverty (which is frequently defined as 60% of median adjusted income), and 
inequality, which had for a long period of time been markedly increasing, fell 
significantly during this period. As Prime Minister Harold Macmillan aptly put it on the 
20th July 1957, “you’ve never had it so good” (quoted in British Political Speech, 
2015a:n.p). 
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General living standards also increased substantially, and unemployment fell below 
3%, a level which has never since been achieved (Mishra, 1999). This post-war 
boom rapidly gathered pace in the 1950’s and 1960’s, taking advantage of the 
success of Fordist mass production and consumption, and its reliance upon large 
reservoirs of locally-available labour (Jessop, 1993). High levels of consumerism 
were sustained as disposable income for many families rose rapidly, along with their 
living standards and quality of life, and was aided by the enormous package of 
national public sector expansion, and the subsequent jobs that came with it (King et 
al., 2012). 
 
2.2  Welfare State retrenchment and the rise of the Workfare State 
2.2.1 The collapse of Atlantic Fordism and the growing threat to the traditional 
Welfare State 
This long post-war economic ‘boom’ came to an abrupt end in the early 1970’s as the 
structure of the internationalised Fordist-Keynesian system of capitalism began to 
crumble (Jones and Lowe, 2002; Jessop, 1993). The global economy went through a 
series of unprecedented upheavals, including the demise of the Bretton-Woods 
system in 1973, as well as the OPEC oil crises of 1973 and 1979, which pushed the 
global economy from one crisis to another throughout the 1970s (Altvater, 2009). 
The global nature of these crises threatened North Atlantic Fordist states (due to the 
role of foreign direct investment (FDI), the freeing up of capital and labour, and the 
emancipation of newly industrialising countries (NICs) in South East Asia), with the 
implications for the state being rapidly rising unemployment, low economic 
productivity and exponential growth in government debt. More locally, it consisted of 
issues surrounding local labour disputes, stagflation and strained living standards. 
With the economic crisis being seen overwhelmingly as a failure of the Fordist-
Keynesian system, this implied that the traditional Welfare State was also to fall on 
its own sword as a perpetrator of economic instability. It also forced politicians and 
businesses alike to start searching for alternatives to the failed Keynesian Welfare 
State system. 
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Welfare State retrenchment has been the underlying facet of the majority of Welfare 
States following the end of the ‘Golden Age’ (Schulze, 2010). It had become clear 
that the system of welfare provision which had underlain both global and national 
economies since the inception of the Keynesian Welfare State in the 1940’s was 
flawed. The result was another definitive shift in policy thinking; at the end of the 
1970’s there was a clear qualitative shift away from the Keynesian Welfare National 
State (Jessop, 1993), which had become so well established over a number of 
decades in many countries, towards a more punitive and market-oriented regime of 
post-industrial Schumpeterian Post-national Workfare Regimes (Jessop, 2002). 
 
2.2.2 The origins of welfare-to-work 
This emerging regime of workfare represented a clear and definitive shift away from 
the Welfare State which had preceded it. It consisted of an ethos of the responsibility 
of the citizen to earn their rights to state welfare provision, primarily through paid 
employment (Jessop, 1993). The state system in this era began to be scaled back 
dramatically. Basic amenities such as unemployment support were still available to 
those who required them in their most basic forms, however the primary emphasis 
was placed upon people beginning to help themselves rather than relying on the 
state as a guarantor (Jessop, ibid). This shift in emphasis did not change overnight; 
however, there was a clear shift from the 1970s onwards whereby the process of 
shifting the emphasis from the state towards its citizens began. 
Conditioned access to welfare support, including housing benefit, tax credits and 
disability support, coupled with an increased requirement to work, marked a 
distinctive shift in discourse. A second trend saw the state not only cut back on some 
welfare functions, but an increasing number of welfare functions were outsourced by 
the state to private sector providers including a growing number of voluntary and 
third sector organisations (Leonard, 1996). This new discourse became known as 
workfarism, or welfare-to-work. This new approach to welfare became most 
prevalent in countries falling under right-wing (neo) conservative mandates, such as 
the USA under President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), and the UK, under 
successive Conservative Governments (1979-1990 under Margaret Thatcher, and 
1990-1997 under John Major) (Dolowitz, 1998; Jessop, 2003; Peck, 2001; Peck and 
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Theodore, 2001). The policy of welfare-to-work became established as the 
cornerstone of many political mandates at this time, with far greater conditionality 
being placed on welfare provision than in the ‘Golden Age’, as well as the state 
actively pushing people back towards the labour market (Carpenter and Speeden, 
2007, in Carpenter et al., 2007). This marked a further qualitative shift, with power 
moving away from the labour force and its trade unions to reside within the neoliberal 
principles of the market and the wider capitalist system (Cripps et al., 2011; Painter, 
2002; Wills, 2001). 
In the UK, the Conservative Party election victory of 1979 ushered in a new era of 
supposedly rationalised economic thinking, founded on minimal state intervention, 
faith in the market and the advocating of private enterprise and ‘financialisation’ of 
the economy (Jessop, 1995; King et al., 2012; Peck and Tickell, 1992; Peck and 
Tickell, 1995). This new economic agenda promoted deregulation, privatisation and 
reduced state intervention in accordance with an “ideological attachment to a 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy” (Held et al., 2003:4). States were driven to adopt a 
new economic imperative; one aimed at reducing public spending on welfare 
provision and re-concentrating it in certain spatial domains to maximise global 
competitiveness in a “new, ruthless economy” (Head, 1996, cited in Leonard, 
1996:113) known as the neoliberal competition state. The very fabric of state space 
began to be restructured. As Brenner (2004) notes, the power logistics of globalising 
forces began to dictate that the national state was no longer sufficient as the spatial 
fix for competitive global accumulation regimes. Subsumed by the discourse of 
“locally embedded economic interactions becoming the basic preconditions for 
globalised capital accumulation” (Sassen, 1991, cited in Brenner, 2004:6), it was now 
national and post-national spaces - what Brenner (2004) terms “new state spaces” - 
which were taking precedence. In turn, this discourse also meant a shift from welfare 
to workfare through a neoliberal mandate (MacLeavy, 2014). 
What this workfare discourse meant for UK society was a targeted reduction in 
benefits across the system (including the rate of unemployment benefit), juxtaposed 
with increased conditionality, greater scrutiny over welfare provision eligibility, and 
raising tax rates. These changes had significant consequences; many people had 
lost their jobs in traditional manufacturing and other industrial sectors, and many 
citizens had slipped into poverty due to the combined effects of diminishing income 
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from the lack of employment and concomitant reduction in state welfare support 
(Taylor-Gooby, 1988). In 1984, one decade after ruptures in the Fordist-Keynesian 
consensus emerged, unemployment in the UK peaked at over 3 million (12%) and 
this put enormous pressure on the welfare system (Office of National Statistics 
(ONS), 2009). 
Henceforth, the traditional Keynesian Welfare State that had existed so successfully 
up until the 1970’s had rapidly become unsustainable. In short, there were less 
people in employment contributing to the welfare budget through taxation, and more 
people drawing on the welfare budget due to rising unemployment. Because of this, 
the traditional system of welfare provision as it had existed for several decades was 
considered no longer viable by leading socio-economic organisations such as the 
World Bank and IMF, as well as the right wing Conservative element of the British 
political system, and was to be reconfigured through a twin-track neoliberal workfare 
framework deemed far more effective and competitive in an era of globalisation. 
However it should be noted that there were alternative views, including those on the 
political left who advocated even greater expansion of the public sector as a means 
of overcoming sustained economic decline. Thus whilst for the majority the everyday 
reality became one of workfare underlain by certain basic welfare allowances, a 
more traditional, yet highly conditional, rubric of welfare provision for those most in 
need remained in place. Such a policy mantra would be vigorously championed by 
successive Conservative Governments between 1979-1997, and although many 
argued it successful in maintaining a quasi-Keynesian welfare system the cutbacks 
were often to the detriment of those members of society occupying the most 
precarious working circumstances (low paid, part time), as well as those in poverty, 
left on the periphery of society (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). 
The workfare state ideology in the UK effectively began altering the cultural 
perception of welfare responsibility being the absolute remit of the state, and instead 
enforcing it upon individuals, families, and, to an extent, the voluntary sector (Ross, 
2009; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). This fresh approach to governmental policy 
processes had started to reverse the state-citizen relationship; welfare provision from 
now on would be much more closely attributed to the responsibilities of citizens to 
contribute economically to the overall wealth of the state in return for even the most 
basic welfare services, with concerted state intervention only coming to the fore as a 
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last resort (Raco, 2009). If the Welfare State was seen to provide a win-win for the 
state (a better educated, healthier workforce leading to increased productivity) the 
move to workfarism was seen to offer another win-win (moving more people into 
work, reducing reliance on welfare benefits, and reducing the state’s direct 
commitment to supporting its citizens). In addition, an underpinning feature of 
Thatcherist neoliberal discourse was the enactment of a swathe of policies designed 
to promote deregulation of economic activities and corporate tax breaks. These 
procedures were incorporated to create a more attractive business climate, as well 
as a more competitive economic environment given the impending global threats 
from FDI outflows and the growing dominance of NICs, and therefore generating 
higher profitability and greater revenues for the UK state to plug the large hole in its 
fiscal budget. 
Thus, the move towards a new ‘Workfare State’ by the Thatcher Government began 
to offer a fairly consistent resemblance to the right wing ideologies of welfare 
extremism devised by the Reagan Government and their Wisconsin Model in the 
USA. The Wisconsin Model prescribes how social mobility is attained through 
economic and social determinants. This was instead of its more traditional links to 
the socio-democratic systems seen across many of the advanced states of Europe 
(Groot et al., 2011). 
 
2.2.3  The era of welfare-to-work 
It is now common-place to talk of welfare-to-work as the dominant discourse of 
welfare provision in the post-Fordist, post-Keynesian, post-national era of neoliberal 
capital accumulation. The outcome of adopting such a discourse and “its 
destructively creative ‘logic’” (Peck, 2010:106), coupled to the widespread diminution 
of state benefits, has led many to point to a colossal growth in inequality, insecurity 
and a rapid loss of social stability (Lister, 1998; Peck, 2002; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; 
Theodore and Peck, 1999). 
The neoliberalisation of welfare provision was pivotal in further increasing the 
distinctive geographical unevenness through which wealth, employment and welfare 
provision, and therefore quality of life and standard of living, have developed in the 
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UK as a result of welfare-to-work policies (Carpenter, Speeden, Griffin and Walters, 
2007, in Carpenter et al., 2007). Dealing with economic crisis in the 1970’s and early 
1980’s and then again in 1992/3, successive Conservative Governments had 
managed not only to control budget deficits and relinquish the state from its ties to a 
role of basic socio-economic guarantor, but had also succeeded in transforming the 
underlying ethos of British society by setting in motion the diminution and 
reorganisation of an assumed set of particular citizen rights to be provided directly by 
the state. As Fothergill and Wilson (2007) point out, the Conservatives had 
institutionalised a system nurturing individual responsibility and private innovation, or 
more succinctly, a shift towards conditional state provision in exchange for individual 
contribution to society through meaningful employment, or the accession of the 
responsibilities of citizens over their basic rights. Taylor (2010:3) succinctly 
acknowledges this, suggesting that: 
“because of Neoliberalism most states became more subtly callous towards 
their less well off, tolerated more exploitation of those who worked…were less 
generous with welfare provision and were more prone to support the 
ambitions of the super-rich.” 
This radical new ‘welfare-to-work’ agenda was to lay the foundations of the 
increasingly privatised system of welfare provision we see today. Whilst the UK did 
not go as far in this process as other states around the world, most notably the 
American conservative movement under Reagan and then George Bush Senior 
(Pierson, 1995), under the Thatcher regime state enterprises were progressively and 
systematically rolled back in favour of privatisation and unfettered market capitalism 
(Peck and Tickell, 1992; Peck and Tickell, 1995). 
By the mid 1990’s it became clear that the workfare regime which numerous states 
had rigorously implemented and followed incorporated a number of flaws and 
challenges which could not necessarily be overcome. States were encountering 
significant difficulties with respect to poverty and unemployment under such a 
mandate as well as rapidly rising inequality (Holt and Greenwood, 2012). These 
problems paved the way for change in political leadership, with more liberal and 
socially sympathetic politics coming to the fore in many countries; in the USA the 
Democrat Bill Clinton came to power, and similarly in the UK the reformed New 
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Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair began rapidly gaining in popularity 
(King and Wickham-Jones, 1999; Peck and Theodore, 2001). Indeed New Labour 
promised to make acute changes to the way the state system was run. In their 1997 
election manifesto they continued to advocate the primacy of the market akin to 
many of their Conservative predecessors, however coupled to this they believed in 
the state taking a proactive stance in tackling many of the social problems still 
present in the UK through their ‘New Deal’ programme (Daguerre, 2004). Whilst this 
might give a false impression of another significant policy shift back towards 
traditional Keynesian welfarism, it can more accurately be defined as a re-articulation 
of the welfare-to-work rhetoric which had come before, but simply in a more 
palatable, socially democratic, form. 
 
2.2.4  Moving towards a ‘Third Way’ 
The 1990’s saw the emergence of what has become known as a ‘Third Way’ political 
discourse (Fyfe, 2005). This agenda is somewhat more difficult to define than the 
systems that had come before it, taking the middle ground between socialism and 
unfettered market capitalism (Powell, 2000). Third Way politics advocated the 
important role of the market and private enterprise in securing prosperity and strong 
economic growth in the long term, whilst simultaneously accepting that the state had 
a pivotal role to play in the emancipation both of its citizens and the economy itself 
(Fuller and Geddes, 2008). What was coming to fruition was a shift towards the 
public and private sectors working together (essentially a balance between the state 
and the market), along with a renegotiation of the relationship between the state and 
its citizens, with both parties being deemed as having responsibility for ensuring an 
adequate standard of living (Powell, 2000). However, the underlying workfare 
mandate remained as strong as ever, with welfare-to-work initiatives such as the 
New Deal becoming the focal point of many policy agendas, and: 
“represented policy transfer from the USA in terms of the diagnosis of the 
problem (welfare dependency), the proposed solution (the centrality of paid 
work) and the instruments (a greater use of compulsion)” (Daguerre, 2004:47; 
see also Peck, 2002; Peck and Theodore, 2001). 
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Thus whilst the underlying politics of workfare have continued to play a pivotal role in 
socio-economic prerogatives worldwide into the 21st Century, in the UK there has in 
fact been a slight change in direction of such discourses since the first election 
victory of New Labour under Tony Blair in 1997. The New Labour Government 
concurred that workfare policies were the right way forward (Daguerre, 2004; Finn, 
2003) as a method of bolstering competitiveness and flexibility in an ever more 
globalising economy, as well as acting as an effective tool for tackling the growing 
welfare bill being faced by the state and the deep-rooted ‘politics of expectation’ 
(Raco, 2009). Labour believed that there would always be a ‘hard core’ of individuals 
who simply had no desire or interest in relinquishing their purportedly generous state 
benefit packages by becoming actively subsumed into the workforce in line with the 
government’s full employment rhetoric (Finn, 2000). It was also noted that many of 
the people classed as long term unemployed or reliant on incapacity benefits (IB) 
were those who had left school with only a low level of educational attainment, 
mainly women and young people, or tended to be older workers who had been made 
redundant from low skilled, blue collar jobs or where the skills had become 
redundant in both the modern UK, and a quicksilver global, economy (Fothergill and 
Wilson, 2007). 
Blair’s Labour Governments were keen to escape from a period of ‘serial policy 
failure’ seen under previous Conservative Governments, by rearticulating the existing 
framework of workfare into an alternative semblance (Peck, 2010:107). They set 
about utilising alternative human capital development (HCD) programmes, which 
specifically targeted those in society lacking the skills and confidence to re-enter the 
labour market in anything other than the most menial and insecure jobs. 
Policymakers identified many of those claiming benefits as lacking the relevant skills 
to obtain meaningful and long term employment into the future, and so encouraged 
behavioural change through educational ‘up skilling’, work placements and 
increasing the intensity of job search programmes (Fletcher, 2011), as well as 
‘incentive reinforcement’ measures (Bonoli, 2010:449). All these aspects were 
incorporated within several New Deal initiatives established after Labour’s 1997 
election victory. The following years saw a gradual decline in the unemployment 
headcount in the UK, however, it remains debatable as to how much of this reduction 
could be afforded to these New Labour initiatives, and how much was actually the 
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result of a continually expanding and strengthening UK economy. What is for sure, 
the two did so hand in hand. Furthermore, as Sunley et al. (2001) have conveyed, 
the New Deal programmes have paradoxically been least effective in inner city areas 
where youth unemployment has been most pronounced (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
This is important because it is where their policies are sold as being most influential. 
The dirigiste Labour Government also made considerable alterations to the state 
benefits system. They enforced an initiative to ‘make work pay’, and attached a high 
level of conditionality to the acquisition of benefits. Of particular significance was 
their focus on reducing child poverty (Piachaud, 2012) and the implementation of 
working tax credits, but Labour also gave greater attention to the needs of those 
classed as long term sick or disabled through welfare-to-work support under the 
‘New Deal for Disabled People.’ This encompassed a number of elements such as 
Disability Living Allowance, Incapacity Benefit and tax credits designed to support 
sick and disabled people with their specific needs as well as helping them overcome 
the societal barriers to work where possible (Drake, 2000). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of youth unemployment in the UK in 1997 compared with 2000 (Source: Sunley et al., 2001:489-490).  
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Figure 2: Youth unemployment in the worst affected towns and cities in the UK (Source: Sunley et al., 2001:488). 
 
Overall, the Labour Government maintained the neoliberal practices embedded in 
the UK in the 1980’s, but also reinvigorated certain aspects of the Keynesian Welfare 
State system. Consequentially, whilst acknowledging that some members of society 
were completely dependent on the state for welfare provision, and as such had a 
rightful entitlement as citizens to expect it, they also promoted the need to reduce the 
welfare bill through a number of ‘time-limited welfare’ policies (Peck and Theodore, 
2001) combining both active employability and job search assistance with effective 
authoritarian benefit sanctioning. In short, Labour claimed this was a successful 
modern ‘carrot and stick’, but one which offered ‘Opportunity for All’ (Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP), 1999). Yet, Blair himself came to acknowledge this was 
a crucial part of his ‘Third Way’ policy discourse (Foley and Martin, 2000), but which 
required significant expansion of state enterprises in order to act as a socio-
economic ‘manager’ of both public and private initiatives. 
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Throughout the Labour Governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, heavy 
emphasis was placed on the “rights and responsibilities” rhetoric of citizens (Peck 
and Theodore, 2001). Labour prioritised the reduction of child poverty, and despite a 
distinct lack of progress in this area in the latter years of their administration, this 
issue continually had a large swathe of policy measures dedicated to it (Dickens, 
2011). What is crucial to understand is that the Labour Government recognised the 
inherent complexity of the socio-economic situation in the UK. They acknowledged 
that the private and public domains were far from self-contained entities, instead 
being interlinked and therefore heavily dependent on each other for their own 
efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless this system has served primarily to erode 
the entitlements of citizens to basic social welfare provision (Ross, 2009). This is 
very much akin to the policies advocated by earlier Conservative Governments of the 
1980’s and early 1990’s, although in a slightly altered form. The result is that the 
state has an underlying conditional responsibility to its citizens to ensure that this 
minimum level of amenity is provided for all citizens, no matter what their race, class, 
age or gender; however the overriding responsibility in the long term now rests with 
individuals and their behavioural tendencies (Fuller and Geddes, 2008). 
Under New Labour, citizens saw the expansion of welfare provision not experienced 
since the era of post war rebuilding, including a vastly increased and specialised 
array of social benefits, strong minimum wage regulations and more generous 
unemployment protection amongst others. Stalwart New Labour advocate Anthony 
Giddens (2007:18) identifies similarly important principles, suggesting that: 
“as far as possible, the object of social policy should be to clear away the 
barriers that prevent those at the bottom from being able to realise their 
aspirations.” 
Furthermore, Labour were determined that their government would not slip into the 
trap of once again increasing public debt to unsustainable levels, but would instead 
utilise the revenues generated from a more attractive and competitive economic 
arena and overhauled tax system that they had created in the UK as the platform for 
increased expenditure on the social needs of the state and its citizens (Smith, 2010). 
However, hindsight tells us that such an agenda would be far more difficult to 
achieve in practice. Thus it could be said that whilst economic growth was a focal 
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part of the agenda, Labour’s policies prevented such economic processes from 
subsuming the social goals which they firmly believed in. Even though Labour failed 
to prevent further accentuation of the wealth gap overall in the UK - because while 
the poor did become wealthier, those already rich increased their wealth at a far 
greater rate - they did succeed in reducing the rate of increase in inequality within 
society to some extent (Fuller and Geddes, 2008). As can be seen in Figure 3, this 
acclaimed success can most certainly be attributed to the massive influx of welfare 
spending implemented during this time, sustained and underpinned by economic 
growth, and can clearly be seen as a reversal of fortunes for many in society 
compared with their plights under the auspices of previous Conservative 
Governments as well as the subsequent policies of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition, and hence a more rigid form of neoliberal workfare. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of total spend by the Labour Government on welfare provision in 1997, 2004 and 2007, compared to 
Coalition spending in 2012 (Source: UK Public Spending, 2012a). 
 
It became abundantly clear however, that state governments had been spending 
beyond their means when the financial crash of 2008-9, and subsequent economic 
crisis, exposed what had appeared manageable government debts to crisis-ridden 
international markets (Smith, 2010) (see Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6). In the UK, 
the keystone mandate of the Labour Government had been to reduce poverty and 
inequality through increased public spending, financed by imposing a greater burden 
on big business, financial transactions and upon those in the upper ranks of society 
(Peck and Theodore, 2001) through a regime of ‘tax and spend’ (Pearce, 2011:8). 
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levels of spending, concomitantly containing inflation and interest rates at low levels. 
Despite this promise, it became clear that such improvements were increasingly 
being financed by heightened borrowing, as greater levels of spending than could be 
obtained via tax returns and economic expansion were required in order to sustain 
continual socio-economic improvements over time, along with the burgeoning cost of 
welfare (Smith, 2010), and the apparently over-generous benefits system which had 
accompanied their ‘make work pay’ rhetoric.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: UK public sector debt, 1900-2011 (Source: UK Public Spending, 2012b). 
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Figure 5: Increase in total UK Government debt, 2005-2015 (Source: UK Public Spending, 2012c). 
 
 
Figure 6: Change in public sector debt under New Labour (Source: The Market Oracle, 2011). 
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increasingly difficult to service the Welfare State. It is this which has subsequently 
indicated that welfare provision in the UK might be entering an entirely new phase, 
although at the present it would be difficult to insinuate whether this is likely to be 
something entirely new, or more a reinvention of the neoliberal system which has 
come before it. 
The policy discourse brought in by New Labour came to a shuddering halt in 2008 
with the onset of the financial crisis and recession which were to violently shake the 
economic core of the global economy. As Peck et al. (2010) have recently argued, 
the neoliberal model had demised into a self-perpetuated crisis. The global system of 
market capitalism which had existed from the late 1970s up until the onset of the 
2008 crisis was inherently built upon financial speculation and a state of “endemic 
‘myopia’” (Altvater, 2009:77) – the assumption that prices, and henceforth profits, 
would continue to steadily rise. In the words of Gordon Brown, the then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, at the 2000 Labour Party Conference, this would “protect hard 
working families from a return to boom and bust” (British Political Speech, 2015b). 
This is a similar argument to that of Keynesianism and its placing of a ‘floor’ in the 
level of popular consumption. This expectation accumulated over several years and 
ran into the early years of the 21st Century, eventually creating a significant ‘credit 
bubble’ (Peck et al., 2009:98) in housing markets. This occurred in many countries 
around the world, but most pertinently, in the USA, where there was a surge in 
subprime mortgage lending overseen by Federal organisations Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae (Aalbers, 2008, 2009; French et al., 2009; Martin, 2011). 
This boom phenomenon became precariously intertwined with the global banking 
system, creating a scenario whereby any faltering of this continual growth would 
cause serious implications worldwide. When this occurred in 2008 as a result of the 
widespread global exposure of multinational banks to the frailties of the market 
through high risk investment activities (Derudder et al., 2011), it became rapidly 
apparent that both public and private enterprises within national states had been 
forged on undeniably strained foundations. This was linked to over-borrowing and 
under-consumption, and subsequently both national governments and their debts 
became exposed to this crisis of global finance (Cripps et al., 2011). In the USA, the 
bursting of the housing bubble led to financial meltdown within the banking sector, 
and the crisis quickly spread worldwide, with the UK being one of the heaviest 
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casualties, primarily due to its structural coherence with the USA compared with the 
rest of Europe (Peck et al., 2010). The banking sector bore the brunt of the impact 
due to generally misguided lending strategies; indeed, the £133bn bail-out noted 
previously was required to nationalise one bank (Northern Rock) and to recapitalise 
certain others deemed too big to fail (such as HBOS, Lloyds TSB and Royal Bank of 
Scotland). 
But how were such events pivotal to the tendential existence of the British Welfare 
State? The crisis in the banking sector in 2008 and 2009 began to have equally 
negative connotations for the global economy as a whole. It led to a global recession 
lasting from Q1 2008 until Q4 of 2009, although Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
the UK did not return to pre-crisis levels until Q3 of 2013 (ONS, 2014a), and at the 
time of writing, this period of economic downturn appears not to have been fully 
resurrected (particularly in the Eurozone). The outcome was an increasingly 
disgruntled citizenry, with public opinion, especially following the entry of the UK into 
recession in 2009 and the negative socio-economic connotations which this entailed 
- growing level of household debt and inflation on everyday essentials such as food 
and fuel (Smith, 2010). As a result, New Labour and their policy ideologies were 
voted out in the 2010 General Election. However, the outcome was far from clear-
cut, in that no party won a clear majority or had a clear mandate for the future. A 
coalition was formed between the Conservatives (36% of the vote) and Liberal 
Democrats (23% of the vote) coming together in the national interest to form a 
government capable of resurrecting the UK economy from a prolonged period of 
downturn and addressing its debt problems (Sawyer, 2011). Henceforth, the 
question that immediately arises from this is that given the tumultuous economic 
climate we have found ourselves in, and therefore the new austerity politics which 
have accompanied it, is a qualitatively different welfare discourse being formulated 
compared to the Thatcher and Blair/Brown years? Alternatively, is it simply another 
phase of workfare which has been reorganised to survive the current economic 
climate, and therefore is showing little or no signs of difference from what has 
preceded it? 
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2.3  The ‘age of austerity’ – qualitative shift or more of the same? 
Given the changes to government policies over the post-war decades, this final 
section will deal with the scenario we have been dealt with at the present. As can be 
noted from earlier parts of this chapter, the state has, in hindsight, undergone a 
specific and somewhat ordered shift to the present situation (although this has 
undoubtedly appeared more or less chaotic and sporadic at particular times), with a 
gradual transformation in policy rhetoric, an almost complete overhaul of the nature 
of state welfare provision, and inversion of relationship between the state and its 
citizens in many policy spheres (e.g. payment for higher education in England). The 
issue that now arises is that with characteristics somewhat akin to previous political-
economic crises and the conditions immediately thereafter (rising employment, 
economic restructuring etc.) (Davies and Pill, 2011), is what we are currently viewing 
a renewal of what went before, or is it something entirely new, that is, a distinct 
qualitative shift which we might come increasingly to recognise as a ‘post-neoliberal’ 
era (Peck et al., 2010)? 
Most capitalist states are now characterised by their convergence towards the 
intensification of workfare, and their allegiance to an austerity drive and fiscal 
rationality in the face of mounting public sector debt (Chung and Thewissen, 2011). 
Within this rhetoric, there are a number of agendas coming to the forefront of policy 
discourse, such as welfare-to-work, work first, and make work pay (Newman, 2011). 
Similarly, the responsibility for welfare once again appears to have shifted to the 
right, with the state washing its hands of all but the most basic forms of welfare 
provision, and instead forcing reliance upon the private and voluntary sectors as 
citizens are left to fend for themselves to a large extent (Patrick, 2012). Despite 
these facets, it is still unclear as to whether this “responsibilisation” of welfare under 
austerity (Howell, 2015:69) represents a definitive break in policy from the past, or 
whether it is a continuation of existing policy rhetoric in a different guise. 
With this in mind, the 2010 UK General Election became pivotal, not least for the 
future structure of state welfare, with both the major parties advocating cuts to 
welfare as part of wider reductions in public expenditure to lower the budget deficit. 
However whilst Labour promoted measured cuts to welfare as part of a “socially 
democratic response”, the Conservatives pressed for rapid, deep cuts to welfare to 
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negate the deficit as quickly as possible, with much greater emphasis on people 
helping themselves through the ‘Big Society’ (Smith, 2010:818). Indeed the 
Conservative General Election Manifesto (Conservative Party, 2010:3) stated that: 
“Gordon Brown’s debt, waste and taxes have wrecked the economy and 
threaten to kill the recovery. A Conservative Government will take action now 
to cut the deficit, stop Labour’s jobs tax, help keep mortgage rates low and get 
the economy moving. We will create a new economic model built on 
investment and savings, not borrowing and debt.” 
In contrast the Labour General Election Manifesto (Labour Party, 2010:12) stated 
that: 
“Our job guarantees will put an end to long-term unemployment and a life on 
benefits. No one fit for work should be abandoned to a life on benefit, so all 
those who can work will be required to do so. At the same time, we believe 
that people should be able to earn enough to live and be better off than on 
welfare.” 
A new Coalition Government between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 
came to fruition, although without a clear political consensus and the power weighted 
firmly towards the Conservative side of the Coalition. Despite their distinct ideological 
differences, there was a mutual agreement to undertake a process of fairly severe 
fiscal austerity implementation as a method of rapidly reducing the burden of national 
debt. Whilst such a course of action might well be expected from the Conservatives, 
it was a far reach from the traditional values of fairness and equality of welfare for 
the poorest people in society advocated by the Liberal Democrats in their election 
campaign. In fact their General Election Manifesto economic plan stated that: 
“We set out in this manifesto a clear plan to bring the budget back under 
control, being honest about the tough choices we need to take. We will cut 
taxes for millions of working people and pensioners, paid for by making sure 
that the very wealthy pay their fair share and that polluting air travel is 
properly taxed. We will boost the state pension by immediately restoring the 
link with earnings growth.” (Liberal Democrats, 2010:13) 
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Such wholesale changes to government policy strategy, including policies around 
student fees, the Spare Room Subsidy (Bedroom Tax), the Work Programme and 
Universal Credit, have been seen as the key to rapidly reducing the imposing budget 
deficit which the Coalition Government, and the social economy as a whole became 
shackled with from the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Right from the outset the Coalition were committed to a £70 billion reduction in 
spending by 2016/17 and the lowering of public expenditure to 40% of GDP by 
2031/32 (Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), 2010). With decisive cuts needing to be 
carried out to address the largest level of public debt experienced since the end of 
the Second World War (see Figure 5), resulting from increased public sector 
spending by earlier Labour administrations as well as the effects of the global 
financial crisis, the large public sector therefore became the Coalition’s obvious 
target of fiscal rationalisation. Their policies centred on the idea of a smart public 
sector with limited state interference. Such a policy agenda entailed both the 
implementation of stringent cut backs on state welfare and services, coupled with a 
marked increase in reliance on private sector and voluntary (third) sector investment 
and provision (Johnston et al., 2011). 
By implementing measures such as the new universal system of credit - a 
replacement for several different forms of benefit now all moulded into one, simpler 
form of provision - tax reforms, as well as altering employment criteria and the 
requirements of individual citizens (Jones, 2012), the government has now created a 
situation where many believe the state has effectively become unshackled from the 
responsibility of holistic provision for its citizens (Patrick, 2012). The government has 
ensured that there is now a far greater emphasis on the role of the individual and 
voluntary organisations to facilitate self-help initiatives and henceforth achieve the 
minimum standard of living which should be expected in the UK today (Hamnett, 
2010; Milbourne and Cushman, 2014). 
Whilst such a mandate for citizens to work and earn welfare entitlements was in 
place under the various New Deal initiatives of the Labour Governments, this latest 
Coalition social contract has gone further by enforcing even more strict conditionality 
upon welfare-to-work in post-crisis welfare provision. Indeed, whilst the policy 
processes which have come to fruition under the auspices of fiscal austerity offer a 
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far more radical approach to state welfare provision (including the ongoing process 
of reclassifying those on disability benefits and restructuring working tax credits and 
child benefits such that fewer families are entitled to them), it is not entirely novel in 
its methodology. Instead, in most respects it appears to be simply an extension and 
amalgamation of a number of policy processes which were already in place before 
the Coalition came to power (Hobsbawm, 2011), although this has yet to be proven 
conclusively through research findings. 
In addition, this continued neoliberalisation has formed the basis for the 
government’s key agenda to ‘make work pay.’ The Coalition has continued with the 
‘roll out’ phase of Neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002:396) which formed the basis 
to ‘make work pay’ for their Labour predecessors, and they firmly believe that paid 
employment is the most effective way out of poverty (Daguerre and Etherington, 
2009), even for those participating in the labour market at the lowest tier. However, 
unlike the previous government, they did not agree with the idea of supplementing 
income with extensive benefits to essentially fabricate a decent standard of living for 
all at great expense to the public purse. What they proposed was a complete 
overhaul of the existing benefits system. This has entailed a range of ‘smart’ 
governance measures, most pertinently concerning the reduction of unemployment 
benefits to an absolute minimum level and the implementation of a universal system 
of credit for those in regular work (Hamnett, 2010). Furthermore, it has entailed 
greater means-testing of welfare provision such that the number of people able to 
claim support such as disability benefits is being reduced as far as possible (Weston, 
2012), whilst those who earn more than the national average wage face losing 
benefits payment altogether. 
The Coalition Government’s Welfare Reform Act 2012 (HM Government, 2012) 
outlined by Work and Pension’s Secretary Iain Duncan-Smith forms the basis of this 
post-crisis workfare agenda. The result has been a drive to push those on the fringes 
of employment back into the jobs market through a systematic retrenchment of social 
protection such as unemployment benefits (Fletcher, 2011), yet at a time when 
unemployment itself has continued to rise (Hamnett, 2010). Whilst bolstering the 
strength of the Coalition’s austerity discourse, such a system has served to further 
discriminate against those most in need - low-skilled women, single parents, young 
people emerging into the jobs market from a poor educational background, the 
36 
 
elderly and ethnic minorities occupying temporary and uncertain working 
arrangements on the fringes of society (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014). It is these groups 
who tend to inhabit the most precarious employment conditions and so are the first 
to be pressurised by welfare reforms (Standing, 2011; Theodore and Peck, 2013), 
which in turn has been accentuated by the government’s more stringent form of 
welfare-to-work socio-economic policies (Harkness and Evans, 2011). 
In effect the government has attempted to extinguish the notion of a “dependency 
culture” (Lindsay and Houston, 2011:704) as well as distinctive behavioural patterns 
associated with work avoidance, which they insist are indignantly omnipotent in 
British society (Houston and Lindsay, 2010). What is important to garner from this, is 
that this signifies something qualitatively different occurring. The idea of a 
dependency culture is nothing new, but the underpinning socio-economic factors for 
tackling this issue have been markedly different for the Conservative-Liberal 
Coalition in a period of economic contraction compared with the earlier period of 
economic prosperity available to their Labour predecessors. Is this then a sign of a 
new era? There has clearly been a qualitative change albeit along the lines of 
renewing existing policy processes of welfare-to-work and making work pay, and this 
presents a gap in the knowledge base which needs to be investigated in depth. 
Furthermore, the Coalition Government appears to have acknowledged that the 
‘intelligent solutions’ they have been enforcing are not to counteract an entirely new 
phenomenon, but are instead to prevent the further deepening of a cultural rhetoric 
which has become entrenched within both the social and economic nodes of the 
daily lives of UK citizens. Henceforth, cutting benefits would act as the incentive to 
push people currently unemployed back into the system from which they had 
previously become excluded, as well as retaining those already there through a 
“work first” welfare policy mantra (McCollum, 2012:225). In a similar fashion, the 
government has also begun to cut back tax credits, and in particular have begun to 
implicate the “squeezed middle” of UK society (Pearce, 2011:4). However, as can be 
seen in Figure 7, contrary to government suggestions that working tax credits have 
been over-generous to such groups, juxtaposed with the spiralling cost of living, it 
has been contended that their welfare-to-work agenda is pushing more and more 
people into relative and even absolute poverty (Pearce, 2011; see also the JRF 
‘Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion Report, 2011’). 
37 
 
 
Chapter Theme Indicator 
Change in 
last 
decade 
Change 
in last 5 
years 
Low 
Income 
Low 
income 
Child poverty Better 
No 
change 
Pensioner poverty Better Better 
Working-age 
adults with 
children poverty 
rate 
No change Worse 
Working-age 
adults without 
children poverty 
rate 
Worse Worse 
Proportion of 
population in deep 
poverty (40% of 
median) 
Worse Worse 
Inequality 
Income inequality 
50:10 
Worse Worse 
Benefits 
and tax 
credits 
Children needing 
tax credits to 
escape low 
income 
Worse Worse 
Number of people 
receiving out-of-
work benefits 
Worse Worse 
Spending 
and debt 
Material 
deprivation 
  Worse 
 
Figure 7: Change in poverty indicators over time in the UK up to 2010 (Source: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011). 
 
The government has maintained that their renewed workfarist vision to ‘make work 
pay’ is the optimal way forward for the UK in order to preserve its competitiveness 
and flexibility within the global economy, even if this means harming its social base 
as well as undergoing “a dramatic change in the relationship of the state with its 
citizens” in the short term (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012:107). Whilst this could be 
portrayed as a significant break from political rhetoric of the past, it is more likely that 
it is simply a re-orientation of the status quo, although in a far more stringent and 
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relentless form. The sum implication of these processes has been that the latest 
recession has seen a return to the scenario of extreme measures of austerity, which 
has not just had dire connotations for those on the bottom rung of the socio-
economic ladder (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a), but has also served to polarise the labour 
market further as people are pushed back towards the poverty threshold (Andre et 
al., 2013). 
With no end to the economic turmoil in sight, and with many states still treading the 
line of an obscure and precarious existence, the Coalition has argued, with 
significant support from classic neoliberal institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF, that the sooner the debt and public expenditure is scaled back to more 
manageable levels the better (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Changes to UK public welfare spending between 1998 and 2015 (Source: UK Public Spending, 2012d). 
 
This of course lends itself to more radical forms of austerity-driven action by the 
government to sustain and even increase the pace of deficit reduction, along with 
growing levels of resistance and co-operation at the local scale in response to 
increasingly harsh conditions of austerity-driven retrenchment. Consequently, this 
idea has been repeatedly challenged by the then Labour Shadow Chancellor Ed 
Balls and others who vehemently oppose the austerity measures prescribed labelling 
them as being made “too fast and too deep and putting jobs and growth at risk” to be 
able to secure a successful economic recovery (Labour Party, 2012a:n.p). In 
essence, this once again opens up the potential for alternative forms of socio-
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economic management, however a consistent break in the policy discourse from the 
long-standing neoliberal agenda seems a distant prospect. As Peck (2010:107) has 
noted: 
“the right and left hands of the neoliberal state may have an increasingly tight 
grip around the fraught regulatory problems of flex-labour and social 
marginality, but this should not be mistaken for an effective grasp.” 
This opens up the possibility for alternative strategies which are now necessary to 
mitigate the adverse social and economic effects of austerity and welfare-to-work 
(Trade Union Congress (TUC), 2011). Yet, when coupled with rising rates of 
unemployment – particularly among the young, women, ethnic minorities and other 
vulnerable groups - and stagnating economic recovery, it remains to be seen how far 
such a radical programme of welfare reforms can be rolled out in the UK (Lowndes 
and Pratchett, 2012), as well as how long such sacrifice lacking tangible rewards will 
be tolerated by its citizens. Many now argue that “the modern British 
Government…has lost sight of the need to promote the general welfare” (Taylor, 
2010:29). Thus whilst the overall effects of the austerity measures implemented by 
the 2010-2015 Coalition Government are decidedly uncertain, it is clear that these 
new geographies of welfare which have begun to take shape in the UK and beyond 
(considering it will also have uneven geographies “the strategic role of cities in the 
contemporary remaking of political-economic space” (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002:349)) will entail alterations to the socio-economic landscape of British society. 
This looks set to create a nascent breed of state enterprise, which is not entirely 
new, but which has taken an alternative approach to “new risks” posed to established 
forms of workfare rhetoric (Johnston et al., 2011:350). 
At this pivotal time in the political and socio-economic reinvigoration of the UK state, 
it is clear that the Coalition Government has attempted to radically shift the state 
towards a situation involving minimal state intervention in both social and economic 
processes (Hills, 2011), a contrast from what had been constructed under 
successive Labour administrations. However, such a move can be problematised 
when considering just how these changes correlate to the processes and material 
effects which have gone before them. In this regard, it is necessary to understand 
whether the UK has experienced a break from the rhetoric of the political and socio-
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economic past as a result of the 2008-9 financial crisis and the subsequent 
recession that followed. In effect, the crux of this argument surrounds the notion of 
whether or not the underlying neoliberal agenda which has been present in the UK 
for a number of decades, subtly or otherwise, remains (Johnston et al., 2011). 
Instead, is there now something completely new, a definitive alternative, a 
breakaway to a new political consensus which would therefore entail a volatile set of 
changes for the future? 
Whilst some have debated vehemently that the 2008-9 crisis was a turning point for 
welfare geographies not just in the UK, but on a global scale, others have been more 
sceptical. There is little doubt that the recent past has “produced a sudden change in 
the economic policy of the UK” (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009:1041), and has thrown 
up a degree of volatility in the system which has inherently disrupted the status quo 
of neoliberal capitalist thought which was evident right up to the end of the last 
Labour Government under Gordon Brown. Gone are the days of generous 
government benefits being complemented by a strong and prosperous economic 
outlook, instead being replaced by what appears to be a nascent form of workfare 
which goes far beyond the relatively muted Labour initiatives to ‘make work pay’ and 
encourage people back into the employment locus (Clegg, 2010). However, it 
remains debatable as to whether this is really a new and untested form of capitalism, 
a move towards the next stage of the agenda (Taylor-Gooby, 2015), or so-called 
‘post-Neoliberalism’ (Peck et al., 2009:95). 
This view has been somewhat contested, with a number of academics indicating that 
the process of neoliberalisation which took place in the 1970’s and 1980’s has now 
become such a core aspect of our society that has far from been removed (Hills, 
2011). Indeed, they instead assert that what is now being experienced by both the 
state and its citizens alike is a kind of contingent Neoliberalism; one which appears 
markedly different from everything which has preceded it, but that pertinently is 
emerging much the same except for its incorporation of several nuances which have 
come about as a direct result of the 2008-9 crisis, and subsequently attempts to seek 
out suitable solutions to it (King et al., 2012). In simple terms, the neoliberal capitalist 
state, and its association to market capitalism more widely, have merely adapted to 
the current socio-economic climate with distinct geographical contextual applications 
(Peck, 2011), with the prospect of “renewing prosperity through austerity” (Kitson et 
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al., 2011:293). If one is to take a closer look at the Coalition policy processes which 
have been implemented into their austerity rhetoric, then it is clear that with the 
primary focus having been on lessening the role of the state through spending cuts 
and satisfying global financial markets, the neoliberal agenda is alive and well. The 
state essentially remains subservient to the whims of the market and so continues to 
be manipulated accordingly, particularly concerning how it is being reconstructed at 
the local scale (Peck, 2011). 
Thus, there are a number of arguments which can be made for and against the post-
2008 era being marked by a qualitative shift in welfare policy. In terms of the 
arguments indicating that such a shift has occurred, the first opinion concerns the 
2008-9 crisis as a major turning point both spatially and temporally, similar to those 
seen in 1973 and in the 1920s-30s (King et al., 2012). The next argument is for a 
‘new politics of austerity’ (MacLeavy, 2011; Dellepiane and Hardiman, 2012) 
emerging from the policy rhetoric as a way of tackling the post-2008 impacts of the 
crisis. It has also been implied that a qualitative shift has taken place due to the new 
political landscape coming to the fore in the UK, with the presence of the first hung 
parliament since the Welfare State, and a Coalition Government whose mandate has 
been concerned with generating prosperity through austerity (Smith, 2010; Lowndes 
and Pratchett, 2012). This is expected to continue following the 2015 General 
Election, where all the major parties are committed to further austerity measures to 
some degree. In addition there has also been an academic element to the argument 
for a qualitative shift, in that the integrity of the neoliberal discourse in the wake of 
the financial crisis has been challenged, with suggestions of a phase of ‘zombie 
Neoliberalism’ (Peck, 2010) or even going as far as announcing the arrival of post-
Neoliberalism (Peck et al., 2010). A final argument suggests that the situation now is 
different from what has come before it, because unlike in past crises, it has not only 
been the poorest and most vulnerable who have been adversely effected by welfare 
austerity, but also has increasingly impinged upon the middle classes and those in 
sustained full time employment (MacLeavy, 2011). 
On the other hand, a number of arguments have been made against this idea of a 
qualitative shift post-2008. The first is that much of the policy rhetoric now in place 
surrounds welfare-to-work and making work pay, ideas which were present before 
the 2008-9 financial crisis, and which have simply been extended and tightened by 
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the Coalition Government since 2010 (Newman, 2011). The second point made is 
that the crisis was initially created by an over reliance on an economy buttressed by 
the financial services sector. Despite attempts by the Coalition Government to move 
away from this dependency towards an economy built more on flexible specialisation 
rather than a simple Fordist manufacturing model, the UK economy is still dominated 
by the financial services industry and the City of London (Sentance et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, with the Welfare State now retrenched beyond recognition as a product 
of the Coalition’s austerity-driven workfarism, it has been portrayed as more of a 
deepening of the grip of Neoliberalism upon the state and its proletariat citizenship 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2012a; Peck, 2013); it could be seen as more of a step back to what 
was experienced in the 1970’s and 1980’s rather than an altogether new entity to be 
challenged or embraced. Indeed, as Peck (2010:106) has noted, “Neoliberalism has 
demonstrated remarkable shape-shifting capacities.” This is no more evident than 
with the relationship the UK state and its government now has with their citizens; 
there appears to be a trend of an unprecedented shift in the dimensions of the rights 
versus responsibilities rhetoric, primarily towards a strict and uncompromising 
emphasis on the responsibilities of citizens, and the remaining elements of the public 
sector “doing more with less” (Levine and Scorsone, 2011:212).  
Due to the debatably stubborn myopia of the Coalition Government to restore parity 
with the global financial system, UK citizens, and specifically the middle classes and 
those languishing at the base of the socio-economic ladder have been forced to take 
the majority of the impact in terms of the cuts which have already been made as well 
as those yet to be implemented, as a result of the state’s relentless pursuit of 
welfare-to-work and a minimalistic public sector (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). And it is in 
cities where significant concentrations of such groups reside, and hence where this 
severe form of neoliberal workfare is now beginning to apply itself in potentially 
devastating fashion. Peck (2010:109) has thus implied that whilst Neoliberalism as 
we know it might well be fading, it is still very much a dominant concept but has now 
'entered its zombie phase', and which could in fact come to be understood as a 
fourth way of socio-economic rhetoric. By this, he suggests that despite the 
tremendous upheaval which has been experienced not only globally but also at 
national and local scales over the past few years, the core philosophy of neoliberal 
capitalism inherently remains. It may have taken a renewed and remodelled form, 
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but the primacy of the market remains as the underlying discourse which dictates 
both social and economic policy processes implemented by the state. In addition, it 
remains questionable whether a realistic break in policy discourse is achievable, at 
least in the short term, and with it, if it is truly possible for alternative forms of policy 
discourse to be formulated (Brenner et al., 2010). 
In spite of this, there are many who advocate the adoption of a post-neoliberal shift 
in discourse. Peck (2010) for instance, asks whether academics should now be 
thinking about neoliberal tendencies solely in the past tense. Others contend that the 
turmoil that resulted from the financial crisis and recession combined penetrated 
deep into the heart of political rhetoric, particularly of advanced western economies 
(Brenner et al., 2010). As a consequence, there has been an obvious and definitive 
step change in the policy rhetoric asserted, not just by the UK Government, but 
within and surrounding the entire global socio-economic system. They argue that the 
era of Neoliberalism as we had come to understand it has been thwarted forever, 
being replaced by a system more wary and frugal as a testament to the immense 
events which have been before. Henceforth, Peck et al. (2009) ask whether 
Neoliberalism could be entering a crisis which is inherently self-inflicted? The 
outcome, they surmise, is a nascent form of post-Neoliberalism (ibid) whereby 
financial actors are far more prudent and regulated, where balancing financial 
obligations has become paramount, and where the state is frequently attempting to 
rationalise its role as a guarantor for its citizens. 
With regards to the UK, the Coalition Government has gone to great lengths to 
ensure that the deficit amassed following the crisis has been reduced as far as 
possible by the end of the parliamentary period in 2015, and to do this has been 
proactive in minimalising the state (Chung and Thewissen, 2011); pervasive welfare 
rights are most definitely a thing of the past in the UK, despite its welfare system 
remaining the envy of many others worldwide. Instead they are being replaced by a 
form of workfare which advocates the importance of making work pay, and citizen 
responsibility to help themselves to fill the void left by an ailing public sector; what 
Crouch (2009) has described as 'privatised Keynesianism’ (cited in Tomlinson, 
2011:656). Yet even as the Coalition has sought to rationalise the state and crucially 
the public sector, the Welfare State is most definitely a stalwart of British society 
owing to its socio-political and economic ties to the cultural expectations of citizens, 
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particularly for those who are vulnerable to change such as the young and elderly. 
Vis et al. (2011:350) convey that, “the Welfare State is simply not that easily toppled.” 
This can be observed in Figure 9 and Figure 10, which show how welfare spending 
remains relatively stable despite Coalition Government attempts to reduce it as far 
as possible since 2010. However, as Hobsbawm (2011) has pointed out, the specific 
facets of these new geographies of austerity mean that future contingent realities 
which will be experienced are decidedly uncertain. 
 
Figure 9: Welfare spending in the UK since 2001 (Source: Economics Help, 2013a). 
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Figure 10: Breakdown of welfare spending in the UK for 2011-12 (Source: Guardian, 2013a). 
 
Whilst this chapter has elucidated on the emergence of the Welfare State and the 
challenges, difficulties and transformations it has undergone since its inception, it 
should be remembered that it is easy in hindsight to take an analytical approach to 
recognising and describing significant shifts in policy and its impacts. In this way, it is 
much more difficult to achieve this at the time such a potential shift is occurring, and 
so the need for detailed research in the period that follows is imperative to improving 
our understanding of the processes taking place and the significance they have had 
on the actions and responses of those experiencing the fallout on a day to day basis. 
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Chapter 3: (Re)new(ed) Geographies of Welfare – A Scalar 
Perspective of Provision in the Era of Austerity 
 
Chapter 2 identified the need to investigate the nature of the changes taking place 
with regards to welfare provision under the auspices of a new austerity politics. This 
chapter is concerned with how such changes are being played out at different 
scales. It is important to decipher whether or not the traits of this supposed 
qualitative shift are apparent, not just nationally, but also locally, regionally and 
internationally. For this reason the chapter will be structured by focusing on changes 
to the welfare agenda at the international (Section 3.1), national (3.2), regional (3.3) 
and local (3.4) scales. Again the aim of this chapter is to identify whether the 
changes taking place at different scales within the global economy are part of a 
definitive qualitative shift, or a consolidation of the neoliberal regime which has been 
in place since the 1970’s. 
 
3.1  Austerity and shifting geographies of welfare provision on the 
international stage 
Clearly the financial crisis of 2008-9 and the prolonged economic downturn which 
followed have had immense social, economic and political implications worldwide. It 
is not just individual national economies or sectors which have faltered, but the entire 
global economy has suffered as a result of the events of the past few years. 
However, far from being a geographically homogenous crisis, certain parts of the 
international community have been more adversely affected than others (Brenner et 
al., 2010) primarily due to their linkages into the global financial system and failing 
consumer demand (Altvater, 2009). In addition to this, as states have experienced 
economic problems such as rising debt and unemployment, most have been faced 
with increased social inequality. 
Welfare provision has been a major issue whereby in most cases governments look 
to cut public spending and implement relatively severe austerity measures in order to 
try and achieve fiscal rationality (Groot et al., 2011; Baggesen Klitgaard and 
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Elmelund-Praestekaer, 2013). The result has been a distinct rise in inequality and 
poverty for vulnerable sections of society, with many states now experiencing a shift 
away from socially democratic politics towards more hardened free-market capitalist 
tendencies than has been the case in recent years. Whilst the crisis itself has 
created a “perfect storm” of conditions which have spelled inherent problems for 
public and private enterprise (Kitson et al., 2011:289) - as rising commodity prices 
and rising public and private sector debt - it has been through the ensuing economic 
slump that the most nefarious implications for both states and their citizens around 
the world have been realised. Exposure was particularly heightened in those 
locations most inherently intertwined in the global financial system, namely the USA 
and the EU. For the first time in its history, the US Government allowed one of its 
major multinational banks, Lehman Brothers, to be liquidated at the height of the 
crisis. Thereafter the US authorities did save certain institutions deemed to be of 
“‘systemic’ importance” (Callinicos, 2012:66), although the sacrifice of Lehman 
Brothers set in motion a chain of events which would strike panic into investors 
worldwide (Swedberg, 2010, in Lounsbury and Hirsch).  
In addition, throughout the recessionary period and beyond, the US has advocated 
strong and positive fiscal stimulation packages, becoming acutely aware that their 
ailing economy was not in a condition to be robust enough by itself to ward off the 
negative effects of a global recession (US Government, 2012a). Whilst at first the 
government appeared to be pumping money into the economy to no avail, it has 
since been portrayed as a sensible move as the US economy has once again begun 
to grow and recover (US Federal Reserve, 2013). Furthermore, whilst the US system 
is essentially one of private enterprise and minimal state interference in the everyday 
lives of the majority of its citizens, the condition of welfare provision has somewhat 
failed to keep pace with recovery of the economy. In fact, most US citizens are 
overwhelmingly expected to provide the basic necessities of welfare for themselves, 
either through direct application, or through payment by private means, such as with 
healthcare. Coupled to this has been the sustained downturn in economic conditions, 
not just in the USA, but worldwide, causing many US citizens to become 
un(der)employed in recent years. Unemployment peaked in October 2009 at 10% 
(US Government, 2012b), and this has hit living standards and quality of life hard 
(Economic Policy Institute, 2012). This is especially so for the middle classes and the 
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US is in a very similar situation to a great many other advanced economies in this 
regard (Crotty, 2012). 
Many of these individuals and families lost their jobs in the early weeks and months 
of 2009 as the US economy became heavily exposed to the crisis. However, aside 
from the most basic unemployment benefits and other forms of bottom line 
emergency support, the well-established welfare discourse has remained very much 
the same, although has become even stricter as the government has begun to 
strengthen welfare-to-work and conditionality within the system (ibid). The result has 
been that whilst for a long time most middle class people in society could afford the 
basic necessities, such as food, healthcare and mortgage payments, the loss of any 
meaningful employment coupled to the absolute inability to obtain any sort of 
replacement income left many in a dire situation. This was also the case for those in 
low paid work. As already noted, the dilemma has since started to improve; the fiscal 
stimulus measures rapidly implemented by the Obama administration have 
successively dragged the state back towards economic growth, if not in an 
immensely sluggish manner, and so are by no means free of the debilitating 
quandaries of the global economy (Krugman, 2012). However, they have made 
significant progress on the road to recovery compared to other states, and this has 
been echoed by a stabilising privatised welfare rhetoric. What is more, the role of the 
voluntary and third sectors should not be overlooked in this circumstance. 
Of far greater concern at the current time are the plights of economies in Europe, 
and significantly the future trajectory of the Eurozone. Kitson et al. (2011:294) have 
noted that: 
“the breadth and depth of the recession has meant that the largest negative 
effects have been felt in the economically weaker regions of the European 
Union.” 
These include Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. In addition, because 
Europe is both heavily linked into the system of global capitalism, as well as 
exporting a vast amount of its produce internally to other EU countries as well as to 
the enormous economy in the USA, this economic region is one of the key locations 
where the full effects of the global economic downturn have been experienced. As a 
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consequence, this entails intricate and unique implications for the condition of 
welfare provision in each of the countries concerned. 
Due to its linkages with both the USA and the wider global economy, the EU became 
rapidly exposed to the crisis conditions afforded by the 2008-9 financial crisis and the 
subsequent recession. In a similar way to the US, a number of European economies 
suffered extensive crashes in their property markets, which was rapidly followed by 
many large banks and even some states falling into serious financial difficulty. The 
extent of the problem became further pronounced when it became clear that even in 
countries not entirely exposed to such problems, these institutions found themselves 
drawn in to the fray as many of their larger banks had vast sums of capital invested 
in economies now seemingly doomed to failure. 
In the UK several local authorities, including Kent, Norfolk and Wiltshire, had 
£1.05bn invested in Icelandic banks (Local Government Association (LGA), 2011). 
Whilst there was an initial consensus in some countries, such as the UK and 
Germany, that fiscal stimulus was immediately required to bolster their faltering 
economic fortunes, coupled with massive bailouts of their multinational banks 
(Chung and Thewissen, 2011), other smaller economies were unable to undertake 
such measures and so bore the full force of economic retrenchment, slipping into a 
deep recession. Whilst many stakeholders still agree these measures were 
necessary at the time, the subsequent processes of fiscal rationalisation and 
austerity which have arisen as a result continue to be vociferously contested. Greece 
was the first country to make it apparent that they were struggling to survive and 
meet with debt repayments. The outcome was a dramatic loss of confidence of 
lenders and financial markets around the world in the sustainability of the Greek 
economy, resulting in their national economy falling to the brink of collapse, only to 
be saved by the intervention of the IMF and European Central Bank. Today, with a 
new leader elected in on an anti-austerity mandate, Greece is seeking to renegotiate 
the very terms of its bailout. 
Despite this, the implications of such a bail-out have been far from straight forward 
from the Greek perspective. The Greek Government has been held to a stringent set 
of terms and conditions for receipt of crucial financial aid, the primary component of 
which has been an all-encompassing austerity drive as part of a radical process of 
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structural readjustment (European Central Bank, 2010). From the perspective of 
state welfare, this has meant that virtually all public provision has been stripped back 
to the most marginal levels possible, leading to a large proportion of the Greek 
citizenry suffering immense hardship. This has been coupled to significant political 
instability such that the state has essentially become obsolete in many capacities 
except debt repayment. Whilst Greece is undoubtedly the worst case scenario, 
particularly in the more advanced economies of global capitalism, it is far from a 
unique case; in Europe alone Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain are also suffering 
immense financial constraints around the traditionally socially democratic EU 
(European Commission, 2015). Indeed the effects are so acute they have the 
potential to challenge the very viability of the union altogether (Rodrik, 2012). Thus 
as Laszlo Andor, EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
noted: 
“the European recovery that we are experiencing is therefore very fragile and 
very uneven. We can call it fragile, because, for instance, we just saw the UK 
economy going back to contraction in the last quarter of 2010. And we have to 
call it uneven, since the relative dynamism of the core region is not 
automatically pulling out the peripheries out of the recession. Countries that 
came close to sovereign default in the recent period had no other choice but 
applying austerity and thus their recovery is delayed, and they still continue to 
lose jobs” (Andor, quoted in European Union, 2011:n.p). 
Furthermore, the pattern of austerity measures implemented in such countries, 
particularly those in the EU, have been relatively similar when accounting for policies 
being tailored to suit the requirements of individual cases. In return for substantial 
financial aid, governments have conditionally slashed most if not all aspects of public 
sector expenditure. As Drahokoupil and Myant (2009:3) have conveyed: 
“the forms of recovery can be presented as different solutions to the problem 
of financing the persistent current account deficits.” 
In the most severe cases, even the most sacrosanct components of the public sector 
have been left to the mercy of fiscal rationalisation measures, with welfare provision 
often experiencing brutal cuts which inevitably have had a direct knock-on effect on 
the state, its citizens, and the relationship between them (Levine and Scorsone, 
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2011). For many, this is coupled to sustained high levels of unemployment, leaving 
them struggling to survive and experiencing immense hardships, falling living 
standards, and for some even a return to poverty. IMF Managing Director, Christine 
Lagarde, therefore suggests that policy must achieve a balance between spending 
and cuts to sustain global economic recovery: 
“Clearly, today’s global economy needs higher and better growth. Getting 
there depends on choosing the right combination of policies. With the wrong 
choices, we risk losing a decade of growth, a generation of young people, and 
an opportunity to put the global economy on a secure footing” (Lagarde, 
quoted in IMF, 2012:n.p). 
Policy has been driven towards accommodating the primacy of the free market in 
order to boost both the national and supranational economies of Europe. However, 
this has frequently been achieved at the expense of many precariously positioned 
people in these countries, and it has been middle class society as well as those 
poorer members of society who have had to bear the brunt of the changes. 
Inevitably, the wealthiest in society, have frequently appeared most insulated from 
the cutbacks, even though they were the ones initially hit. Whilst it is an inevitable 
consequence that we might expect the poorest members of society to suffer the 
greatest hardships in times of austerity, it is less familiar for the middle classes of 
society to be affected (Taylor, 2010). Despite this, 
“one can argue whether the responses to the crisis were well-designed in 
particular countries, but there seems to be broad consensus that rapid 
international action on a number of fronts was necessary to prevent a 1930s-
like depression with unforeseen global economic consequences” (World 
Bank, 2014:n.p). 
This is conspicuous due to many European states traditionally following a more 
socially democratic economic pathway compared to their American counterparts, 
and so frequently having well established systems for citizen support from the state. 
The current economic predicament has meant that many citizens have come to 
adopt this relationship, and somewhat dependency, as the norm, has been 
challenged. In short, more citizens have been left to deal with a greater burden of 
welfare provision as the state searches for ever more radical ways of restricting 
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expenditure and its long term commitment to rationalised public welfare provision 
(Newman, 2011). 
Furthermore, this latest welfare requirement has had a number of distinct effects, 
with many policies being met with aggression and significant resistance as the more 
reprehensible aspects of neoliberal workfare come to the fore. Again this can be 
viewed in countries such as Spain and Greece, which have for many years enjoyed 
strong economic growth, and which have been complemented by substantial gains in 
social spending and henceforth the living standards and quality of life of their 
citizens. It is no wonder that such seemingly radical austerity policies are being met 
with substantial hostility and resistance (Ladi and Tsarouhas, 2014). 
Another concern internationally is that even though certain countries have not been 
adversely affected by the global economic slump to the same extent as others, their 
interconnectedness and their exposure to the “contagion” of the crisis has seen them 
adopt similar, yet less stringent austerity measures, but which still convey significant 
impingements upon the Welfare State (Tomlinson, 2011:655). A good example of 
this has been the UK. Whilst the UK has not suffered anywhere the extent of 
hardships seen in other European countries, its precarious exposure to the global 
economy has led the Coalition Government to implement a swathe of policy rhetoric 
aimed at promoting austerity. This has denoted a concerted attempt to ward off the 
negative connotations of the global economic downturn (Smith, 2010). This case is 
extremely pertinent given the distinctive scalar and temporal effects which have 
arisen in the UK due to the role of London and the wider South East region in both 
the global economy as well as their overwhelming economic and social effects on 
the UK itself. 
In more recent years, the outlook is generally improving for advanced economies 
around the world, however growth is starting to slow down in oil-exporting countries 
with falling market prices since mid-2014. However, for the most part, lower oil prices 
have supported the global economic recovery. The Chinese economy has also 
begun to slow down. Despite the economic recovery, there is still a great deal of 
apprehension and uncertainty over whether another recession is on the horizon. 
Growth has also been supported by low interest rates, however care must be 
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paramount, because raising them at the wrong time could have disastrous 
consequences for the global economy. 
Thus whilst many states were left to deal with spiralling debts and bloated public 
sectors, many have now stabilised and are well on the road to recovery back to pre-
crisis levels of employment and GDP in an increasingly strong, yet fragile, global 
economy. However, there is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the 
Eurozone and in particular the fate of Greece. Where many of the other states in the 
EU which suffered extensively from the fallout of the financial crisis, such as Italy, 
Portugal, Ireland, and to an extent, the UK, have all taken action to avert economic 
collapse, Greece has continued on its perilous trajectory towards socio-economic 
ruin (European Commission, 2015). Having been continually bailed out by the EU, 
IMF and World Bank since 2009, and having implemented extremely severe 
austerity measures in return, the Greek economy has slipped ever closer to a point 
of no return. Furthermore, the election of a new anti-austerity government in January 
2015 has created additional tensions as the Greek Government attempt to have a 
large proportion of their debt written off at the same time as relenting on prescribed 
austerity measures, and overseeing record high levels of unemployment. 
The outcome is that Greece is now back in recession and is worryingly close to 
defaulting on its €240 billion bail-out (EU, 2012), €65 billion of which has been 
provided by Europe’s largest economy, Germany, and there is a chance that it will 
have to leave the Eurozone altogether (Spiegel, 2015). This raises important 
questions about the future structure and viability of the Eurozone, and the lessons 
which have been learned for the economic security of the region and its constituent 
states. 
Aside from the EU and the Eurozone, the UK is still in a precarious economic 
position 6 years on from the financial crisis. Whilst the recovery in the UK has been 
relatively strong in the last few years (the strongest of any country in the EU and the 
strongest in the G7 for 2014) (IFS, 2015c), growth is only projected to be 2.5% in 
2015 (Bank of England, 2015a), and is showing clear signs of slowing down. Indeed, 
despite its problems, growth in the Eurozone was higher than in the UK in the first 
quarter of 2015 (ONS, 2015). A defining feature of the UK economy at present, and 
one which has concerned a significant number of commentators, is the distinctive 
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underlying weakness in the UK economy. It is true that there are record numbers of 
people in work, but this trend is largely down to the growth in self-employment and 
low paid, zero hours contract work. This is reflected in the recovery of household 
disposable income, which since 2009 has grown only by 1.4%, a figure much lower 
than the period following any of the recessions of the 1970’s, 80’s or 90’s, and paints 
a picture of continued high dependency on the Welfare State to prop up meagre 
household income (New Policy Institute, 2015). Concerns have also been raised 
about the persisting imbalances in the UK economy; the large balance of payments 
deficit, low corporate investment despite the Coalition Government’s best efforts to 
encourage it, and high deficits in household spending compared with income. It is 
contended that these factors are the result of the Coalition Government cutting too 
far and too fast in the early part of their tenure, which has therefore eroded the 
foundation for building a sustainable recovery (New Policy Institute, ibid). 
These issues inevitably raise a number of important questions of the research. The 
frailties being experienced by Greece and the wider Eurozone have the potential for 
serious knock on consequences for the UK economy through a reliance on exports 
to the region, and a subsequent impact on the growth of British business and the 
availability of work. There might also be corollaries for the ability of the government 
to tackle the deficit over the next parliament if the fears of economic slowdown 
become a reality. Clearly since the financial crisis of 2008-9 the UK Government 
mandate has been one of austerity and a smaller state through welfare-to-work 
policies, however its ability to reduce the budget deficit could be curtailed if the 
availability of work remains limited and dependency on state welfare remains high. In 
addition, the case of Greece is becoming increasingly pertinent in the discourse of 
anti-austerity, because the country appears to have reached a significant tipping 
point whereby austerity measures have failed to stabilise its failing economy and its 
citizens have suffered significant pain for absolutely no gains. In fact their situation 
has got progressively worse over time, with high unemployment and extremely 
limited state welfare provision. These issues immediately raise questions about the 
epistemological groundings of austerity as a solution to crisis conditions. Is austerity 
really the answer? Is welfare-to-work really the best course of action moving forward 
in the long term? Will the UK eventually go the same way as Greece in that 
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continued austerity may push citizens to a tipping point whereby they are no longer 
willing to accept a government whose policies are based on an austerity mandate? 
The situations being observed at present in both the UK and the wider Eurozone 
also raises questions about a continued agenda to make work pay. Whilst nothing 
new, the Coalition Government has placed significant emphasis on this agenda 
throughout their tenure. Whilst levels of employment in the UK are increasing, the 
fact that this has predominantly been through low paid work which is either 
temporary or part time, as well as the increase in zero hours contract employment 
bring the idea that people are better off in work than on benefits into disrepute. 
Furthermore, the lack of well-paid, full time work coming to fruition is still a significant 
problem both for the government and its citizens, because dependency is being 
maintained through in-work benefits. In this way therefore a number of questions can 
be raised, such as is the lack of disposable income for citizens affecting economic 
growth in the UK and the ability of the government to tackle the budget deficit? Is 
austerity beginning to have a negative impact on growth? Does the fact that the 
benefits of making work pay are not as clear cut as the government has proposed 
mean that there could be negative connotations for welfare-to-work and the 
willingness of citizens to take poorly paid work over benefits and thereby lower their 
dependency on state welfare support? How will the lack of sustainable employment 
opportunities affect the government agenda for a smaller state? Will stuttering 
economic growth and low income of citizens mean the state has to start increasing 
welfare support once again? Or could it mean even more difficult conditions for 
citizens, employers and third sector organisations in trying to implement and respond 
to welfare-to-work if work does not pay in the short or long term? 
 
3.2 Austerity and welfare provision in the UK 
In the UK, austerity measures have been widely accepted by the advocates of 
neoliberal workfare as being necessary in order to restore economic stability within 
the global economy (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). However, this has often been at 
the expense of the taxpayers of individual states, and has been particularly heavily 
felt in the UK due to a tradition of “ontological security” (Giddens, 1990, cited in 
Raco, 2009:438). Ontological security has not only been institutionalised through the 
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Welfare State, but also due to the inherent linkages of the City of London and the 
wider South East region with the global capitalist system (Hodson and Mabbett, 
2009). Nevertheless, research has shown the UK has been hit hard by the financial 
crisis. This is not only those precariously treading the poverty line, but also those 
previously determined as part of the middle classes have been feeling the bite of the 
cut backs, especially when such withdrawals are coupled with a marked increase in 
the level of unemployment. In relation to this, the Labour leader of the past 5 years, 
Ed Miliband, noted: “I don’t think people are going to trust … this government to help 
the squeezed middle” (Labour Party, 2012b:n.p). 
The result of this growing fiscal ‘squeeze’ on middle income earners has been a 
marked reduction in the proportion of the UK population occupying this social class 
(MacLeavy, 2011). Perhaps more worryingly, this lapse back into poverty has seen a 
significant fall in the standard of living and quality of life for many of these people, 
and with no end to the austere socio-economic conditions in the UK immediately 
forthcoming, this situation looks set to get worse (Pearce, 2011). Subsequently then, 
it can be presupposed that the recession and the accompanying cuts to welfare 
provision as part of the wider reform process have led to a rapidly polarising social 
hierarchy and with it rising inequality (Dorling, 2012). The key point here then is that 
within a modern capitalist society inequality is somewhat inevitable (Taylor, 2010). 
However, how much of this inequality is acceptable and tolerable for UK citizens? 
The Coalition Government has begun implementing a set of “socially constructed” 
policy theories (Peck and Theodore, 2010:169) or “‘fast-policy’ regimes” (Peck, 
2011:773) which have imposed strict conditionality on minimalist state provision, 
along with a large emphasis on privatisation and the role of the individual and the 
family unit in making up for the gap left by the withdrawal of public sector enterprise. 
This is what Prime Minister Cameron has described as the ‘Big Society’ (British 
Political Speech, 2015c:n.p). It was supposed that the government would be able to 
rapidly reduce public spending, by not only reducing high cost aspects of welfare 
provision such as the benefits system, but also by making mass redundancies over 
their parliamentary term in office. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) expects 
this to reach at least 700,000 by 2017 (OBR, 2011). However, several academics 
and politicians, including the Labour opposition leader Ed Miliband, have queried the 
government’s imperative to create a smaller and smarter state through a long-
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established neoliberal policy agenda to “starve the beast” (Angelini, 2011:5). It is 
argued that without effective public provision, their vision for strong private growth 
and hence economic recovery will be in jeopardy (Murphy, 2011). The government’s 
pursuit of economic rationalisation has imposed heavily negative connotations on the 
citizens of the UK, with the insistence that short-term suffering is necessary for long 
term gains, however the integrity of this argument has been openly questioned, no 
more so than by Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls at the Labour Party Conference in 
Manchester in October 2012: 
“We warned two years ago that drastic spending cuts and early tax rises – too 
far, too fast – risked choking off the recovery and making a difficult situation 
worse. We warned that you either learn the lessons of history or you repeat 
the mistakes of history. Because this is the fundamental truth: if more people 
are on the dole, not paying taxes, you can’t get the deficit down. If businesses 
are going bust, not hiring new workers, you can’t get the deficit down. If the 
economy’s not growing, you can’t get the deficit down” (Ed Balls, 2012:n.p).  
The Coalition Government introduced a number of key policies to help implement 
and embed the austerity rhetoric being advocated. The first is the new system of 
Universal Credit. This is a radical overhaul of the benefits system in the UK, where 
all current benefit claims are accumulated into a single, monthly benefit payment 
aimed at simplifying the system such that it is much easier for citizens to work out 
what they are entitled to, as well as clarifying much more clearly the advantages of 
being in work compared to benefits i.e. making work pay (DWP, 2010a). 
Another major policy has been the introduction of the Work Programme. This is an 
initiative of the Coalition Government brought in to band all employment support 
services together with the aim of providing personalised support for helping people 
back towards the labour market. It involves subcontracting the process away from 
the role of the state to private agencies which provide employment and skills support 
on a payment-by-results basis (DWP, 2012). The aim is to move as many people as 
possible off long term sickness benefits and Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) into 
sustained, full time employment, and in so doing reduce the cost of welfare to the 
state. 
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Furthermore, there has been significant rhetoric around the Spare Room Subsidy, or 
Bedroom Tax. This is a new tax which has been imposed by the Coalition 
Government onto welfare recipients who live in a council house which is under-
occupied. Under the new legislation, people are asked to either move into 
accommodation of a more suitable size, or pay a spare room subsidy in order to 
remain in their current property (DWP, 2013a). The aim of this policy is to free up 
housing availability for those who need it, as well as to make recipients more 
responsible for their own welfare, and in turn, encourage those hit with the Bedroom 
Tax to find work in order to afford to stay in their current residence. 
A final key policy initiative has been the reforms to disability support, including 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) and the implementation of Personal Independence 
Payments (PIP). PIP has been implemented as a benefit to replace DLA for those 
aged 16-64, and is paid to citizens based on how a disability affects their day to day 
living and not on a particular condition per se. Claimants are required to undergo a 
Work Capability Assessment (WCA) to determine whether they are entitled to 
disability benefits or whether they should be moved onto a work related benefit such 
as Employment Support Allowance (ESA) or Jobseekers Allowance. Claimants are 
regularly reassessed to ensure that they are being provided with the correct support 
that they need (DWP, 2015a). 
So far, the policies put in place appear to be progressing as expected by many. 
Public debt has begun to be reduced, but with a further £16.7bn (7%) in benefit cuts 
expected for 2015-16 (see Figure 11), the majority of UK citizens in receipt of welfare 
are set to suffer continually worse socio-economic conditions (IFS, 2015a; see also 
‘The £10bn question: where could the Chancellor find welfare cuts?’ (IFS, 2012a)). 
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Figure 11: Projected progress of UK benefit cuts from 2010-2017 (Source: Full Fact, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 12: Government budget deficit reduction projections to 2020 (Source: Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), 2015). 
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overcome under the auspices of a period of relative economic prosperity under New 
Labour and their extensive welfare spending programmes since 1997 (Piachaud, 
2012). 
Whilst Chancellor George Osborne in his Emergency Budget speech in June 2010 
promised that although many would suffer significant hardships in the short term as 
part of a responsible plan for economic restructuring and deficit reduction, in the long 
run they would benefit from a stronger, more flexible and most importantly highly 
competitive UK economy providing benefits for all (HM Treasury, 2010). Despite 
these promises, five years later the socio-economic outlook for many UK citizens has 
become decidedly worse, and certainly looks set to deteriorate even further in the 
coming months and years, particularly in those regions least insulated from the 
effects of the policies being put in place. Opponents have become increasingly vocal 
in denouncing the policies of the Coalition Government for just this reason; the 
economist Paul Krugman (2012) argues that as long as such policies are so 
doggedly sustained, the UK economic recovery will be harmed more substantially 
over time. This has become even more pertinent given the Chancellor’s statement in 
2012 that the deficit had barely been touched to that point in the parliament for a 
variety of reasons, and therefore the deficit reduction forecast has been revised back 
beyond the 2015 General Election to 2018-19 (OBR, 2015). This can be seen in 
Figure 12. 
Such an oversight is likely to have serious consequences for those lower down the 
social hierarchy in UK society, not least through extending and deepening the reach 
of social issues bound to neoliberalised austerity. Henceforth, this is subsequently 
likely to create conditions fostering increased levels of resistance and indignation to 
government policies, as well as requiring new forms of co-operation and 
collaboration to overcome impending socio-economic quandaries (Shaw, 2012). This 
is especially the case in those regions containing a high proportion of vulnerable 
people, which for a long period have relied on the wide base of public welfare 
provision made available to them (Ross, 2009). 
In light of this, many in society are quickly beginning to question the Coalition’s 
strategy. The economist Joseph Stiglitz (2012, cited in The Telegraph, 2012a) 
contends that whilst cutting the deficit is inherently necessary, the meagre gains 
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being witnessed are simply not worth the pain and suffering many members of 
society are now being put through to achieve them. Instead, many academics are 
now calling for a complete rethink of the policy processes and strategies being 
undertaken, which focus more on cutting the debt in a sustainable manner, 
simultaneously controlling levels of debt at a manageable level whilst still providing 
the necessary aspects of welfare for citizens who desperately require it in times of 
austerity (Krugman, 2012). This is particularly the case for many young people and 
women (MacLeavy, 2011) as well as other vulnerable and minority groups, who are 
frequently the members of society who occupy the precarious forms of employment 
most at risk from these policy agendas (Harkness and Evans, 2011). In fact as can 
be seen in Figure 13 and Figure 14, data shows that the UK is one of the worst 
examples of the youth unemployment problem in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).  
 
 
Figure 13: Rate of youth unemployment in the UK compared with the EU and other OECD countries (Source: The Work 
Foundation, 2013). 
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Figure 14: Youth unemployment in the OECD 2007-2012 (Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2012). 
 
Standing (2011:35) even goes as far as to assert that “workfare is the wrong policy 
response to the insecurities and inequalities of a flexible market economy.” If this is 
the case then a key goal for future research is to critically evaluate the merits of a 
truly workfare-oriented system which we seem to be heading towards, especially 
giving consideration to the Coalition’s renewed welfare-to-work agenda which has 
appeared at the fore of their economic policy discourse. Furthermore, the Coalition 
prerogative for “creating resilience through generalised private-sector dynamism” 
(Raco and Street, 2011:14) has been weak, tepid and spatially uneven to say the 
least. 
For many this is not at all surprising given the policy agenda that the Coalition 
Government has continually ratified. As Peck et al. (2009:102) note, “the crisis 
managers seem effectively to be flying blind.” Thus the planned roll-back of core 
public sector initiatives coupled to the advocacy of neoliberal workfare does not 
automatically equate to positive returns from private capitalism (Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) North, 2011; Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). The issue of inequality 
once again has come to the fore. Figure 15 and Figure 16 annunciate that certain 
areas of the UK, particularly London and the South East, have remained relatively 
insulated from the public sector cuts so far. In addition this region contains fewer 
susceptible citizens when compared with the northern areas of England, Scotland 
and Wales. 
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Rank City 
Median 
IMD 
2010 
Score 
 
Rank City 
Median 
IMD 2010 
Score 
      
 
      
1 Aldershot 7.4 
 
29 London 21.4 
2 Reading 8.1 
 
30 Leicester 21.9 
3 York 9.5 
 
31 Plymouth 22 
4 
Milton 
Keynes 
10.9 
 
32 Huddersfield  22.6 
5 Crawley 11.9 
 
33 Wigan 22.8 
6 Swindon 12.1 
 
34 Wakefield 22.8 
7 Warrington 12.1 
 
35 Sheffield 23.4 
8 Southend 13.6 
 
36 Luton 23.5 
9 Norwich 13.9 
 
37 Coventry 23.8 
10 Cambridge 14.3 
 
38 Grimsby 24.2 
11 Bristol 15 
 
39 Manchester 24.5 
12 Worthing 15.9 
 
40 Middlesbrough 24.9 
13 Portsmouth 16.3 
 
41 Peterborough 25 
14 Preston 16.5 
 
42 Mansfield 25.5 
15 Bournemouth 16.5 
 
43 Newcastle 25.7 
16 Gloucester 17.5 
 
44 Barnsley 26 
17 Southampton 18.4 
 
45 Stoke 27.2 
18 Birkenhead 18.6 
 
46 Doncaster 27.3 
19 Oxford 18.6 
 
47 Sunderland 28 
20 Northampton 18.8 
 
48 Bradford 28.6 
21 Chatham 19.1 
 
49 Bolton 28.6 
22 Blackpool 20.3 
 
50 Burnley 29.8 
23 Leeds 20.6 
 
51 Rochdale 31 
24 Nottingham 20.7 
 
52 Birmingham 31.5 
25 Ipswich 20.9 
 
53 Hastings 31.9 
26 Derby 21 
 
54 Blackburn 34.8 
27 Telford 21.1 
 
55 Hull 36.5 
28 Brighton 21.3 
 
56 Liverpool 39.1 
 
Figure 15: Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 for England (Source: Centre for Cities, 2011a). 
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Figure 16: Differences in reliance on public sector employment by constituency in 2010 (Source: Guardian, 2010). 
 
This was noted at the time by Alexandra Jones, Chief Executive of the Centre for 
Cities, who states how: 
“during 2011, the UK cities most dependent on the public sector, and which 
have seen slower economic growth over the last decade, will find it more 
difficult to rebalance towards the private sector” (quoted in Centre for Cities, 
2011b:n.p). 
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Indeed, the government push to make people take any job at any wage has become 
self-defeating in that many lack the opportunity to upgrade their skill set and so will 
inevitably become stuck in a cycle of low end employment for much of their working 
lives (McCollum, 2012). There are also potentially synonymous connotations for 
youth employment, especially for those who lack essential skills and educational 
attainment (Allen and Ainley, 2012). This leads to the creation of areas exhibiting 
high levels of poverty and isolation, the result being that “some people…suffer 
disproportionately more than others” (Kitson et al., 2011:294). This has been steadily 
accompanied by a growing amount of resistance and contestation to the policies 
implemented by the Coalition, which are likely to introduce even greater 
impingements onto the citizenry of the UK (Shaw, 2012). 
Clearly then, the geographical inequality which seems to be coming to fruition as a 
result of the Coalition’s renewed welfare-to-work agenda has had a profound effect 
on the reconstitution of state welfare provision (Wright, 2012), particularly relating to 
aspects of employment and poverty, which can be seen in Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
Of even greater concern, was that unemployment rose sharply to 2.68 million (8.4%) 
by November 2011, the highest number of unemployed people in the UK since 1995, 
and including 729,000 unemployed young people (20.7%), which is the highest it has 
ever been (ONS, 2012a). This was the result of continued economic contraction and 
stagnation in the 3 years after the crisis. This in turn led to a growing number of 
people seeking benefits and job search assistance in order to rapidly re-enter the 
labour market. Furthermore, government policy now incorporates an underlying 
‘carrot and stick’ agenda to return people to the labour market through their Work 
Programme (Vis et al., 2011). This includes incentives such as working tax credits 
(even though this provision diminished from 2011 as an additional form of spending 
cut), but more pertinently advocates the utilisation of sanctions such as removal of 
benefits for non-compliance, unemployment benefits provided at below the rate of 
minimum wage, and stricter assessment criteria for attainment of disability and long 
term sick payments amongst others (Scruggs et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
encouragement to take any job at any wage results in many low skilled earners 
finding that the benefits of being in regular work are minimal at best, if existent at all, 
once the influence of welfare withdrawal is taken into account. In essence, some 
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may actually become worse off when in work compared to being unemployed exactly 
for this reason (Brewer et al., 2012). 
Another point to consider is that because the economy is still in a precarious 
situation, many low skilled workers found it difficult to hold down a long term job, and 
particularly difficult when trying to find a job with good prospects for the future. In this 
regard, they can become isolated in a vicious “‘low, no pay’ cycle of moving from 
unemployment into low-paid work and back again” (Newman, 2011:96). This 
scenario has been particularly exacerbated by public sector job losses, which has 
had negative connotations in those cities where public sector employment has 
played an extensive role in maintaining welfare provision at a relatively high level 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002; IPPR North, 2010). Because of this, many of the 
jobless may subsequently choose not to search for meaningful employment because 
in the long run the implications of losing out on benefit payments may in fact leave 
them worse off through attempting to enter the jobs market (Newman, 2011). It is 
therefore unsurprising that areas stripped of their established public sector economic 
base appear to be the worst off as a result of the government’s austerity measures, 
and subsequently are the locations where unemployment remains stubbornly high 
and where those with limited employability become most exposed. As Goulden 
(2010:1) conveys, “entering work cannot provide a sustainable route out of poverty if 
job security, low pay and lack of progression are not also addressed.” 
Thus it can be contended that the recession has led to what can be described as an 
ideological shift by politicians in the UK (Fuller and Geddes, 2008), with an inherent 
drive towards validating their apparently post-neoliberal and progressively harsher 
forms of workfare, and as such impressing upon the population the need to take 
greater responsibility for their own welfare requirements (Trudeau and Cope, 2003). 
The implications of such policies will be vastly contingent and widespread, taking on 
different scalar arrangements and having different meanings and effects for different 
people in different places all over the UK, but especially so in the North of England 
(IPPR North, 2014). However, the nature of this socio-political shift as an ideological 
break from the past remains problematic, with the situation being far from clear-cut 
as to whether the established neoliberal traits of the UK state have actually been 
relinquished (Peck, 2010). 
68 
 
Set against a background of the rising costs of everyday living coupled with shrinking 
or stagnated incomes (Davis et al., 2014), the future for many citizens at least in the 
near-term sense looks increasingly bleak, and more heavily regulated welfare 
provision will serve only to trap many in a desperate cycle of poverty and survival 
tactics for years to come. Indeed, Patrick (2012:5) has noted that: 
“simplistic and unsustainable binary distinctions between ‘work’ and 
‘dependency’ only serve to further exclude and demoralise those already on 
the margins of social exclusions.” 
Furthermore, the thought that citizens will voluntarily take up the strain, and 
moreover the expense, of this “institutional isomorphism” (Peck, 2011:789) of welfare 
provision due to the general unwillingness of the private sector and the purported 
incapacity of the state to do so themselves is very much a misplaced conception. It is 
far more likely that in times of austerity, individuals and families will simply do without 
rather than accept additional unnecessary strain on their time and finances, which 
will subsequently entail a direct need to replace such provision by state enterprises 
over time through new private forms of co-operation and altruism within communities 
and across a variety of heterogeneous spaces (Hills, 2011). 
 
3.3 The plight of welfare provision and austerity politics - the case of North 
West England 
The 2008-9 financial crisis and the ensuing economic downturn had tumultuous 
implications upon society and at the regional level in particular. To this end a number 
of academics have begun to focus upon the specific effects of the crisis on economic 
structures and processes at a variety of different scales. The challenge is that whilst 
it is relatively easy to denote the changes taking place at the national scale, it is 
equally important to convey the implications of this process at other scales, such as 
the regional and local levels. 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 convey that the increasing gap in wealth and inequality 
between those at the top and bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy has created a 
dichotomy between spaces of absolute deprivation - such as for many working class 
families in the North West of England - and those of relative wealth - predominantly 
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the South East of England. Although there are pockets of wealth dispersed within 
regions, the regional scale is important for revealing the geographical intensification 
of social and economic polarisation. 
 
 
Figure 17: Overall risk of poverty in England by constituency in 2012 (Source: Guardian, 2012). 
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Figure 18: Differing risk of poverty between constituencies of North West England (Source: Guardian, 2012). 
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Local Authority 
Greatest 
Overall 
Risk 
    
Middlesbrough 1 
Kingston upon Hull 2 
Knowsley 3 
Hartlepool 4 
Liverpool 5 
Nottingham 6 
Manchester 7 
Stoke on Trent 8 
South Tyneside 9 
Blackburn with 
Darwen 
10 
Leicester 11 
Wolverhampton 12 
Halton 13 
Sunderland 14 
Mansfield 15 
Rochdale 16 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
17 
St Helens 18 
Birmingham 19 
Burnley 20 
Redcar and 
Cleveland 
21 
North East 
Lincolnshire 
22 
Gateshead 23 
Stockton-on-Tees 24 
Sandwell 25 
Salford 26 
 
Figure 19: Local authorities whose constituents are at greatest risk of poverty in England (Source: Guardian, 2012). 
 
Research by the Centre for Cities (2011a) indicates that the recession has caused 
increased levels of deprivation, with a number of locations in the North West 
particularly implicated (see Figure 17). Similarly, Taylor-Gooby and Stoker (2011:8) 
rightly point out: 
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“however the spending programme is analysed, the cuts in services for poorer 
groups substantially outweigh the impact of tax increases on higher-rate 
taxpayers.” 
In particular, attention has begun to be enshrined upon the changing nature of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens, and within this guise, specifically 
surmising the effects of changes to welfare provision on those more vulnerable 
members of society attributed to the discourse to ‘make work pay’ (Standing, 2011; 
Theodore and Peck, 2013).  Specifically this refers to those who no longer have the 
guarantee of a minimum standard of living as the bargaining position of the average 
citizen has been radically altered, resulting in many now having to find new and 
novel methods of ensuring access to particular welfare facilities previously enacted 
by the state. This has principally been an issue in the North West where much of the 
welfare provision available had been propped up by an extensive public sector 
framework (see Figure 19). 
Whilst the crisis impinged upon the functioning of virtually every local, regional, 
national and supranational institution entrenched within the globalised economic 
system (Peck et al., 2012), the implications unsurprisingly vary considerably across 
time and space. Indeed, the North West of England appears significantly 
compromised by a cornucopia of intrinsic effects resulting from economic stagnation 
and a move towards a politics of more extreme workfarism and austerity (Centre for 
Cities, 2011c). This region will serve as an appropriate surrogate for analysing the 
connotations of the Coalition’s welfare-to-work agenda. Recent data indicates that of 
the fifty boroughs in England most at risk of their citizens being in poverty, fifteen 
reside in the North West, and many lie within inner city areas (Guardian, 2012) (see 
Figures 19, 20 and 21). And if one takes a closer inspection of the specifics, it also 
becomes clear that women, the young and families will be most vulnerable to such 
difficulties (MacLeavy, 2011). Furthermore, it is these distinct locations which are 
becoming significant as spaces of contestation and resilience in the face of a 
developing austerity agenda in the UK (Shaw, 2012). However, these changes may 
be challenged in terms of their unique structure; are they definitely a significant leap 
into the unknowns of austerity-driven workfarism, or are they more likely the 
reinvention and renewal of a socio-economic discourse which has underwritten UK 
society for a much longer period? 
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In his 2012 budget, Chancellor George Osborne indicated that an additional £10bn 
of spending cuts would be needed by 2016/17, which would be in addition to the 
initial £18bn worth of annual cuts outlined at the beginning of the parliament (IFS, 
2012a). Henceforth, for those regions most intently implicated by the fiscal austerity, 
particularly those in the North and West (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013), the welfare 
scenario is often one of increasing poverty and deprivation (especially those low 
income households containing children) (IFS, 2012b), coupled to poor employment 
and education prospects as both direct and indirect results of spending retrenchment 
(JRF, 2012). Further to this, the current conditions appear only to serve to enforce 
societal inequality to an even greater extent than has been experienced in the UK 
over recent decades, as “some people in some places have suffered 
disproportionately more than others” (Kitson et al., 2011:294). This is a disparity 
which has long been an issue between regions of the North and South, as well as 
within the North West region itself (see Figures 19, 20 and 21). The outcome is 
seemingly a steep descent into a vicious cycle of demising living standards for the 
most vulnerable members of society, including the significant proportion of public 
sector workers in the North and West, who have become endemically reliant on the 
safety net which state welfare provision has traditionally provided (Taylor-Gooby, 
2012a). Indeed Piachaud (2012:100) has suggested that “benefits are being cut to 
contribute to the overall reduction in public spending; overall those on lower incomes 
will lose.” However, it remains debatable as to just how much of an impact the 
current catalogue of welfare reforms are having upon the overarching initiative to 
drive down public spending (which has continued to rise in real terms). With vast 
numbers of such citizens residing in the North West of England, where many are 
increasingly experiencing a multiplicity of hardships resulting from a combination of 
unemployment, poverty and targeted fiscal rationalisation policies (JRF, 2011), future 
research should be engaging to disentangle the processes and experiences being 
profligated in the differentiated everyday lives of these citizens. 
Subsequently then, the forms and processes by which resistance to these changes 
to welfare provision are beginning to manifest themselves in British society and in 
cities in particular, must be identified and critically addressed, since these are 
pertinent locations to analyse these issues. In addition to this, it is important to 
articulate if there are any new pronunciations of resilience coming to fruition. The 
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answer looks increasingly likely to lie in the uneven nature of hardships and 
inequalities being faced by citizens at different scales within society (Taylor, 2010). 
Following on through this thematic, the forms of resistance which are likely to occur 
are necessarily dependent on the contingent experiences of different people in 
different places around the UK. Henceforth, the ways in which this is played out 
effectively determines the exact nature of the austerity-driven welfare-to-work 
experienced by members of society in alternate regional settings and subsequently 
therefore the nature of the resistance and contestation to such negative 
connotations. Thus the individualistic tendencies of the impacts of austerity are 
continually being played out in a multitude of forms (JRF, 2012), and this will only 
continue to intensify into the future as the aftershocks of the downturn persist. 
For instance, a number of UK regions have suffered from socio-economic decline 
since the late 1970’s, including the North West, the Midlands, the North East and 
South Wales (Martin, 2012), at the same time as the financial services sector in the 
South East and London has grown and strengthened exponentially, a trend which 
has been embedded even further since the 2008-9 crisis (Gardiner et al., 2013). 
Neoliberal policy rhetoric since the beginning of the Thatcher Government in 1979 
has developed a market economy underpinned by a flexible labour market, which 
has left some parts of the UK blighted by the loss of core industrial and 
manufacturing sectors, and the un(der-)employment and social issues which have 
inevitably followed (Andre et al., 2013). 
In the North West, the 1980s and 1990s saw widespread economic restructuring and 
underperformance. Since 2000, the situation has improved somewhat, but the region 
still fails to achieve its potential contribution to the wider UK economy (Centre for 
Local Economic Strategies, 2014). For much of the 21st Century, public sector 
employment has filled the gap left by the earlier period of declining employment, 
however with public sector employment accounting for 20.3% of all employment in 
the region in the first quarter of 2013 (ONS, 2013a), the cuts being made as part of 
government austerity measures are having a much more debilitating effect in the 
North West than elsewhere (Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 2014). Indeed, 
the unemployment rate in the North West is relatively high at 8.1%, compared with 
the national average of 7% and is 2% higher than when the financial crisis hit in 
2008-9 (ONS, 2014b). 
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Clearly, the austerity measures being implemented, and particularly the cuts to 
welfare expenditure which thus far have been at the forefront of such fiscal policies 
in the UK and beyond, will be reciprocally felt nationwide, yet will most likely entail 
their most acute consequences at the local scale. However, such cuts exhibit a 
distinctly uneven spread of effects within different regions and localities within state 
space (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). This has therefore resulted in the loss of a 
significant number of jobs in the public domain, leading to a return to steadily rising 
unemployment; the North West stands apart from other regions in this respect 
because of its apparent over-zealous reliance upon the public sector to prop-up the 
economy, and has subsequently begun to suffer the repercussions of having an 
ambiguous hole left gaping in its socio-economic fabric by the 30,000 jobs already 
lost by 2012, coupled to in excess of 80,000 more likely to be lost by 2017 (TUC, 
2012). However this is contested by a number of critics, notably Neil O’Brien, 
Director of the Policy Exchange think tank (cited in The Telegraph, 2012b). Whilst the 
region was relatively insulated from the vast majority of the cuts in the early part of 
the parliamentary term, Figure 20 shows that the employment situation in the North 
West of England continued to deteriorate, with unemployment peaking at 331,000 in 
May 2012 (9.5%) (ONS, 2012b). This compares to a pre-crisis figure of 221,000 
(6.6%) in August 2008 (ONS, 2008). 
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Summary of LFS headline indicators (thousands, seasonally adjusted) 
  All aged 16 & over 
  
All 
aged 
16 & 
over 
Total 
economically 
active 
Total in 
employment 
Un- 
employed 
Economically 
inactive 
Economic 
activity 
rate (%) 
Employment 
rate (%) 
Un- 
employment 
rate (%) 
Economic 
inactivity 
rate (%) 
Number 
of 
people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                    
Mar-
May 10 
5,529 3,423 3,137 286 2,106 61.9 56.7 8.4 38.1 
Mar-
May 11 
5,547 3,413 3,120 292 2,135 61.5 56.3 8.6 38.5 
Jun-Aug 
11 
5,551 3,434 3,152 282 2,117 61.9 56.8 8.2 38.1 
Sep-
Nov 11 
5,556 3,443 3,136 307 2,112 62 56.5 8.9 38 
Dec-
Feb 12 
5,559 3,401 3,076 325 2,159 61.2 55.3 9.6 38.8 
Mar-
May 12 
5,563 3,470 3,140 331 2,093 62.4 56.4 9.5 37.6 
                    
Change 
on 
quarter 
4 70 64 6 -66 1.2 1.1 0 -1.2 
% 0.1 2.1 2.1 1.7 -3         
Change 
on year 
16 58 19 38 -42 0.9 0.2 1 -0.9 
% 0.3 1.7 0.6 13.2 -2         
 
Figure 20: Peak North West unemployment May 2012 (Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2012). 
 
With this in mind, Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) have conveyed that the local scale 
is crucial for analysing and experiencing the effects of the cuts and reforms to 
welfare which are being made. Indeed, it has become evident on numerous 
occasions over the past few years since the austerity cuts and fiscal rationalisation 
programmes have come into force in the UK, that certain localities and areas have 
been hit far harder than others (Church Urban Fund (CUF), 2012). There has been a 
definitive deepening of the North-South divide owing to the effects felt as a direct 
result of the retrenchment, or even the complete removal of specific elements of 
welfare provision. This is especially applicable to employment benefits, with the 
Coalition Government’s heavy emphasis on ‘making work pay’ through the extension 
of the welfare-to-work initiative (MacLeavy, 2011). Henceforth, the North West of 
England has been carefully selected as the key site for conducting this research 
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project, because it exhibits locations demonstrating both enormous problems relating 
to the recession and cuts to public spending, but similarly locations apparently 
relatively well insulated from the retrenchment of welfare provision due to their 
greater linkages within the private sector (Hamnett, 2010), as well as much deeper 
rooted issues including class politics, age and gender concerns. However, it must 
also be noted that undertaking an analysis of an entire region comprising the sheer 
size and complexity displayed by the North West throws up a number of difficulties 
and challenges. 
 
3.4 Austerity, welfare provision, and the state – the importance of cities 
As noted in the previous section, local interactions are at the heart of the impacts 
and effects of austerity and welfare reform. In this regard, Brenner and Theodore 
(2002:351) convey that: 
“cities have become strategically crucial geographical arenas in which a 
variety of neoliberal initiatives – along with closely intertwined strategies of 
crisis displacement and crisis management – have been articulated.” 
In the UK, it is well acknowledged that there is an established North-South divide 
between the living standards and employment opportunities contingently 
experienced by citizens in the northern areas of the country compared with those 
residing in the South (Hamnett, 2010). However, it appears that it is the towns and 
cities in the North West of England which seem to be particularly heavily influenced 
by the effects of the austerity-driven workfare discourse of the Coalition (Centre for 
Cities, 2011b; 2011c). It has therefore been suggested that not only is it the towns 
and cities of the North West which are suffering this plight, but it has also become 
apparent that the effects are felt even more succinctly at the local and even 
individual household level (Taylor, 2010). It should be noted from the outset that 
whilst certain settlements are circled out from the rest as being specific hotspots of 
poverty, it would be naïve for us to infer from this that there is a blanket phenomenon 
occurring uniformly throughout that settlement and its hinterlands. Indeed even in the 
locations seemingly blighted by deprivation, it must be considered that there are 
incredibly affluent areas adjacent to those suffering from the deepest forms of 
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poverty seen in the UK (CUF, 2012). Taking the North West of England as a prime 
example of this, it can be observed that whilst there are indeed a large number of 
deprived cities as well as deprived areas of cities, there are adjacent cities and areas 
which are considerably more affluent and are in fact the complete opposite case of 
the stigmatism attached to issues of poverty and welfare dependency. 
Settlements particularly hard hit by the issues associated with the poverty conditions 
most likely implicated by current government policy discourse are Liverpool, 
Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale and Blackpool in the North West (Guardian, 2012). 
Of further interest is that five of the top ten locations (and henceforth the places most 
likely to be implicated by the nationwide retrenchment of welfare provision) reside in 
the Liverpool conurbation, and the one in Blackpool (South Shore) also exhibits the 
lowest life expectancy of anywhere in England (CUF, 2012). The North West more 
than others has benefited from the widespread expansion since 1997 of public sector 
provision, particularly through the number of well-paid jobs which it has provided. 
However, since the onset of recession and the implementation of the relatively 
severe austerity measures, the public purse has been reeled in, and with it has gone 
the funding for many of the welfare-oriented projects previously underlined as part of 
the drive to eradicate poverty and deprivation in these locations. Henceforth, the 
combined effects of both rapidly rising unemployment and the relinquishment of 
benefits for many has led to the socio-economic outlook of the towns and cities of 
the North West looking extremely bleak. It is therefore becoming clear as to why it is 
areas predominantly of Merseyside and Greater Manchester where the problems 
seem to be proliferating most frequently (Ibid). 
The first and most prominent location is Liverpool. The city regularly tops national 
statistics for a wide range of social and economic indicators associated with 
unemployment, poverty and deprivation, and so it is little surprise that five of the 
city’s parishes make it into the top ten for the whole of England (ibid). Liverpool as a 
city has a long tradition in manufacturing and construction, and in particular ship 
building (Work Foundation, 2009). However, the city’s economy was in decline for 
much of the 1970’s and 1980’s owing to its diminishing position in the global 
economy (Sykes et al., 2013). The city has also for a long period been bereft of a 
vast array of social problems, ranging from unemployment, to poor health and 
squalid living conditions. The public sector budget for Liverpool is therefore 
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enormous, and was expanded substantially under earlier Labour administrations to 
tackle deprivation, and child poverty in particular (Piachaud, 2012). However, it has 
also become apparent that a significant ‘dependency culture’ has developed in 
Liverpool, owing not only to the high proportion of the working age population who 
are considered long term unemployed, but also due to the high number of people not 
in employment, education or training (NEETs) and single parent households (Work 
Foundation, 2011). 
A major impact of the current economic slump and austerity measures has been the 
retrenchment of state welfare accompanied by the slashing of annual council 
budgets and a drive towards a discourse of “austerity localism” (Featherstone et al., 
2012). This has meant that Liverpool City Council has already had to make 
significant cost-cutting savings across the board to the tune of £173m since 2010, 
with a further £156m of savings needing to be found by 2017, and so are having to 
make difficult decisions as to where these savings are to be made (Liverpool City 
Council, 2014). Furthermore, despite government insistence on private sector 
dynamism, the city is yet to see any of this benefit, with many of the city’s residents 
remaining encapsulated within a low-pay-no-pay cycle of poverty. Henceforth, both 
the social and economic outlook for the city look bleak, at least up until the end of the 
current parliamentary period; citizens can expect specifically targeted welfare 
assistance from the government, with many forced to look for jobs which are often 
low paid and low skilled with few prospects, or may even be non-existent altogether 
under the Coalition’s work first rhetoric (Standing, 2013a; Standing, 2014). 
Furthermore, they will more frequently be left to their own devices to find a way of 
surviving effectively the severe negative impacts of the economic slump impinging 
upon their everyday lives. Substantial investment from the public purse is required 
into the city and its suburbs if the problems are to be even remotely arrested in the 
coming months and years otherwise the downward spiral will more than likely 
continue (Davies and Pill, 2011) This will not only lead to individuals and families 
slipping back from their middle class status’ beyond the poverty threshold as they fail 
to sustain their expected living standards, but it also implies that those members of 
the working class who are already poor look set to get even poorer and suffer even 
greater levels of deprivation, with no feasible route of escape or social mobility 
(Pearce, 2011). 
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The other city to focus on is Manchester and its surrounding satellites. Manchester 
has an established manufacturing history, but the problem of economic decline 
became particularly pronounced in the 1970’s, when the neoliberal rhetoric of the 
global economy led to many jobs and services being outsourced to cheaper 
locations. In recent years, the city of Manchester itself has recovered, managing to 
attract lucrative investment and undertaking large-scale regeneration projects. 
Coupled to the policy measures of the Labour Government from 1997, this has 
meant that the city has once again developed into a major socio-economic hub, and 
the middle class contingent has swelled to unprecedented levels (Association of 
Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), 2009). However, it must be considered that 
there are still significant areas of deprivation within the city whose residents live with 
substantial poverty and deprivation everyday of their lives despite the efforts of 
previous governments (CUF, 2012). The situation for many vulnerable groups has 
been made significantly worse under the auspices of the Coalition Government’s 
austerity measures. The losses are not as great as for Liverpool; the city has a 
vibrant private sector and so is not as reliant as the former on the public sector for 
both employment and to buttress the foundations of the local economy. However it is 
suffering great hardships due to the enormous levels of savings the city council has 
been required to make, coupled to the substantial amount of welfare retrenchment 
being implemented at national, regional and local levels. For instance, Manchester 
City Council has had to cut £250m from its budget between 2011 and 2015, and in 
the next 2 years will have to find an additional £70m of savings (Manchester City 
Council, 2015a). Again this eludes to the discourse of localism being advocated by 
the Coalition Government (Gregory, 2014), in that budget cuts are imposed onto the 
local authority which then must decide what to cut, and in turn, which citizens to 
protect. 
The economic downturn along with the austerity regime of the Coalition has meant 
many are now struggling to maintain the quality of life for themselves and their 
families, and are more frequently than not slipping back towards the poverty 
threshold (JRF, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). This has been compounded by the fact 
that the private sector has not rebounded as robustly in its growth to account for the 
sheer number of jobs, both public and private, lost as a result of the recession 
(Tomlinson, 2011). This has meant that many are now suffering from both 
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unemployment and lack of welfare support; for some this has meant a return to a 
lifestyle beneath the poverty threshold, whilst for others it has served merely to 
intensify the cycle of poverty which they have been entrenched within for much of 
their working lives (Standing, 2011). 
Aside from the city of Manchester itself, some of its satellite towns have not fared 
anywhere near as well in recent years. Rochdale and Oldham appear badly affected, 
and since the 1970’s have suffered the same fate of deindustrialisation that their 
larger neighbour has had to endure (New Economy Manchester, 2011a, 2011b). In 
contrast however, these former mill towns have been unable to attract the same kind 
of private investment Manchester has managed to secure, and as such have never 
really recovered from the effects of neoliberalisation and its associated facets (New 
Economy Manchester, 2011c). Thus these locations have been in a continuous 
downward spiral of unemployment coupled to high levels of poverty and deprivation 
(CUF, 2012). This goes hand in hand with the idea that there are “entrenched 
problems of worklessness” in many former industrial locations in the North of 
England (Fletcher, 2011:450). The situation improved slightly under Labour’s Third 
Way and their programmes of welfare expansion, however since the onset of the 
recession and the introduction of the Coalition Government’s widespread austerity 
measures, the rate of decline has intensified to the extent that poverty and 
deprivation is now greater than for most other places in England (Centre for Cities, 
2011a) (see Figures 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21). This fits well with the portrayal of 
Meegan et al. (2014), who suggest that the local level is where most of the welfare 
issues that arise from cuts and unemployment come to fruition. 
Rochdale in particular has severe issues with unemployment, with many working 
class people finding it almost impossible to secure long term and meaningful 
employment, especially when growth in the private sector is almost stagnant. The 
2008-9 crisis led to a 3.3% fall in employment in Rochdale (New Economy 
Manchester, 2011c). The future prospects for such places are not promising. With 
the economy continuing to suffer the after-effects of a drawn out economic slump, 
the opportunities for jobs in the wider Greater Manchester area are likely to be 
limited and mediocre at best. Similarly, at a time when the average citizen suffering 
such hardships is likely to be even more reliant on help and provision from the state, 
such services are being retrenched beyond recognition as the government localism 
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agenda makes it obligatory for local authorities to make enormous and unsustainable 
savings in the coming months and years (Featherstone et al., 2012). In this regard: 
“at present, the impacts of welfare reform on residents and places are still 
somewhat uncertain but given the extent of benefit dependency, in 
Manchester they are likely to be far reaching” (Manchester City Council, 
2015b:n.p). 
With private sector growth being decidedly sluggish, and with little signs of 
improvement, many working and middle class citizens could easily become sucked 
back in to the deprivation rhetoric and a relentless cycle of poverty (Pearce, 2011). 
Another consideration involves what forms of co-operation are similarly coming to 
fruition at local scales within cities as methods of mitigating the negative implications 
afforded by the policy processes under the new welfare geographies discourse. It 
has become increasingly apparent that individuals at the local level are necessarily 
being required to take overall responsibility for the provision of their own welfare 
(McDonald and Marston, 2005). As Newman (2011:91) notes: 
“policy has increasingly been driven by a desire to embed a new consensus in 
which it is accepted…that the unemployed have responsibility for tackling their 
own unemployment.” 
In fact, with the national government progressively retracting funding from local 
authorities which has been essential for the sustainability of a vast number of 
seemingly indispensable welfare services, such authorities are having to make 
difficult decisions as to where to make savings, and therefore, which of their 
constituents will be most adversely affected by the austerity measures being 
implemented (Manchester Evening News, 2012). As Knox et al. (2008) have noted, 
local authorities find themselves tied to a string of nationally devised policies, 
indicating that public expenditure is mediated through political motives, rather than 
socio-economic priorities. To this end, with cities often representing areas of high 
concentrations of poverty, vulnerability and henceforth welfare dependence, these 
are frequently being earmarked as the key locations for local authorities to make the 
necessary fiscal rationalisations attributable to having their budgets slashed 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). 
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Thus with such implications for large numbers of dependent individuals and families 
coming to the fore, it is now becoming increasingly important for people to become 
“aspirational citizens,” (Raco, 2009:436) helping themselves as a mode of replacing 
the effective safety net of services which have been seemingly whipped away from 
under their feet. In this regard, with resources not forthcoming to undertake such 
projects, there is an inherent need, both in the present and most certainly for the 
future as the austerity drive starts to bite even harder, for vulnerable groups to co-
operate and assist each other in order to strengthen their resolve in mitigating the 
negativities of the new welfare geographies of austerity in the UK. Therefore, as 
Ross (2009:63) points out: 
“community self-government forces people to become responsible for their 
own social welfare without being able to access the necessary resources to 
actualise their welfare delivery plans.” 
However, whilst their perceptible susceptibility to austerity is clear, the concentration 
of such individuals within cities offers a clear opportunity for effective path-dependent 
co-operation and resilience (Martin, 2012; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013), in order 
to ameliorate the adverse connotations which are inevitable to those who have for so 
long been heavily reliant on the Welfare State as a basic guarantor of minimum living 
standards. However there are significant doubts arising over whether such a process 
can be implemented and sustained without massive state support (Smith, 2010), and 
this is another aspect of the welfare-to-work discourse which must be challenged by 
the forthcoming research. 
It should now be apparent that there are significant changes taking place in the UK 
and beyond in relation to austerity and welfare reform. Much has been written in 
recent years about these processes across various scales, from the international 
level down to that of individuals in cities, and how both intricate geographies of 
welfare and welfare geographies are emerging as a result. It is important however to 
question not only whether the reforms being made are (re)new(ed), but also to 
emphasise that the extent of this (re)new(al) might vary at different scales. In this 
way, we could see a stronger or weaker shift at different scales and in different 
situations. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The next chapter of the thesis deals directly with the specific methods through which 
the researcher completed this project. To recap, the aim of this thesis is to examine 
whether or not there has been a qualitative shift in the welfare-to-work discourse 
following the 2008-9 financial crisis and to discover if what we are witnessing is 
simply a reinvention or re-articulation of the neoliberal paradigm which has preceded 
it. In turn this leads to the question of whether what is now being contingently 
experienced across a number of spatial scales is something new or whether what we 
are seeing is essentially the same as before the crisis. The research questions 
formulated as a result were: 
 To what extent is austerity influencing the nature of welfare provision? 
 What political strategies and their associated material effects are 
emerging in response to austerity? 
 How are the least insulated cities acting as locations of co-operation 
and resistance to such strategies and policy processes? 
This chapter begins by outlining the research methods employed in actually 
undertaking the collection and analysis of data in the project (Section 4.2). This 
includes a detailed breakdown of the interview process, the selection of the 
participants involved, and the analysis of the results which emerged as a 
consequence. The chapter then goes on to address the ethical considerations 
underpinning the research project, as well as issues around positionality and 
reflexivity (Section 4.3). Following on from this, it elucidates upon similar research 
within the fields of qualitative research, as well as studies around austerity and 
welfare-to-work (Section 4.4). Section 4.5 then identifies a series of research 
questions to be asked and then subsequently answered in the following empirical 
chapters. The chapter concludes by discussing how the final research findings will 
be disseminated (Section 4.6) as well as the limitations which form an inevitable part 
of any research project (Section 4.7). 
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4.2  Qualitative research 
In order to gather the information required from the project, the intention was to 
utilise the qualitative data collection technique of semi-structured interviews. This 
would hopefully enable interviewees to express their thoughts and opinions on 
welfare-to-work issues specific to their situation, whilst at the same time maintaining 
a focus on the questions being explored in the thesis. In short, qualitative methods 
offer a more humanistic approach to research because it offers a balance between 
examining structural processes and the experiences of the individual (Winchester 
and Rofe, 2010) The use of semi-structured interviews is a common technique in the 
undertaking of qualitative research, but other qualitative approaches such as focus 
groups and media analysis are also common and can be equally effective. Good 
examples of qualitative research in this field include studies by the charity 
Gingerbread (2012) looking into welfare-to-work for single parents, and Mascini et al. 
(2009) who investigate the changing nature of labour market activation policies 
under welfare-to-work. A clear example of where a mixed methods approach has 
been taken to qualitative research can be seen in the paper by Hancock and Mooney 
(2012). 
 
4.3  Research methods 
4.3.1  Semi-structured interviews 
The main source of primary data was 40 semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders involved in conducting, implementing and experiencing the impacts of 
welfare-to-work reforms under the auspices of austerity. Selecting the correct 
research methodology was crucial because “in complex ways, ontology and 
epistemology are linked to the methods we choose to use for research” (Winchester 
and Rofe, 2010:5). 
There are numerous benefits of using semi-structured interviews. Dunn (2010:110) 
notes that they give the benefits of ensuring both the flexibility of a conversation 
whilst still maintaining a basic structure, as well as being “content-focused” at the 
same time as allowing a free flowing conversation between interviewer and 
participant. In this way they also keep an interview informal and allow for open 
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responses rather than simply closed responses such as yes or no (Longhurst, 
2004:119). However, the researcher was also careful to ameliorate the potential 
negative aspects of using a semi-structured interview technique, such as participants 
straying too far off topic, making assumptions about the information provided by 
respondents to an interviewer compared with if they were having the same 
conversation with their peers, or simply needing to collate a large enough sample set 
to make comparisons between interviews credible. Despite this, there was an overall 
positive experience from using a qualitative methodology such as semi-structured 
interviews, because as Winchester and Rofe (2010:7) note: 
“individuals experience the same events and places differently. Giving voice 
to individuals allow viewpoints to be heard that otherwise might be silenced or 
excluded.” 
Longhurst (2004:128) takes a similar stance emphasising that: 
“semi-structured interviews…make a significant contribution to geographic 
research, especially now that discussions about meaning, identity, 
subjectivity, politics, knowledge, power and representation are high on many 
geographers’ agendas.” 
But why do interviews at all? Thrift (2000) scrutinises the use of qualitative research 
methods, insisting that they limit themselves by being reliant on a narrow set of 
techniques to collect their data. However in contrast, Brannen (1992) conveys that 
qualitative methods such as interviews enable the researcher to view the world from 
a much wider perspective than would otherwise be the case using quantitative 
methods. Despite being questioned by advocates of more traditional quantitative 
methodologies, there are a number of fundamental advantages to collecting data 
through interviews. Dunn (2010:102) expresses that there are four core reasons for 
undertaking interviews. Firstly they fill gaps in the knowledge base which other 
methods are unable to address. Secondly, they offer an option to investigate 
complex behaviours and motivations which other methods, particularly quantitative 
ones, might overlook. Another strong benefit of using interviews is because, third, 
they offer a route to subjective data, such as opinions, experiences and meanings. 
They are especially useful in this respect when working with groups because they 
help to identify differences in opinion but also consensus. Finally, they identify 
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themselves as a method which shows respect and empathy with the thoughts and 
feelings of participants, and perhaps more crucially, empowers them. 
These principles are supported by Longhurst (2004:128) who infers that semi-
structured interviews “are useful for investigating complex behaviours, opinions and 
emotions, and for collecting a diversity of experiences.” Furthermore, other 
advantages of using interviews identified by Dunn (2010:102) include the use of 
open as opposed to closed questions (and therefore responses), because they tend 
to offer a much more powerful relevance to the participant and they can help to 
identify any misplaced questions in the interview schedule which might need 
addressing or improving in the long run. Finally they have a positive effect on the 
integrity of a research project, because they can validate or invalidate the opinions 
and conclusions of the interviewer, but also offer the potential to elucidate any issues 
or topics which might previously have been missed or deemed to be of lesser 
importance. 
 
4.3.2  Selection and recruitment of interviewees 
One of the first considerations was the need for the methodology to reflect the 
different spatial scales at which welfare reform is co-ordinated, implemented and 
experienced. For this reason the selection of interviewees was guided, in the first 
instance, by focusing on the national, regional and local levels. It was decided that 
the first round of interviews should focus on the national level. This is because these 
interviews would reveal in greater detail the motivations underpinning austerity 
politics and welfare reform, thereby helping to refine the broader conceptual focus of 
the thesis as well as uncover the major political themes which could then be 
explored in greater detail in the regional and local level interviews. In other words, 
the national level interviews were designed to better understand the rhetoric and 
mechanisms by which austerity-inspired welfare reforms were being actioned. The 
importance of stressing the acute nuances of the processes around austerity and 
welfare-to-work particularly at various scales has been justified by Shirlow (2009:43) 
who articulates that: 
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“governance is more than the act of government, given that it stretches 
beyond institutional frameworks and into areas including institutional actors 
such as quangos, pressure groups, lobby groups, social movements and non-
governmental organisations.” 
These national level interviews were conducted between January 2013 and April 
2013 when the political debate centred on the impacts relating to the speed and 
extent of austerity measures and public sector job losses. In this way, national level 
interviews contributed mostly to addressing research question 1. 
Regional level interviews were then conducted in North West England between 
March and October 2013 when the political debate centred on welfare-to-work, the 
effectiveness of the government’s Work Programme, and an emphasis on fairness 
and protecting the benefits of pensioners at the expense of those of working age. 
The aim of these interviews was to identify what effect the austerity and welfare-to-
work policies of the present Coalition Government are having on regional capacity to 
implement and respond to the impacts of such an agenda. Regional level interviews 
contributed mostly to addressing research questions 1 and 2. 
These were followed by the local level interviews in towns and cities across North 
West England. Conducted between April 2013 and November 2013, this was when 
the political debate centred on adapting to austerity and welfare-to-work reforms, and 
mitigating the impacts coming to fruition at the local level. The aim of these 
interviews was to uncover the specific effects and responses coming to the fore in 
local situations of nationally devised austerity and welfare-to-work measures. Local 
level interviews contributed mostly to addressing research questions 2 and 3. 
The initial aim was to conduct 40 interviews, divided between national (x10), regional 
(x10) and local (x20) respondents. This balance reflected a recognition that national 
and regional level interviews were important for analysing the rhetoric and reality of 
government policy formation and how it cascades down from central government, 
but it is the local level at which the effects of welfare reform policies are most visible 
and as such where the (un)intended consequences of austerity politics would be 
most acute. Table 4.1 contains a breakdown of the target population and how they 
were to be sampled to cover the breadth of scale and actors 
(conductors/orchestrators, implementers and recipients). 
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Table 4.1  Selection of interviewees 
Scale Actors Target number of 
Interviews 
National (x10) Government ministers and 
department officials 
6 
Representatives of 
national voluntary/private 
sector groups 
4 
Regional (x10) Researchers at policy 
think tanks 
3 
Leaders and officials in 
regional governance 
4 
Area and representatives 
for voluntary/private sector 
3 
Local (x20) Members of Parliament 5 
Local authority leaders 
and policy officials 
10 
Voluntary sector groups 2 
Job Centre Plus 3 
 
There was flexibility in this selection and recruitment process and the practicalities of 
undertaking research ensured that achieving this sample of interviewees proved to 
be more challenging than initially envisaged. Indeed, while 40 interviews were 
completed (Table 4.2), the breakdown was 17 national level interviews (+7 on my 
original target), 6 regional level interviews (-4 on my original target), and 17 local 
level interviews (-3 on my original target). There were a number of reasons for this. 
First, at the national level the researcher was able to get more interviews than 
initially anticipated, offering a wider variety of perspectives than originally thought to 
be necessary. Whilst this raises the issue of saturation of information, additional 
national level interviews were only taken on if there was additional value to be 
gained from doing so. 
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Table 4.2  Actual interviewee numbers 
Interview Scale Type of Interviewees 
Required 
Number of Interviews 
National (x18) Government 
ministers/department 
officials 
1 
Voluntary (3rd 
sector)/private sector 
3 
Think tank 12 
Other 2 
Regional (x6) Regional government 0 
Voluntary (3rd 
sector)/private sector 
2 
Think tank (including one 
regional branch) 
2 
Other 2 
Local (x16) Local government 8 
Voluntary (3rd 
sector)/private sector 
8 
 
Second, and somewhat related to this, there were quite a limited number of regional 
interviews undertaken. This has not been an oversight on the part of the researcher 
by skewing the interviews towards the other scales, but instead it was progressively 
found that the regional structures are simply not in place to explore as initially 
intended. One consequence of the Coalition Government sweeping away the 
regional tier of governance in England between 2010-2012 is that the regional 
organisations originally identified as a rich source of information have been wound 
up, with the people working in these institutions that had the knowledge either being 
lost to other professions or now being absorbed into local authorities. In short, it was 
much harder to find regional level interviewees, or trace those who previously 
worked in regional institutions to access the information they hold. 
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Thirdly, it became clear that the willingness to speak was very different between 
national and local levels. There was a strong sense that those working at the 
national level were much more prepared to speak with the researcher, possibly 
seeing it as an opportunity to communicate how the policies are designed to work. 
An exception to this arose when attempting to set up interviews with government 
departments heavily involved in the welfare reform process, which were very 
reluctant to speak to the researcher in any capacity, possibly due to the sensitive 
nature of the work they undertake on a daily basis. In contrast, those working at the 
local level were more difficult to secure interviews with. This could be due in larger 
part to the burden of work they are dealing with and the request for 45 minutes of 
their time is not something many felt able to commit to. 
The selection and recruitment of interviewees was slightly different at national, 
regional and local levels. National level interviewees were selected to reflect the 
broad range of political views represented among policy think tanks. This ranged 
from left-leaning organisations such as the Centre for Welfare Reform, through the 
left of centre Fabian Society and the right of centre Policy Exchange, to the more 
right-orientated Centre for Social Justice. 
Regional level interviews involved targeting the few remaining regional institutions 
(e.g. NWTUC) and identifying former employees of regional institutions (e.g. 
Regional Development Agencies, Regional Assemblies, Government Offices for the 
Regions) who have reappeared in other organisations – be they at a local, regional 
or national scale (e.g. local authorities, Local Enterprise Partnerships, policy think 
tanks). Compared to the local and national level interviews there was much less 
sampling undertaken at the regional level. 
Local level interviews were undertaken with a range of stakeholders from local 
authorities, to housing associations, Citizens’ Advice and local employment charities. 
Towns and cities identified through previously published research findings as the 
most exposed to the effects of austerity and welfare reform were specifically 
targeted. Research from the Centre for Cities (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) confirmed that 
a large proportion of the cities dealing with issues of deprivation, low employment 
rates and substantial welfare bills were located in the North West of England. From 
this, particular cities were highlighted as key areas of focus for the project, including 
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(Greater) Manchester, Liverpool (Merseyside), Rochdale, Burnley, Blackburn, 
Birkenhead, Blackpool, St. Helens, Oldham, Wigan and Bolton. Efforts were made to 
undertake interviews in all these locations with local authorities and third sector 
organisations, and were completed in all but Wigan, Bolton and Blackburn where 
there was reluctance to participate or difficulties in identifying suitable interviewees. 
From here, Cameron (2000) conveys that participants should be chosen for 
interviews based on their topical experience, so a snowballing-type technique – 
where interviewees made the researcher aware of other individuals or organisations 
it would be useful for them to talk to – was employed. However it is important to note 
that such a process was only considered where the researcher felt the suggested 
participants would add value to the project, and not just undertaking the interview on 
the basis of someone’s recommendation. It was a difficult process in that many of 
the interviews were difficult to set up in terms of getting a response from the 
stakeholders contacted, and then finding a mutually suitable date and time for the 
interview to take place. 
The result of this was that the researcher was able to undertake and analyse 40 
interviews (which met with my original target of 40 interviews). This constituted a 
59% success rate of the 68 potential interviewees initially approached. As already 
noted, receiving responses from local target areas such as Wigan, Bolton and 
Blackburn proved much more challenging than in other places. This was either due 
to a lack of response from the stakeholder or a reluctance to participate. Several 
stakeholders did, however, provide some generic information about their welfare-to-
work initiatives as an alternative. Further to this, the researcher also had significant 
problems when attempting to set up interviews with bodies closely affiliated with the 
Coalition Government’s welfare-to-work agenda, mainly Jobcentre Plus and DWP 
(problems were experienced at national, regional and local scales). Despite 
extensive endeavours to establish a rapport with these key stakeholders, it proved 
impossible because of their policies of not participating in research which had not 
been sanctioned by the DWP. Aside from these main problems, other barriers to 
participation included lack of time or availability or lack of visible contact details. 
On the other hand, however, certain stakeholders proved extremely easy to contact 
and were more than willing to assist in my investigations. In particular, local voluntary 
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organisations such as Citizens’ Advice and local employment charities were readily 
available to speak with me. Many welcomed the opportunity to be able to elucidate 
upon their day to day experiences of austerity, welfare-to-work and the difficulties 
that arise as they implement and respond to the impacts of a renewed welfare-to-
work rhetoric. In terms of the spread of the sample of interviewees who participated, 
the researcher believes they managed to obtain a good range of stakeholders from 
national, regional and local backgrounds. However there were a number of slight 
anomalies in the distribution. At the national level, there was an underrepresentation 
of participants from government agencies. These were key targets for potential 
interviewees as these are the stakeholders charged with the initial conducting and 
implementation of the government austerity and welfare-to-work policy. The regional 
scale interviews also threw up an anomaly, because the researcher was unable to 
obtain any interviews with representatives of regional government organisations. Far 
from this being an oversight on the part of the researcher, lengthy attempts were 
made to source regional government contacts, but which proved completely futile. 
However this helped the interviewer to identify the inherent void left by government 
austerity measures which had all but stripped out any regional level structures for 
disseminating and co-ordinating policy processes down to the local level. 
There was also a small amount of snowball sampling involved in the selection of 
participants. Particularly where first choice targets were not available, or where 
certain individuals were recommended based on what had been discussed with 
other participants, the researcher was advised to contact potential interviewees who 
they had perhaps not come across previously, or who had initially been lower down 
the list of priority to conduct interviews with. However, it should be noted that 
meticulous preparation and selection of participants kept such a snowballing effect to 
a bare minimum, and in many cases, interviewees recommended other potential 
participants who had already been interviewed or who had been contacted to set up 
an interview in future. 
 
4.3.3  Conducting interviews 
All interviews were semi-structured (samples of national, regional and local level 
interview schedules can be found in Appendices 1-3 respectively). The structure of 
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the interviews included up to 13 primary questions (the appropriate number of these 
asked was left to the discretion of the interviewer at the time of the interview) which 
were generic to all respondents. These questions lasted for the first 10 or 15 minutes 
of each interview, and were intended to establish a flowing conversation with each 
stakeholder, focusing on their understanding of the Welfare State in the UK, what 
they considered to be the major impacts of austerity under the Coalition 
Government, which groups of people they felt had been more or less affected by 
austerity and welfare reform, and if they had come across any unexpected impacts 
of the aforementioned processes. This was followed by secondary questions tailored 
specifically to the stakeholder being interviewed (based on the scale the stakeholder 
operated at).  
During the process the researcher was also careful not to disclose the thoughts and 
statements of previous participants. This is important so as not to guide or influence 
their responses. From these considerations the researcher devised three interview 
templates – one each for national, regional and local level interviews – which could 
then be tailored to the individual interviewee to reflect their role and position within 
the design and implementation of austerity inspired welfare reforms. Care was taken 
when constructing each schedule so as to avoid any leading questions. That said, in 
each case the interview was structured to explore three main issues: (1) whether 
austerity politics are an economic necessity or more of a politically-driven strategy; 
(2) the tactics and strategies being used by those stakeholders involved with 
conducting, implementing and experiencing the current welfare-to-work legislation; 
(3) responses to the welfare-to-work reforms. This was done to directly address the 
research questions and therefore the overall aim of assessing whether austerity-
inspired welfare-to-work reforms are something qualitatively new (discontinuation) or 
a renewal (continuation) of previous reforms. 
The utilisation of interviews by the researcher was intended to act as a conversation 
more than a cross-examination, as this approach was thought to uncover far more in 
depth and interesting information by creating a more relaxed and laid back approach 
to conducting the interviews. Furthermore, the use of such qualitative research 
methods enabled the researcher to explore in far more depth the intricate themes 
coming to the fore around the responses of key stakeholders to austerity politics and 
(re)new(ed) welfare-to-work. 
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Within the broad structures of my interviews, the actual interview questions focused 
on key political and policy issues which are indicative of austerity-inspired welfare 
reform in action: inter alia Universal Credit (DWP, 2010a), The Work Programme 
(DWP, 2012), the removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (DWP, 2013a), in-work 
conditionality (DWP, 2010a), The Localism Act (DCLG, 2011), Big Society (Cabinet 
Office, 2010) and Work Capability Assessments (DWP, 2010b). Broader political and 
economic issues were also addressed, most notably: the availability and suitability of 
work; low paid work, zero-hours contracts and the living wage; the rights and 
responsibilities of the state, providers and citizens; political ideology; the impacts of 
welfare reforms; the privatisation of welfare-workfare; and measuring unemployment 
and disability. No interview covered all of these in depth, but the 40 interviews did 
cover this broad spectrum of topics. Before each interview the researcher tailored 
the focus based on the interviewee’s position and role, including more questions on 
particular topics where the researcher felt the interviewee would be more 
knowledgeable and therefore more able to provide more detailed answers and 
understanding. Then in each interview the researcher was constantly evaluating their 
answers, and where they raised particular points of interest which were worth 
exploring, further follow up questions were asked. In this way there was always a 
strong degree of flexibility, particularly as each interviewee could bring in to the 
discussion topics and issues which the researcher had not thought of prior to the 
interview and/or had more or less knowledge and understanding of a particular topic 
than might have been imagined given their job title. 
For this reason the themes and questions were not necessarily addressed in the 
order outlined in the interview script. Interviewees were encouraged to converse 
freely and discuss issues in a way pertinent to them. However, it should be noted 
that the interviews remained in a semi-structured format and respondents were 
periodically kept in check so that they did not stray too far from the discussion topics 
intended. 
In addition, the interview schedules evolved through the data collection phase as 
new issues arose and political-economic circumstances changed as the interview 
process advanced. One significant alteration followed the changes to Universal 
Credit proposals under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (HM Government, 2012) and 
other benefit reforms – most notably the ‘Bedroom Tax’ (DWP, 2013a) and the 
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introduction of a benefits cap at £26,000 (DWP, 2014a). These reforms introduced 
new elements, and in turn required the interview schedules to be constantly updated. 
The capacity to apply flexibility within the broad structure of an interview scheme was 
important in enabling the research to remain current and timely, but also remain 
close to the original focus of the research. In other words, semi-structured interviews 
benefit from striking an important balance between rigidity, necessary to keep the 
data collection on topic, and flexibility, necessary for aligning theory and empirics. 
Given the politicised nature of the research topic, interview questions were carefully 
worded. It was necessary to avoid using particular terms – e.g. ‘conditionality’ or 
‘political strategies’ – and allow them to emerge from the research because the 
danger is that if the interviewer uses them it leads the interviewee to use them and 
can therefore skew the findings one way or another depending on the nature of the 
term. It was also important to avoid leading interviewees towards focusing on certain 
societal groups when asking about the effects of the welfare reforms. This was 
intended to maintain the integrity of the interview schedule and so avoid leading 
respondents into particular answers and academic terminology to gain an outcome 
beneficial to the arguments then presented in the thesis. Despite this, a large 
proportion of those interviewed freely chose to use these terms – itself an important 
research finding. 
Interviews were a mixture of face-to-face (n=15) and phone interviews (n=25). Face-
to-face interviews were the preferred approach so as to obtain the highest quality 
data; however, this had to be balanced with issues of availability and securing 
access to targeted interviewees. In the end, because the research was most 
interested in the content of interviews – much more than say the delivery – 
conducting interviews by telephone proved less of a concern as the research 
progressed, particularly as the researcher became more confident. 
Average interview time was 55 minutes, meaning over 36 hours of interview data 
was collected. The shortest interview lasted 25 minutes and the longest interview 
lasted for 1 hour 53 minutes. The majority of the interviews lasted between 45 
minutes and 60 minutes. Interviews took place at a time (and location for face-to-
face interviews) chosen by the interviewee, because using an environment deemed 
comfortable and familiar to the participant was more likely to elicit more detailed and 
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comprehensive responses. Furthermore, the responses were often supported by 
additional information, be it in the form of examples or in the case of face-to-face 
interviews through extra materials such as leaflets. 
All interviews were digitally recorded. The benefit of recording interviews is that it 
enables the interviewer to “focus fully on the interaction instead of feeling pressure to 
get the participants words recorded” (Longhurst 2004:125). 
The pace of the interviews was, in the main, dictated by the participant, as this 
allowed them to put across all the information that they wished and would not feel 
pressured into giving shorter answers which may have resulted in critical information 
being omitted. Small periods of silence were also treated as productive parts of the 
interview process, as they were represented as opportunities for respondents to 
pause and think before relaying their answer to a particular question. 
 
4.3.4  Analysing interviews 
Upon the completion of the interview process, transcriptions were undertaken for all 
interviews as soon as possible afterwards because having the interview still recently 
in mind made the procedure faster, more coherent and allowed a first level analysis 
to be undertaken (Longhurst, ibid). It was also important to transcribe the interviews 
quickly because this helped inform upcoming interviews. Interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and produced 324,260 words of data to analyse. Transcripts were then 
coded according to the relevant themes and topics. 
 
4.3.5  Coding 
As a piece of qualitative research, the project involved a significant amount of 
coding. Cope (2010:281) conveys that: 
“geographers are increasingly engaged not only in doing qualitative research 
but also in thinking and writing critically about methodologies including the 
ways that we evaluate, organise and ‘make sense’ of our data through the 
coding process.”  
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The primary data coded were the 40 semi-structured interviews conducted. Coding 
involves separating material into more manageable chunks by assigning categories 
or codes to pieces of information which are of interest to the research project. In turn, 
the frequent reoccurrence of certain codes and their connections and assimilations 
with other codes enables the researcher to formulate themes through which original 
content and findings can be ascertained. Cope (2004:446) notes however that 
coding qualitative data can be problematic because: 
“often, the traditional standards of ‘good research’, such as objectivity and the 
ability to generalise to larger populations, are not applicable for such 
materials.” 
Cope (2010) identifies four key purposes of coding, including data reduction, 
organisation, data exploration, analysis and theory building, and coding can be used 
in an exploratory way such as with grounded theory (generating theories from 
empirical data). 
Aside from the purposes of coding, there are also a number of types of coding which 
can be utilised depending on the desired outcome. The most simplistic stage of 
coding involves the use of descriptive codes. These reflect clear and obvious themes 
or patterns which are emerging from the data. Strauss (1987) infers that identifying 
patterns and categories are the most basic level of coding. In the case of interviews, 
these can often be described as in vivo codes, in that thoughts and ideas played out 
are important to the individual being interviewed. If the researcher requires a much 
more in depth approach then they might choose to use analytic codes. These reflect 
points of interest within the material which are not so clear cut, and which are 
deduced by the researcher based on the context of actions and the language used 
by participants. Other types include ‘open coding’ (Strauss, ibid) where the coding of 
data is unrestricted, and ‘axial coding’, a type of open coding which proceeds along a 
particular axis, and which allows the researcher to follow a particular category to test 
its relevance. Alternatively there is ‘selective coding’ where a systematic approach is 
taken towards a core category or research interest (Cope, 2004). 
Crang (2013) highlights even more approaches to coding, suggesting that there is a 
definitive need to clarify the relationship between codes and the materials analysed. 
He points to ‘emic’ coding, a process similar to in vivo coding which refers to the 
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localised terms which are used by the participants themselves. On the other hand 
there are ‘etic’ codes, which by contrast are assigned by the researcher to describe 
events and provide meanings and theories. These codes are theoretical in nature 
and are accumulated in response to issues arising from the data. However Agar 
(1980, cited in Flowerdew and Martin, 2013:225) notes that emic and etic coding 
types are not so clear cut, and most sources of data are in fact a combination of 
both. In a similar way, Crang (2013:225) highlights the importance of using a robust 
and credible coding methodology: 
“clearly these categories must have a certain level of robustness…one of the 
themes outlined…is how to develop this robustness through the evolution of 
ideas and codes, so that in the iterative process of developing then refining, 
categorising and re-categorising, the final categories are coherent and 
supportable.” 
The researcher therefore began by consulting the research questions and 
constructing a number of more descriptive, generalised codes with which to begin 
the process of analysis. However, Cope (2010) asserts that it is important to 
remember that analysis does not begin after the coding process has been 
completed, but instead that coding is in itself part of the analysis procedure, and is a 
cyclical, ongoing process. Indeed Cope (2004:448) states that “coding enables the 
researcher to make new connections.” In this research project, these included 
‘employment’, ‘responses’ and ‘material effects.’ These generalised codes were then 
subdivided further into more specific analytic codes in order to pick out the particular 
nuances of what the researcher was attempting to unpick. For example, within the 
code ‘employment’, there were a number of sub-codes such as ‘availability of jobs’, 
‘the Work Programme’ and ‘hours of work/incentives.’ These sub-codes by 
comparison were not arbitrally assigned in line with the research questions, but 
instead were constructed chronologically as they emerged from within the text as 
other codes were being addressed. However it does enable the researcher to be 
more objective and link the responses to the research questions and not the other 
way round. Cope (ibid) asserts that coding needs to be specific otherwise the 
analysis process becomes too general and weakens the integrity of the results. 
Furthermore, coding was conducted on a sentence by sentence basis, so taking 
100 
 
each segment of text independently and applying each code and sub-code as 
appropriate, enabled a thorough and detailed analysis of the data collected. 
Indeed, within each interview transcript, relevant quotes were highlighted in red, 
followed by their assigned letter and number combination to denote which code or 
sub-code they related to. For example, any reference to the Work Programme was 
highlighted and assigned the code B8. Cope (2010:284) notes that: 
“while the development of the coding structure is by no means a simple 
process, it is one that – if done well – enables the data to be organised in 
such a way that patterns, commonalities, relationships, correspondences, and 
even disjunctures are identified and brought out for scrutiny.” 
After an extensive process of analysing all the interview material collected, a 
comprehensive coding framework was assembled (Appendix 5) consisting of 14 
codes and 88 sub-codes, which acted as a fluid and dynamic document as it could 
be added to or changed throughout the process, whilst at the same time continually 
referred back to the research questions initially proposed in order to maintain the 
focus on the task at hand. From this, each code and sub-code could be assigned 
where appropriate within the interview text, and the relevant sections of text were 
then copied into distinct Microsoft Word documents where they could be more easily 
analysed in more detail. In this way, coding helps to reduce data by putting it into 
smaller, more manageable sections. As Lefebvre (1991:105) suggested “reduction is 
a scientific procedure designed to deal with the complexity and chaos of brute 
observations.” 
Once all the quotes had been inserted into the relevant coding documents, it was 
possible to pick out the major themes which were emerging from the interview 
process. Cope (2004:454) conveys that: 
“the process of theme building is central to qualitative, interpretive work 
because it allows for the organisation of information into trends, categories 
and common elements that are theoretically important.” 
Cope (2010) also infers that coding creates a level of organisation which allows data 
to be arranged in terms of similarity and relationship. Once these themes had 
become apparent (which will be addressed in the forthcoming empirical chapters), 
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the researcher then selected quotes from the coded material which best highlighted 
these key issues, as well as being representative of the views of the majority of 
respondents. However, Jackson (2001) notes that it is crucial we remember that 
theme building should be done utilising a variety of materials together rather than 
assessing each piece of information separately. 
 
4.3.6 Triangulation 
Qualitative methods “have traditionally been used as part of triangulation or multiple 
methods in a search for validity and corroborative evidence” (Winchester and Rofe, 
2010:21). Advocates of traditional quantitative methods of validation might question 
the rigour of qualitative analytical methods. However Silverman (1993) asserts that 
such quantitative approaches are inappropriate for ethnographic studies, and 
therefore strategies such as triangulation can be used to ensure the reliability of 
results in qualitative work. In this research project, whilst the coding and analysis 
process enabled the researcher to bequeath a plethora of useful information and 
interview quotes from the data, it is important that individual responses were not 
taken as fact purely to satisfy the research questions initially propositioned. 
Winchester and Rofe (2010) have identified four major types of triangulation: multiple 
sources, multiple methods, multiple investigators and multiple themes. In this way, 
the process of triangulation became crucial, by utilising a mixture of different sources 
(i.e. the range of different interviewees selected) to corroborate the opinions and 
ideas put across by the respondents. In turn, this meant that the researcher could be 
much more confident that the comments being made were not just subjective 
opinions, but were actually factually grounded. Indeed Clifford and Valentine 
(2004:8) contend that triangulation ensures that “researchers can use multiple 
methods or different sources of information to try to maximise an understanding of a 
research question.” In a similar way, Longhurst (2004:120) notes the value of using 
interviews from a range of stakeholders in order to strengthen the argument being 
made. He states that: 
“both semi-structured interviews and focus groups can be used as ‘stand-
alone methods’, as a supplement to other methods or as a means for 
triangulation in multi-methods research.” 
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What this meant for this research project was that utilising multiple sources of 
information by conducting interviews with a range of different stakeholders 
significantly strengthened the results obtained. 
 
4.4  Positionality and ethical considerations 
4.4.1  Positionality 
Research is subjective not objective, so we must always consider our own 
positionality within the research process. Having no previous affiliation to or with any 
of the stakeholders or organisations involved in the research process was an 
advantage. Nevertheless, our own political persuasions undeniably impact the 
research process and it is important to be aware of those as best can be achieved 
across the design, implementation and analysis phases. That stated, Rose (1997) 
reminds us that it is virtually impossible for a researcher to position themselves 
perfectly within their research. 
In these ways, it is crucial to remember that the position of the researcher within the 
research process can influence the research project itself, being manifested through 
potential subjective observations and opinions which could convolute the findings. 
This is conveyed by Mansvelt and Berg (2010:339), who state that: 
“it is important to both reflect upon and analyse how one’s position in relation 
to the processes, people, and phenomena we are researching actually affects 
both those phenomena and our understanding of them.” 
In this way it was important for the researcher to consider their specific positionality 
within the research process, being a young male from the North West of England, 
and how this could potentially influence the responses given to the questions put to 
each interviewee. However, the process of designing the questions was careful to 
minimise this conflict of interests wherever possible, by remaining objective and not 
disclosing any information which might have an influence on the response a 
participant might provide. 
The researcher set about undertaking the interviews with an intentional naivety 
towards the issues at hand, allowing respondents to express their views freely in 
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order to obtain a greater diversity of information from the interview process. The 
need to attain a relaxed and informative environment through which an expressive 
conversation could be had was considered a high priority by the researcher as a way 
of obtaining as much useful interview material as possible, as advocated by 
Longhurst (2004). As a result, the interviews were conducted in the most comfortable 
and familiar environment for those participating, be that in their place of work, a 
public meeting place, or perhaps over the phone. An emphasis was therefore 
inherently placed upon the need for openness, trust and transparency in the 
conversations taking place. To ensure this level of engagement further, a small 
amount of time was spent at the beginning of each interview establishing an 
amicable rapport, whereby each participant was given the opportunity to explain a bit 
about themselves, their work, and their experiences of welfare reform and welfare-to-
work under Coalition austerity. 
It was also essential to acknowledge the potential for researcher bias when 
transcribing and analysing the interview data, and not just in the process of actually 
conducting the interviews. By taking specific care to accurately transcribe and record 
data, and by paying close attention to nuances in the language used, the researcher 
was able to minimise subjectivity when data was analysed. 
 
4.4.2 Reflexivity 
The final consideration which needed to be made throughout the project was that of 
reflexivity, whereby the researcher necessarily undertook an ongoing appraisal of 
their performance holistically from project design, through data collection and to 
analytical findings, as an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ within the project (Moss, 1995). 
Reflexivity is defined by Charmaz (2006:188) as “the researcher’s scrutiny of his or 
her research experience”, essentially a self-analysis of how the process of 
undertaking a research project is addressed. The awareness of the researcher as to 
their position within the research project, and in turn their ability, proactively or 
otherwise, to influence it, is an essential part of any research project. However 
Bourdieu (2003) conveys caution towards too much obsession with objectivity, 
because it can lead the researcher to neglect the consideration that some 
subjectivity is an important part of all social research. Positionality is integral at every 
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stage of the research process in terms of the construction of knowledge, from data 
collection to the discussion of research findings. The researcher took a great deal of 
time throughout the research at each stage to reflect on the methods, the processes 
and the outcomes of the project, enabling them to reflect on what they had done, 
what worked well and what had not worked so well. This was so that in future 
methods could be refined in order to continually improve the research process and 
maintain the objectivity and integrity of the project. The use of coding helps create 
this opportunity for reflexivity because its contemplation and analytical nature offers 
a chance for reflective thought (Cope, 2010). 
 
4.4.3  Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was gained through Loughborough University’s ethical practices 
guidelines. The research project was approved by the Loughborough University 
Ethics Advisory Committee. 
The main ethical issue to be adhered to in this project was that there were no 
negative consequences for participants involved in the interview process. In this way, 
participants were given as much information as possible to ensure they were entirely 
comfortable with taking part in the interview process and which would not have an 
effect on the answers which were subsequently given. Participants were provided 
with a ‘Participant Information Sheet’ prior to the interview taking place, which was 
important because it gave them the opportunity to ask any questions or raise any 
concerns prior to partaking. Each individual was also required to fill out an ‘Informed 
Consent’ form, to confirm that they understood what the interview process would 
involve and that they were entirely happy to take part (Appendix 4). This was also 
completed prior to each interview taking place. Participant information sheets were 
emailed out to participants at least one week in advance of the interview where 
possible. For phone interviews, the participant consent forms were also emailed out 
at the same time such that they could be filled out and returned by email or post prior 
to the interview taking place. For the face-to-face interviews, each interviewee was 
asked to fill out their consent form on the day immediately prior to the interview 
taking place. In this way participation was completely voluntary, with nobody forced 
or coerced into taking part at any point in the process, with the ability to withdraw at 
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any point without any recriminations. In addition, it was made clear that if a 
respondent wished not to provide an answer for whatever reason, they were able to 
do so without having to justify their basis for doing so, and were similarly made 
aware that they could end the interview at any time, again without having to justify 
why. 
It was also clarified to the interviewees that the digital recordings of the interviews 
would only be listened to by the researcher, and that nobody else would have access 
to the recordings. This was also important given the sensitive nature of the 
discussions particularly given specific local contexts (Smith, 2004). In addition, 
participants were assured that all recordings would be anonymous, and that they 
would be contacted prior to the submission of the thesis if quotes from their 
interviews had been used, to reaffirm that they were happy for their comments to be 
included despite total anonymity. This anonymity was ensured by the use of generic 
pseudonyms attached to interview quotes in the transcripts, thesis itself and beyond. 
It was also made clear to those interviewed that confidential information, including 
the transcripts, recordings and contact details would be stored in password protected 
files and would not be shared. This is similar to the assertion of Valentine (1997) that 
confidentiality and anonymity of participants is arguably the most important aspect of 
any research process. Once the consent of each participant had been obtained, 
each was required to sign a consent form to establish officially that they were happy 
to partake in the research project. 
 
4.5  Wider policy relevance and academic research 
4.5.1 Studies of welfare-to-work 
There have also been a number of similar research projects undertaken which 
examine the social and economic effects of (re)new(ed) welfare-to-work in the UK 
under the Coalition Government. Whilst all such projects in some way investigate the 
impacts that austerity is having upon both economic and social elements of welfare-
to-work in the UK, they all reflect slight differences in focus towards the specific 
effects and specific responses to particular elements of the welfare reform process, 
as well as a variety of methodological techniques undertaken in doing so. Prime 
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examples of this type of research include Weston (2012) who investigates the impact 
of welfare-to-work on the disabled, and McCollum (2012) who challenges the issues 
surrounding welfare-to-work cycling. Other constructive research papers include the 
work of Standing (2011), Wright (2012), Fletcher (2011) and Jones (2012). 
 
4.5.2 Studies of post-recession austerity 
There has also been a considerable amount of research undertaken which uses 
various qualitative approaches to analyse the implications of austerity under the 
Coalition Government, and in particular the effects such austerity politics are having 
on issues of welfare and welfare reform. There has been a particular focus on the 
places and groups of people who are losing out, particularly in those locations with 
depressed labour market conditions. The most pertinent illustrations of this type of 
research can be seen in the work of Beatty and Fothergill (2013) who focus on the 
specifics of different austerity measures through a geographical lens to observe who 
is hardest hit and where, as well as Shaw (2012) who draws attention to the actions 
of local authorities attempting to mitigate the negative connotations of austerity. 
Other good examples of this type of research include Baggesen Klitgaard and 
Elmelund-Praestekaer (2013), Taylor-Gooby (2012a) and Callinicos (2012). 
 
4.6  Research questions and the presentation of empirical findings 
To this end, three key research questions emerged in order to assess how austerity 
is affecting the nature of welfare-to-work in the North West of England: 
 To what extent is austerity influencing the nature of welfare provision? 
 What political strategies and their associated material effects are 
emerging in response to austerity? 
 How are the least insulated cities acting as locations of co-operation 
and resistance to such strategies and policy processes? 
Based on these observations it was decided that the most appropriate approach to 
undertaking this thesis was to employ a system of semi-structured interviews with 
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critical stakeholders within the welfare-to-work debate in the UK. In this way, the 
interview process can be used to assess how the reforms to welfare-to-work are 
being experienced in those towns and cities most exposed to conditions of austerity. 
The research process will primarily involve stakeholders experiencing and 
responding to the welfare reform process. Furthermore, the empirics of the thesis will 
be arranged by addressing each of three contemporary questions which arose in 
turn with a spatially-orientated undertone focusing on towns and cities of the North 
West of England, as this is one of the areas hardest hit by the reforms to welfare-to-
work across a number of different measures. This links well with the thoughts of 
Latham et al. (2009:142) who assert the important of cities in the localised realities of 
how such processes are experienced, suggesting that: 
“cities are sites of networked practices which are distanciated, stretched over 
miles and miles.” 
The first empirical chapter will ask whether the nature of the austerity measures 
implemented by the Coalition Government have been a consequence of economic 
necessity or politically driven mantra. The second empirical chapter will move on to 
hone focus on the tactics and strategies of the key stakeholders tasked with 
conducting, implementing and receiving the effects of (re)new(ed) welfare-to-work 
processes, because it is these locally derived stakeholders who define the extent of 
both the impacts and the subsequent responses to austerity and welfare reform. The 
final empirical chapter attends to the responses of such stakeholders to the impacts 
of austerity and welfare reform, and in particular, means of overcoming the negative 
consequences attributed to welfare-to-work programmes under austerity. The 
importance of unscrambling these interactions and identities within such a process is 
key, because as Gallagher (2009:7) notes from a post-structuralist perspective, it is 
essential to understand the importance of “how people are defined in society and 
how they maintain, resist, subvert or nuance those identities.” 
 
4.7  Dissemination of research 
The findings of the research will be disseminated to all stakeholders involved in the 
research process as was promised as an incentive for participating in the research 
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project. Copies of the findings will be emailed out to all those who participated with 
the thanks of the researcher. It is important to note that although the research project 
undertaken is limited in its complexity, its original input enables it to display 
relevance beyond academic circles. Indeed, the research will potentially have 
pertinent connotations for social, economic and political processes across a variety 
of national, regional and local scales. This also highlights the important role that 
research conducted within universities and other academic institutions has to play 
within the wider examination of austerity and welfare-to-work. Furthermore, much of 
the empirical data which will emerge from the research will hopefully contribute to 
papers published in academic journals and other forms of media. 
 
4.8  Research limitations 
A final yet crucial consideration of the methodology process is to recognise the 
limitations that this research project possesses. The first issue to address is that the 
research was strongly focused on towns and cities in the North West of England. 
Whilst it has previously been explained that the region was chosen because it is 
distinctive in how it has been affected by reforms to welfare in the UK, it does 
consequently mean that findings may not be entirely reflective of the UK as a whole. 
Particularly where the nationally-orientated interviewees were concerned, their focus 
on the UK often meant a lack of specific knowledge about more regional or local 
situations and in turn the applicability of Coalition austerity and welfare-to-work 
policies. 
Snowball sampling of interview procedures must also be taken into account, as there 
was potential for participants to be gathered via this method. This would have meant 
favouring certain individuals or organisations over others and would therefore call 
into question the objectivity of the research methodology. However, this project 
involved very minor snowballing of interviewees and so had a negligible effect on the 
sampling strategy utilised. 
It also needs to be noted that at the point where interviews were undertaken, the 
responses given would have represented the view point of the stakeholder at that 
moment in time. It should be remembered that this view may have since changed or 
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altered in some way, in line with policy processes and changes to the socio-
economic impacts such policies might have had. Indeed, throughout the period of 
conducting this thesis, the policy landscape has varied significantly (for instance 
around Universal Credit), and this has been updated in the thesis as far as possible. 
The problem occurs where the reality of austerity and welfare-to-work in local and 
regional scenarios streaks far ahead of the policy documentation which accompanies 
them. It is therefore important to acknowledge the temporal nature of research which 
heavily involves policy and the potential issues that this presents. 
In a similar way, it must also be considered that participant opinions and responses 
may be biased, especially those originating at the local level, and are more likely for 
those situations where negative consequences of austerity and welfare-to-work 
policies are prevailing. This in turn means that the interpretation of responses given 
had to be objective (as far as possible) and measured in order to separate fact from 
opinion. 
Although there were therefore a number of limitations present within the process, the 
methods used enabled the researcher to address the aims of the research 
effectively. Future study of the topic area could be used to solve some of the 
limitations encountered, however the current thesis has settled these issues in an 
appropriate and effective manner. 
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Chapter 5: Austerity Politics – Economic Necessity or 
Politically Driven Strategy? 
 
5.1  Introduction - the geo-economics and geopolitics of austerity 
The 2010-2015 Coalition Government in the UK implemented a raft of austerity-
inspired policies justified by their conviction of an essential requirement to 
significantly reduce national debt following the 2008-9 global financial crisis. The 
2010 Comprehensive Spending Review – where the government set out its spending 
plans for the next three years – heralded an overall reduction in government 
spending of £83bn by 2014/15 (HM Treasury, 2013a). All but a few areas of 
government spending – notably health and education – were spared. Some of the 
most significant cuts were reserved for the welfare budget, which was earmarked for 
an £11bn reduction and which has subsequently risen further, such that cuts will 
reach £18bn by 2014-15 with an additional £4bn to the end of the spending period in 
2018 (HM Treasury, 2013b). It quickly became apparent that if some areas of 
government spending were to be spared while others were targeted for deeper cuts, 
austerity politics may be an economic necessity post-2008, but where the axe was to 
fall was an intensely politicised act. This was something that the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, himself makes clear: 
“Cutting pensions to pay for working age benefits is a choice this government 
is certainly not prepared to make” (George Osborne, quoted in The Guardian, 
2013b:n.p; emphasis added). 
Thus whilst the government has indicated that cuts to welfare spending are an 
economic necessity, there is clearly a level of choice as to where the cuts should fall, 
which areas of government spending should be cut harder and faster, and ultimately 
which parts of society should be affected most or least. Such choices clarify that 
even within the restraints of austerity, there is still a significant level of politically 
conscious choice available with which to pursue a desired agenda to produce a 
certain preferred outcome (König, 2015). 
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Against this backdrop, the Coalition Government – certainly the Conservative 
element of it – has been quick to point out that welfare spending was out of control 
under the previous Labour Government. They emphasise that welfare spending was 
ultimately unsustainable and should therefore be front and centre of the cuts. 
Speaking about welfare reform, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, claims: 
“There are few more entrenched problems than our out-of-control welfare 
system and few more daunting challenges than reforming it” (quoted in The 
Telegraph, 2012c:n.p). 
This is despite social security spending accounting for only a tiny fraction of the 
overall welfare budget. In 2011/12 benefit spending in the UK was £159bn, of which 
only £4.9bn (3%) was spent on Jobseekers Allowance. By contrast £74.2bn (47%) 
was spent on pensions (Guardian, 2013a). Yet, the Coalition Government appear to 
have put forward a convincing argument for reducing spending on social security to 
all but the bare minimum (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). 
All major UK political parties agree on the need to reduce debt levels, with cuts to 
government spending part of this process. The Conservative Party has suggested 
that reducing national debt forms a key part of their plan to “secure a stronger 
economy and a better future for Britain” (The Conservative Party, 2014a:n.p), whilst 
the Liberal Democrats’ leader up to the 2015 General Election, Nick Clegg, has also 
pressed the need to meet the challenge of growing national debt through a balance 
of tax and spending cuts to achieve a “stronger economy and fairer society” (The 
Liberal Democrats, 2015a:n.p). In comparison, Labour’s former Shadow Chancellor, 
Ed Balls, has also expressed the importance to “deliver a surplus on the current 
budget and get the national debt falling in the next Parliament” (The Labour Party, 
2014a:n.p). As a result the political debate centres on three key questions: 
(i) How deep the cuts need to be? 
(ii) How fast the cuts need to be made? 
(iii) Where should the cuts be made (which by implication means which part(s) 
of society and the country should shoulder the biggest burden for cutting 
the deficit)? 
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The nature of the debate is one which ebbs and flows according to the geo-
economic and geopolitical arguments put forward by the various stakeholders – from 
the political parties themselves, to political commentators, global institutions (the EU, 
IMF, World Bank) all the way through to social groups. In crude terms, the 
Conservative Party rhetoric argues cuts to be an economic necessity, having very 
little to do with political prerogatives (The Conservative Party, 2014b); while the 
Labour Party argue that while cuts are necessary economically, they need not be as 
quick or as deep. The Labour Party leader up until the 2015 General Election, Ed 
Miliband, suggests that the current austerity politics in the UK reflect the politically 
motivated aspirations of the Conservative Party rather more than what is 
economically necessary to rejuvenate the UK economy: 
“They are doing it, not because they have to do it, but because they want to.” 
(The Labour Party, 2014b:n.p) 
Similarly, the Liberal Democrats have also expressed concerns that their Coalition 
partners have attempted to pursue deep and rapid cuts too aggressively, as the now 
former party leader Nick Clegg noted in his speech to the Liberal Democrat Spring 
Conference in 2013: 
“Balancing the books is a judgement, not a science. And our plan has always 
allowed room for manoeuvre. One of the most important things I have learnt in 
government is this: in a fluid, fast-moving global economic environment, 
sticking to a plan requires government to be flexible, as well as resolute. 
Nimble, as well as determined. When economic circumstances around us 
deteriorated and UK growth forecasts suffered, voices on the right called for 
us to respond by cutting further and faster. But instead we took the pragmatic 
choice to extend the deficit reduction timetable” (Clegg, 2013 at the Liberal 
Democrat Spring Conference). 
 
Allied to this, heightened levels of conditionality applied to the benefits system – in 
particular that being placed upon those already in employment and in receipt of 
social security support from the state – and figures suggesting that the Coalition’s 
welfare reform agenda has been more symbolic than saving the vast sums of money 
the UK Government propose is required to sustain a long-term, balanced and 
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sustainable recovery, are fuelling the argument that austerity politics are more 
politically-driven than derived from economic logic (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). 
The first of three empirical chapters, the aim of this chapter is to reveal how austerity 
politics are influencing (the geography of) welfare provision in the UK. It will examine 
whether there has been a qualitative shift in the welfare-to-work policy following the 
2008-9 financial crisis (Section 5.2); whether the welfare reforms and austerity 
measures implemented by the UK Coalition Government reflect economic necessity 
and/or a conscious political strategy (Section 5.3); and if, and where, there are 
contradictions between the rhetoric and the reality of austerity-inspired welfare-to-
work policy strategies (Section 5.4). It will also address the perceptions and attitudes 
to welfare-to-work which provide the support for government policy rhetoric (Section 
5.5). Finally it will relate these findings to broader debates on welfare geographies 
(Section 5.6). 
 
5.2  The plan: austerity politics - in what sense a (re)new(ed) welfare-to-work 
discourse? 
The Coalition Government was quick to herald its welfare-to-work programme as 
something qualitatively new and different from that which preceded it (Taylor-Gooby, 
2015). Indeed the media have proclaimed the reforms as signalling a complete 
overhaul of the welfare system (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). That said, the validity of 
such statements has been challenged with suggestions that far from being new, the 
Coalition Government’s welfare-to-work programme is in fact a continuation, 
extension and intensification of policy processes already underway (Grimshaw and 
Rubery, 2012). 
Alongside this, very few people disagree that the Welfare State is in need of reform – 
particularly post-financial crisis. But, as one interviewee put it to me, the way it 
appears to be being carried out - by effectively marginalising the most exposed 
members of society, consciously or otherwise - has increasingly come to represent 
the front line for social and political contest: 
“It appears that some of the most vulnerable, most deprived people … the 
poorest people in our society are going to be adversely affected, which an 
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observer would suggest is only going to increase inequality and unfairness.” 
(Spokesperson, Wirral Borough Council) 
In the face of such criticism, government reforms are being accompanied by 
language aimed at justifying the measures being taken. An agenda of fairness has 
become a major debating point (Hoggett et al., 2013), one which reverberates 
around the whole austerity agenda with proclamations of everyone being ‘in it 
together’ offset by those arguing ‘only those who can afford to pay should be asked 
to pay’, that those with ‘the broadest shoulders’ should take the biggest burden, and 
‘the bankers caused it so they should pay for it.’ The interviews indicate that far from 
being ‘in it together’, the most vulnerable people in society are being affected by 
austerity politics and welfare reforms. More than this they reveal that this dichotomy 
is not so clear cut. Rather there is a far more nuanced and politicised disambiguation 
of the causes and consequences of austerity inspired welfare reform. 
Clearly those who are, or become, unemployed in times of recession or stunted post-
recession economic recovery are likely to face a heavy burden from welfare reforms 
(MacLeavy, 2011; Larner et al. 2013), but it is becoming increasingly apparent that 
other social groups are starting to be affected more so than in previous examples of 
welfare reforms. Such groups include the disabled, women and young people who 
are low skilled (Patrick, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2015), but now extend to include those 
who are in work but on low pay and therefore still reliant on state support to a lesser 
or greater extent (Newman, 2011; Hancock and Mooney, 2012). This point is usefully 
picked up in Peck’s work on neoliberal reforms where he suggests that those not 
afforded protection by those in power or a significant voting influence electorally are 
exposed to what he sees as: 
“the default targeting of programs for the poor and marginalised, but also 
extending into middle-class terrain…where costs can be externalised and 
services incrementally privatised” (Peck, 2012:631). 
Targeting those on the margins of society by applying pressure to move from welfare 
to work can be seen most clearly through a heightened level of conditionality now 
being placed on citizens to search for work in return for benefit receipt, and this will 
be addressed in the next section of the chapter. 
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5.2.1 (Re)new(ing) conditionality 
Under the Coalition Government benefit entitlements have been cut harder in real 
terms than at any point in the past: £19bn per year by 2014-15, equivalent to £470 
for every working age adult in the UK (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). Allied to this, as 
one project co-ordinator at a Manchester-based housing and employment charity 
explains, proving entitlement to those out-of-work benefits has somewhat perversely 
become a full time occupation in itself: 
“All of a sudden they’ve got this big commitment. [The government is] going 
from let’s not do anything with you, just come here every fortnight, sign your 
name and off you pop, to all of a sudden, now you will do everything. It’s a full 
time job for you to find work. And we’re getting quite a lot of that now as well, 
the jobcentre saying well now you must do thirty two hours per week of 
looking for work.” (Project Co-ordinator, Greater Manchester Social Housing 
Provider) 
What this points to is the role of social security changing as a result of austerity 
politics, with the erosion of the safety net which constitutes the very foundation of the 
Welfare State concept. Whilst the least economically active groups have always 
been guaranteed a minimum standard of living irrespective of their own socio-
economic circumstances (Painter, 2002), the current process of austerity-inspired 
welfare reform is characterised by a drive to save money by constricting the payment 
of benefits through additional conditionalities and responsibilities, seemingly 
wherever this is possible (Standing, 2013b). The deployment of such “technologies 
of power” to control the conditionality of access to benefits to those traditionally in 
receipt of out of work and disability benefits is now being applied to those in some 
form of structured employment (Etherington and Ingold, 2012:33). In this way, whilst 
the principle of conditionality being applied to benefit receipt is nothing new, it is now 
being applied more extensively and in a far firmer manner than in the past. This idea 
is similar to that of Patrick (2012:8) who notes that the: 
“while the Coalition argues that it is developing a distinctive welfare reform 
agenda … there are in fact marked similarities between the Coalition’s 
approach and its New Labour predecessors. Indeed the Coalition seems to be 
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simply extending New Labour’s reliance on welfare conditionality and 
sanctions.” 
Furthermore, what is qualitatively new is the use of in-work conditionality alongside 
out of work conditionality. In short, the same scrutiny placed on those out of work is 
now being applied to those in employment but who still rely on some state support. 
Alongside in-work conditionality, there has also been a tightening of the remit of 
testing and sanctioning procedures. This entails people having to justify their 
entitlement to benefits according to new, stricter, criteria as set out by the Coalition 
Government: 
“Jobseekers need to justify that they are actually looking for a job. Being 
unemployed isn’t enough. Even in cases where people have paid into the 
system for twenty years, they are being asked during their contributory period, 
to justify what they are doing to look for a job. There is a sense that you have 
a responsibility as an unemployed person to be doing this, this and this, and 
we’re not going to pay you unless you’re doing it. So rather than leaving 
someone for six months to see whether or not they can get a job, they are 
perhaps being pursued a bit more. They still need to go for interviews and still 
need to justify it to the jobcentre. And that obviously creates an emphasis on 
helping yourself.” (Spokesperson for a Liverpool Citizens’ Advice Bureau 
(CAB)) 
The idea of ‘helping yourself’ is integral to workforce programmes, as is 
conditionality, but the importance that the Coalition Government has placed on work 
through its austerity programme is progressively intensifying a conditionality regime 
which means recipients can now lose some or all of their entitlements for between 4 
weeks and 3 years (DWP, 2013b). In fact, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
justify entitlement to social security support through a testing system that is 
increasingly prescribed. This is coupled to new sanctions which punitively force 
people towards the labour market faster than in the past. Reinforcing the emphasis 
of responsibility on citizens to search for work in order to gain access to benefits, 
Peck (2012:632) makes the important point that: 
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“austerity is ultimately concerned with offloading costs, displacing 
responsibility; it is about making others pay the price of fiscal retrenchment” 
(original emphasis). 
Thus the social contract which exists between the state and its citizens is changing 
rapidly such that rights to support are no longer a basic entitlement but a condition of 
work. 
This social contract, which is at the heart of the Welfare State, is now becoming 
increasingly one sided. Far more importance is being placed on the responsibilities 
of the citizen through conditionality and this is being coupled with a more minimalist 
role for the state in welfare provision. As part of this, the government is also 
redefining the scope of vulnerability, with extreme conditionality requirements being 
placed not only on those in and out of work, but also on those previously deemed too 
sick to work or who are disabled: 
“What’s changing is that the extent of conditionality directed at working-age 
people receiving a whole range of different benefits is being intensified - 
whether that would be people who were previously on disability benefits 
who’ve been reassessed under both the Personal Independence Payments, 
or the existing Employment Support Allowance arrangements, through to lone 
parents being drawn in to this conditionality regime, through to people in work. 
So the nature of the contract is changing. It’s being made much more explicit.” 
(Spokesperson, Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion (CESI)) 
With this in mind, it appears that the shift towards much more explicit conditionality is 
not entirely new. Instead it is formalising a process which already existed (Taylor, 
2010; Wright, 2012). Despite the Coalition Government suggesting otherwise, this 
points to the economic situation being used to justify not only a renewing, but a 
further strengthening, of the social contract which sees responsibility shifting from 
the state to its citizens (Howell, 2015). 
Nevertheless, there is an argument to suggest that using the economic crisis to push 
through these policy measures has been done without the ramifications of any 
political fallout which might arise at a more affluent time being thought through: 
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“the bottom line for the Welfare State is that in a globalised world its business 
is to educate, train, incentivise and mobilise the population for paid work – 
and to do as little as possible beyond that.” (Taylor-Gooby, 2012b:124) 
Furthermore, this extension of conditionality seems to be a politically conscious 
decision as it has drawn people into the welfare-to-work process who had previously 
been exempt for genuine reasons that are now deemed inadequate because of the 
prevailing economic conditions, whilst others remain immune who could quite easily 
fall into the same remit. For example, between October 2008 and March 2013, 
980,400 people were found fit for work who were previously exempt (DWP, 2014b). 
This change appears to create conflict, because whilst people’s welfare needs 
remain relatively stable, many are now deemed fit to work when in the past they 
were not. This implies that such a stark difference in benefit eligibility lies with 
deliberate policy ideals, and so conditionality appears to follow the politically 
conscious rhetoric set out in Coalition welfare-to-work discourse. However, it should 
also be remembered that reducing the number of people eligible to claim benefits is 
not completely based on an ideological rhetoric for a smaller state, but to an extent is 
also an economic necessity as part of the government’s deficit reduction strategy 
(Gaffney, 2015). 
 
5.2.2 In-work conditionality: extending welfare-to-work 
Whilst those able to work but who are unemployed have been necessarily pushed 
towards the labour market, the incentivisation created by strict conditionality has 
been extended to those already in work who are not in full time employment or 
earning below the threshold amount entitling them to continued state support. This 
was highlighted by a number of respondents expressing similar concerns to the 
following example from a Trade Union spokesperson: 
“One part of Universal Credit is something called in-work conditionality. This 
means, for the first time ever by the way, a benefit has had the word 
conditionality attached to it. So…you’re getting working tax credits because 
you’re in a job... and you’re doing sixteen hours work. In-work conditionality 
means that after your sixteen hours you now have to show the jobcentre that 
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you are actively looking for more hours” (emphasis added). (Spokesperson for 
the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW)) 
Whilst in more prosperous times such a policy might have been met with some 
resistance, or at the very least questioned, under austerity politics it is proclaimed as 
a necessary aspect of reducing the budgetary deficit. It cannot be underestimated 
that the reforms are ushering in a completely new ideology that not only scrutinises 
those out of work, but also places additional responsibilities on those in work to 
progress up the income scale to a point where they no longer require state support. 
This is significant because it presents an entirely new approach to thinking about 
welfare entitlements. Even those people who are in some form of employment no 
longer have an automatic right to social security support. As social commentators 
Dwyer and Wright (2014:31) have portrayed: 
“One of the crucial changes that Universal Credit brings is to open up low-paid 
insecure and part-time workers and their partners to behavioural conditionality 
and associated sanctions/fines. This onus on heavy sticks was originally 
designed to deter so-called ‘free loaders’ from claiming unemployment 
benefits when they were not looking for work. Universal Credit now enables 
this sanction based approach to be applied to in work claimants for the first 
time. However, the harsh penalties introduced seem potentially counter-
productive as a principle for delivering in-work benefits for those who are 
already fulfilling their work related citizenship obligations.” 
Similarly Bennett (2012:18) suggests that this latest form of conditionality serves to 
problematise welfare-to-work policy because: 
“[I]t re-categorises the previously respectable ‘deserving’ status of low paid 
workers as ‘undeserving’. As such it serves to abolish the distinction between 
being ‘in’ and ‘out’ of work – and also, in theory at least, to extend 
conditionality – and its associated stigma – to everyone within its range.” 
Furthermore, this growing conditionality agenda throws up another key issue which 
had not been apparent before. Whilst the payment of benefits both in and out of work 
now has a swathe of conditionality attached to it, the heightened significance of 
means testing over universalism means that there is no longer necessarily an 
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automatic right to welfare provision (Etherington and Ingold, 2012). This not only 
means conditionality in justification for meeting the criteria of looking for work, but for 
the first time, it means justifying that you are genuinely poor enough to be in receipt 
of benefits. What this means is that whilst in the past it was more of an open and 
shut case, where falling below a certain income threshold entitled someone to 
benefits whatever their circumstances, the current means testing regime dictates that 
being poor is not merely enough. In effect benefits are no longer for the poor, but 
instead are reserved for poor people actively seeking work, a category of ‘work-first 
welfare’: 
“In the rights and responsibilities agenda, the idea that to be in receipt of 
welfare…you should be actively seeking work and that is part of your 
responsibilities before you should be claiming any welfare benefit, therefore 
you should be out there actively seeking work, and that also links to the 
agenda obviously of the issue of are people on out of work benefits, 
particularly IB as it was, ESA as it now is, that those people should not be 
‘parked’ on those benefits as might have been the case previously, but they 
should be tested or whatever to see whether they are claiming the right 
benefits. So I think there is an issue there that the welfare still has a role, but 
there’s clearly this issue that you should be out there actively helping yourself, 
helping the country by looking for work etcetera.” (Professional Fellow, 
Institute for Employment Research) 
This brings an entirely new definition to the relationship between the state and its 
citizens, and consequentially how the very nature of dependency is perceived; there 
is far more emphasis on people having a responsibility to earn welfare support than 
having a basic entitlement to it. This is clearly a highly politicised aspect of welfare-
to-work rhetoric, and far from being economically necessary - only 3% of benefit 
spending goes on JSA, 3% on IB and 2% on ESA (Guardian, 2013a) - appears to 
form part of a deliberate push to justify moving people off benefits and away from 
state support by redefining the criteria for entitlement to social security. This is also 
portrayed by MacLeavy (2011) who suggests that austerity has provided an 
opportunity not only for government to legitimately tighten its grip on welfare 
recipients in terms of pushing them towards the labour market and therefore taking 
greater responsibility for their own welfare, but has also skewed the relationship 
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between the state and its citizens in terms of lowering expectations of basic 
entitlements. She asserts that: 
“the overall objectives of reform - encouraging those who can to work, 
delivering a simplified system, reducing costs and removing perverse 
disincentives to paid employment - do not purport to share economic risks 
across a wider population, redistribute resources over the individual/family 
lifecycle and between generations and balance taxation between those with 
and without dependents in the manner of the post-war welfare state. Rather 
they are designed to reduce the social insurance and protection that was 
instituted by the Welfare State by forcing a substantial reduction in the 
numbers of those receiving financial assistance” (MacLeavy, 2011:365). 
An additional concern is that this new form of conditionality for those in receipt of in-
work benefits now constitutes a greater proportion of spending than that of 
conditional benefits for the unemployed: 
“[A]t the lower level we’re seeing more and more people in receipt of in-work 
benefits, so having to go through the claim process and everything that goes 
with it while they’re in work…In Greater Manchester…the welfare spending 
budget now is greater for in-work benefits than it is on out of work benefits, so 
what we’ve got is the state if you like is propping up low paid work and 
employers who only want to pay the minimum wage. So that has been a big 
impact on people I think, and then if the changes to Universal Credit do go 
through, then there’ll be an impact on that group of people who are in work 
who have conditionality applied to them which will mean that they’ll have to 
repeatedly and consistently show what they’ve done to try to get more work, 
higher paid work, better paid work, more hours of work. So they’ll have a 
whole load of hoops that they’ll have to jump through to retain any benefits 
when they’re in work” (emphasis added). (Senior Official, Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) in the North West of England)  
Consequently, it appears that the austerity measures are creating conditions 
whereby conditionality is being transferred from those outside the labour market to 
those in some form of work, especially those who are low paid and in receipt of 
significant amounts of income support. This is different from what has been seen in 
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the past. There now appears to be an increasingly strong focus on not only getting 
people into a job, but to continually push them to make a commitment to take on 
more work such that they are gradually entitled to less and less social security 
support. This principle has been highlighted by McCollum (2012:227), who conveys 
that: 
“for the changes to the welfare system…to prove effective they need to take 
place alongside reforms to the precarious and poor quality nature of the jobs 
that many of those going into work are restricted to.” 
What this infers is that whilst it is acceptable for governments to continually advocate 
more work and less reliance on the state, the opportunities must exist in the labour 
market for people to take on such additional responsibilities to provide for 
themselves. Without these incentives inevitable tensions are created between state 
welfare-to-work rhetoric on the one hand, and the neoliberal nature of the labour 
market on the other. 
What is more, in-work conditionality has been accompanied by increased 
responsibility being placed upon benefit recipients to continue to search for extra 
hours of work to the point where they are no longer entitled to claim support from the 
state: 
“I guess primarily since the Coalition has come in, the first aim in many 
respects has been to try and change the relationship between rights and 
responsibilities…that there’s been a greater tightening of requirements put on 
people…So, a lot of households will be required to be looking for work, even if 
they are in work. So there are a lot of conversations there about where the 
responsibility for, not just getting into work, but moving off benefits as a 
process, are going to lie.” (Research Fellow, Policy Exchange) 
This raises the issue that if citizens have additional responsibilities to look for work 
then the jobs or extra hours must necessarily be available for them to move into. 
This is invariably creating tensions for both employers and employees given the 
current economic climate in which suitable vacancies and hours are proving less 
forthcoming than is required. This mismatch has been highlighted by Hancock and 
Mooney (2012:4) who have identified that the state has a role to play: 
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“in both producing and reproducing inequality in the context of Neoliberalism 
while also managing the effects of rising inequality in terms of a growing 
punitiveness and steady drift towards authoritarianism.”  
What this means is that the state must not contradict itself by applying ever stronger 
job search criteria to people when the prevailing economic conditions fail to allow for 
it. The outcome is likely to be greater welfare dependency in future, resulting in a 
greater cost to the public purse and thus the limited success or even failure of the 
current raft of welfare-to-work policies aimed at bringing about serious reform in the 
UK labour market and Welfare State. 
 
5.3  The plan: (re)new(ing) welfare-to-work policies – economically and/or 
politically driven? 
Whilst the UK Government has vociferously argued that their austerity welfare forms 
a crucial aspect of their deficit reduction plan, there has been significant opposition 
implying that the economic crisis has provided a basis for pushing through a 
politically motivated ideology for a smaller state. This section examines the extent to 
which these welfare-to-work policies are economically or politically driven. It will 
analyse which groups are being affected, the intensity of the rhetoric being 
implemented, and the language being utilised to justify the policies being 
implemented. 
 
5.3.1  Making work pay 
The Coalition Government’s ‘making work pay’ rhetoric has become a key part of a 
drive to get more people into work and thus lower dependency and the overall cost 
of social security (Morris, 2011). Such an agenda is proving more difficult to achieve 
however due to its reliance on jobs being available for people to move into. As one 
interviewee remarked, this is particularly difficult at a time when the economic 
recovery remains relatively sluggish comparative to the speed with which the 
government is imposing welfare-to-work reforms: 
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“I don’t think anybody argues the fact that the system needs to be simplified, 
and there needs to be incentives for people to go into work. The problem is 
that the economy as it is. What chance have people got who have never 
worked, who have got low attainment in school? ... How they’re expected to 
get jobs in times like this is beyond me really, and that’s the problem. Welfare 
reform only really works when there are jobs available. So basically, what 
they’re doing is they are penalising people on benefits; trying to make it 
harder to live on benefits, but there’s no other real alternative.” (Senior 
Official, Knowsley Housing Trust) 
In some ways this rhetoric to make work pay is somewhat inevitable; spending 
reductions are clearly a necessary aspect of austerity and the rebalancing of the 
economy, however the intensity with which the policy pushes people towards the 
labour market is most certainly a politically conscious decision (Radice, 2011). Policy 
is forcing people to search for work in an economic environment which is not suited 
to the structure of the current UK labour market, but despite a lack of suitable job 
vacancies for the number of people now being scrutinised, the Coalition Government 
has continued to pursue its welfare-to-work agenda including greater conditionality 
and sanctioning for non-compliance. 
In the period up to July 2014, 1.01 million people in the UK were claiming JSA 
compared with 656,000 available job vacancies (ONS, 2014c). This suggests that 
pushing people towards the labour market under the banner of ‘making work pay’ is 
widely accepted as being economically necessary rather than being a political 
choice. However, implementing this policy is becoming increasingly difficult because 
benefits are being squeezed to encourage people towards a labour market which 
cannot accommodate them, and to which there is no alternative. This is 
comparatively noted by Jones (2012:442), when claiming that: 
“the imposition of a ‘one size fits all’ solution inappropriate to the problems of 
an area of high unemployment…means a catastrophic social fallout which will 
cost more to put right than the government has ever saved.” 
The entire policy rhetoric which the Coalition has developed to ‘make work pay’ is 
constructed around the idea that someone will always be better off in work than on 
benefits. The idea is that making the disparities between the financial rewards of 
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being in work as opposed to being on benefits will adequately incentivise people to 
actively seek work (Wright, 2012). However, despite this appearing to be a perfectly 
sensible assumption, according to the experiences of some of the people 
interviewed, it is far from the reality: 
“It’s always a trade off because… you could make work pay for some people 
at some time, but you’re never going to make work pay for everyone at every 
time. This is simply because any time you provide any sort of transfer you 
have to take it away again. Either you have to take it away in an abatement, 
or you have to take it away in higher taxes. So there’s no such thing as a 
disincentive-free Welfare State, unless of course you provide no benefits at 
all, and no-one’s arguing for that! So it’s that choice about who exactly the 
system is trying to support into work, and which people might face 
disincentives. But they are actually a second-order problem and they should 
really just look after themselves. So that’s the choice policymakers have to 
make” (emphasis added). (Senior Official, Think Tank Reform) 
Indeed, whilst under the Coalition Government people in work are nearly always 
better off in work, in a number of instances, particularly for part time and low paid 
jobs, the incentives are so minimal or even non-existent that it is frequently seen as 
superfluous to get a job. For example, single people working for the national 
minimum wage might only take home £62 per week compared to £71 if they were on 
Jobseekers Allowance (JRF, 2014a). What is more, even realistic financial incentives 
are now being counterbalanced by the austerity measures being utilised alongside 
these work incentives, such that for many people any extra income attained by being 
in employment is lost almost immediately to additional costs of transport and 
childcare, suggesting that in reality the aims of austerity and making work pay are in 
conflict and incompatible with one another. As a result policies around making work 
pay serve only to compound dependency and the lifestyle choices they seek to 
disenfranchise through a lack of available and suitable forms of employment. Thus it 
is clear that cuts in the name of austerity do need to be made, but because the 
structure of the labour market makes it impossible for work to benefit everyone at the 
same time, the decisions about who benefits and who loses out in this process can 
be exposed as very much a political preference. 
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This is eluded to by McCollum (2012), who conveys that the mandate of welfare-to-
work policies forcing people towards the labour market is simply not adequate 
because jobs are frequently short term and low paid, meaning that they often lead to 
low pay, no pay cycling, in and out of the benefits system. He goes on to add that 
meaningful, sustained work that incentivises employment over benefits dependency 
is the only legitimate method of lowering the cost of welfare on the state, employers 
and individuals. On the other hand, Royston (2012:71) suggests that the more 
favourable benefit taper rate afforded by Universal Credit “helps to ensure that work 
pays, even when undertaking a small number of hours.” 
What has also become apparent from the interviews is that lack of suitable 
employment opportunities is just as much of a deterrent to work as generous benefit 
provision: 
“This government thinks that welfare benefits are a hindrance to work. But 
actually what is a hindrance to work is not having work to go to.” (City 
Councillor in Liverpool) 
In effect, whilst it is an economic necessity to get people into work in order to lower 
the supposed burden of inflated welfare spending, the lack of employment 
opportunities perhaps creates a greater problem of dependency than receipt of 
welfare benefits. In this way, the focus of government policy on limiting access to 
welfare benefits as a way of forcing people into work is unfounded because there are 
not the jobs for people to take (see ONS, 2014c). Furthermore, it implies that 
because there is no economic rationale for forcing people towards a labour market 
which cannot accommodate them, the process of attacking welfare benefits as part 
of welfare-to-work reforms represents a deliberate political strategy. This rings true 
with the comments of Clegg (2010:7) who infers that: 
“without even speaking of the social impacts of such limited state support for 
unemployed people, it is therefore far from clear that Britain’s restrictive 
benefit regime is economically virtuous.” 
Getting people into work is the linchpin idea behind much of the rhetoric which has 
been lain out by the Coalition Government. Aspiring to increase the rate of 
employment in the UK is not new but the Coalition appears to have taken a less 
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humanistic approach to the job search process. They have been far more concerned 
with using austerity to get people off benefits rather than finding them a suitable job: 
“It’s giving ammunition and power to companies to sanction people off 
benefits and all the rest of it. It’s another way of getting people off benefits 
which the jobcentre can’t do.” (Project Co-ordinator, Greater Manchester 
Social Housing Provider) 
What the government rhetoric intends is that by adjusting entitlements and taper 
rates to favour people in work as opposed to those outside of the labour market, they 
can create the right incentives to push people into work rather than living comfortable 
lives on benefits at the expense of the state. This has clear echoes with what the 
political commentator Wright (2012:320-321) reminds us of: 
“Policymaking is not a neutral process. It is a political process within which 
agency is exercised in relation to competing interests…Policy-makers have 
pressed ahead with reforms regardless of evidence that policies are unlikely 
to have the stated intended effect.” 
She goes on to state that: 
“this means that welfare reforms have been justified largely in relation to a 
non-existent problem; only a tiny proportion of people who can work do not do 
so.” 
By utilising a regime of conditionality for both those out of work and in work, coupled 
with punitive sanctioning measures for non-compliance, the intention to move people 
off benefits and into sustained employment is being sacrificed at the expense of 
getting people into any job at any wage; suggesting policy is being driven much more 
by political ideology than economic necessity. 
 
5.3.2  Small state ideology and the neoliberal tendencies of welfare-to-work 
Whilst the government and its supporters have argued that achieving a smaller state 
through austerity is an economic necessity, many others have opposed this idea: 
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“I think this government has taken that on another ratchet. Personally I think 
they want to aim towards a more minimal state, which is quite philosophically 
different I guess from the Labour view of it, but using similar market processes 
and really just intensifying it. So we did quite a lot of work on the Open Public 
Services White Paper that lays out all that they want to change in the 
relationship between the state and society. I think that is quite different than 
New Labour and I think they’ve used the financial crisis as a sort of tool really. 
They can talk about reducing the deficit and the Big Society and all this, but 
actually they want the smaller state, because that’s what they believe in.” 
(Spokesperson, Social Action and Research Foundation (SARF)) 
This once again points to a politically conscious strategy to achieve a more 
minimalist state using the financial crisis as a tool for doing so. In essence the 
financial crisis has presented the Coalition Government with an opportunity to not 
only reduce the level of public spending and in turn the deficit, but simultaneously 
use it to justify reducing the size of the state and altering the nature of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens (Hamnett, 2014). 
In addition, it has moved away from the financial significance of benefits, instead 
putting considerable emphasis on the opportunities available for people to take 
responsibility for their own needs through work and to better themselves without 
financial support from the state: 
“The other fundamental shift has been when they talk about poverty now. 
Even though they still have a relative income poverty measure, the present 
government is trying to de-emphasise both that and the importance of money, 
and emphasise the importance of opportunities, behaviours and the 
environment that children grow up in - not necessarily focusing on the finance” 
(Spokesperson, Centre for Research on Social Policy). 
By de-emphasising the relevance of the financial aspects of austerity and welfare 
reform, the government is essentially disregarding the economic prerogative which 
formed the basis of its policy rhetoric. Dickens indicates that the Coalition realises 
that meeting poverty targets based on financial foundations laid out by the previous 
government is unrealistic and so it has shifted away from pure income measures 
towards improving life chances. He goes on to state that changing the definitions of 
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poverty is a dangerous political game that the government is playing because “these 
measures detract from income as an important factor” (2011:17) in both measuring 
and addressing issues of poverty and dependency. 
Another of the major themes to emerge from the interview process is the changing 
attitude towards the longstanding rights of citizens affected by welfare-to-work: 
“Well exactly, if your responsibility is to take a job then do you have a right to 
get one? That question I think needs fundamentally addressing...in terms of 
what constitutes welfare rights. Is someone’s welfare right declining if you 
keep reducing social security? I think it probably is, but other people might just 
think well you know, some of the rights of social security are to some 
modicum of income support, so I don’t know. So rights and responsibilities, I 
mean it’s an old thing, responsibility is getting stronger; I don’t think people’s 
rights are getting much better to be honest.” (Researcher, Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) North) 
What this suggests is a qualitative shift in the attitude and perception of the state 
towards its citizens because not only is there now far more emphasis being placed 
on citizen responsibilities to work than their entitlements to support from the Welfare 
State, but also that the Welfare State is itself now being utilised not as a tool for 
providing a safety net for those members of society exposed to the negative effects 
of neoliberal market forces, but for embedding a small state agenda through 
austerity and welfare-to-work policies (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014). In essence the 
attitude has inverted, to a situation where the state has a right to expect citizens to 
work for welfare support, as opposed to citizens expecting to have an unconditional 
right to that support. This is highlighted by Dale (2012:17), who suggests this relates 
to the work of Harvey (2005) in that: 
“the free market utopia that ostensibly defines Neoliberalism in fact functions 
as ideological cover for a ‘class project’: the drive to restore corporate profit 
rates at the expense of workers and welfare recipients.” 
There is a much higher importance now placed on the responsibility of people to 
provide for themselves rather than having a right to dependency on the state, with 
welfare more concerned with the neoliberal prerogative of the market than the needs 
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of its citizens (Howell, 2015). Such a process consolidates the ideas of Swyngedouw 
(2011:372), who suggests that the configurations of social aspects of governance: 
“combines a desire to construct politically the market as the preferred social 
institution of resource mobilisation and allocation…an engineering of the 
social in the direction of greater individualised responsibility.” 
Thus the underlying message here is that whilst savings do need to be made as a 
point of economic necessity, the government is using the opportunity to weave a 
neoliberal discourse into the fabric of the Welfare State to a greater extent than ever 
before, and this suggests that welfare-to-work policy and therefore in turn the welfare 
provision of the state is very much a politically driven process. 
It has also become increasingly apparent that unlike previous attempts by 
governments to implement reforms, where the objective has always been to help 
people to take responsibility for themselves and their welfare through work, it is 
appearing increasingly the case that the means testing agenda of the Coalition 
Government is not seen primarily as a method of helping people into employment, 
but instead is more about getting people off benefits and onto Jobseekers 
Allowance: 
“From the government’s point of view I think Employment Support Allowance, 
that’s definitely been a winner for them, because people are being registered 
as fit for work. Whether or not those people then go on to get jobs, I don’t 
know?” (Spokesperson, Blackpool Council) 
This appears to be more about actively minimising the size of the state and its role in 
social security provision, by getting people off benefits, and in particular those on IB 
and ESA benefits, and onto Jobseekers Allowance which makes them far easier to 
target and push towards the active labour market, and hence a lesser place for 
responsibility of the state to support its citizens. In 2008, 2.6m people were claiming 
sickness benefit, and by August 2010, 900,000 people had been claiming it for more 
than a decade (DWP, 2014b). Furthermore, there appears to be a deliberate 
disregard for the needs of the individual in this respect, with the primary concern 
being getting people off benefits without considering whether a person is actually fit 
for work, and in fact whether there is a job for them at the end of the process. 
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Lindsay and Houston (2011) note that the Coalition as well as their Labour 
predecessors has taken the view of the sickness benefit issue as a problem of 
employability, motivation and skills amongst a core group of the population. This is 
despite considerable evidence correlating labour market conditions and the level of 
IB claims, and therefore shows that there is greater emphasis being placed on the 
political ideology of reducing the number of benefit claimants than the economic 
prerogative on which many of the current welfare-to-work policies have been 
constructed. 
Henceforth it does appear that under the banner of austerity the Coalition 
Government is pursuing this agenda with far more guile and ferocity than has been 
the case in the past, and whilst lowering the burden of dependency on the state is 
very much a necessity to reign back welfare spending, the intensity with which the 
process is being advocated through austerity and welfare-to-work is certainly a 
politically conscious decision, because the economic rationale to forcing people off 
benefits when there is no job for them to move into is questionable, and points to a 
more ideological objective. 
 
5.3.3  Where the cuts fall 
Some groups who prior to the recession might have been earmarked to be 
potentially adversely affected by austerity and cuts to social security and welfare 
provision have in fact been spared much of the burden of the cuts: 
“The other way of flipping this round is if you want to work out who’s not been 
affected, or who is affected the least, then it’s a thing you can always do 
around the Welfare State which is you can pretty much guarantee that swing 
voters aren’t affected. That’s what a lot of this is about. So benefits are being 
cut but pensions are being protected because many pensioners are important 
voters. Tax allowances are being changed to benefit people in middle earning 
jobs, it won’t benefit the poorest.” (Spokesperson, Centre for Welfare Reform) 
Groups such as the elderly and middle income families who could potentially stand 
to lose out quite heavily under conditions of austerity have suffered comparatively 
little to other groups. Critically, this is most likely because of the Coalition 
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Government’s determination to protect groups designated as core voters – notably 
wealthy pensioners (Casebourne, 2010, cited in JRF, 2010:13) – at the same time as 
meeting pressures of neoliberal forces acting on welfare spending. In short, reforms 
to welfare policy are not being made purely from the perspective of economic 
prerogative; the fact that certain groups appear to be being selectively excluded or 
marginalised by the reforms suggests there is a distinct political aspect to where and 
when the cuts and reforms are executed. This relates to the ideas of Peck 
(2010:105) that: 
“Innovations in contemporary statecraft reflect an increasingly ambidextrous 
relationship between the authoritarian and assistential wings of the state, 
which between them exert an increasingly tight grip on the regulatory 
dilemmas of labour market flexibilisation and advanced social marginality.” 
But what is the rhetoric really about? Is it a genuine attempt by the Coalition 
Government to help people find a job and better themselves, or is there an 
alternative motive based on core ideological intentions? When presented with this 
question, most interviewees contended that the situation constituted a mixture of 
both scenarios; yes, there is a definite need to save money and social security 
expenditure is an easy target for cuts in that respect, but the economic downturn and 
austerity that have followed have equally enabled the Conservatives to push through 
their idea for a smaller state, and hence has been able to target benefits and 
people’s dependency on them, at the same time as arguing that such a process 
does not constitute the withdrawal of support to those less well off: 
“I don’t think they are inevitable at all, I think there are lots of other things you 
could have done, and certainly a lot of the cuts are concentrated on the very 
poorest, so they’ve been slightly vindictive almost. And so they almost fell into 
this policy, and having fallen into it…into this rhetoric of we have to cut our 
way out of this and we must not scare the rich off, they haven’t got another 
story so they’re stuck with it.” (Professor of Geography Specialising in 
Austerity and Welfare Reform) 
Again this points to a serious contradiction in the government policy rhetoric. 
Although they have justified reducing the size of the state and its involvement in the 
provision of social security support, particularly for those out of work, through the 
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necessity of austerity and spending reductions coupled to the implementation of 
strict work requirements for benefit entitlements, the reality is that the austerity 
measures being put in place are far from inevitable, and are increasingly seen to be 
focused on the poorest and most exposed in society. Indeed the largest cuts to 
household income since 2010 have been to the poorest 10% of households, which 
have experienced a 9% drop in already extremely low post-tax annual income. This 
compares to the richest 10% of households which have only seen a decrease of 3% 
over the same period (IFS, 2015b). This is particularly pertinent when considering 
the weakness in the labour market and the lack of available jobs. In essence 
therefore it is becoming increasingly clear that the removal of support for those out of 
work juxtaposed with the heightened conditionalities and responsibilities being 
placed on the unemployed, are part of a wider deliberate political strategy to reduce 
the burden on the state and the public purse and therefore to get people off benefits 
wherever possible and take responsibility for their own welfare provision. 
In addition, these malevolently selective decisions around spending cuts on the part 
of the government to enact policy which would mean other sections of society would 
also lose out further indicates a very deliberate political strategy being developed 
(Hills, 2011). With core voting groups, notably pensioners, potentially losing out 
significantly if more wholesale benefit cuts were made, such groups have been 
almost completely exempt from the cuts so far, leading to the burden falling even 
more heavily on those people who are more easily targeted under austerity. These 
are mainly working age people who are unemployed or in low paid, part time work. 
These issues are confirmed by Taylor (2010) conveying that current welfare-to-work 
policies are skewing the impacts of cuts and reforms such that the burden is falling 
disproportionately on those who are most exposed, namely the unemployed, 
disabled and the working poor. 
 
5.4  Contradictions between the politics and the economics of (re)new(ed) 
welfare-to-work policies 
Since 2010 the Coalition Government has proposed and implemented a raft of 
welfare-to-work policies which are both qualitatively new as well as a renewal and 
extension of those that have preceded them. However, a number of clear 
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contradictions have arisen whereby differences between policy rhetoric and the 
reality of their introduction have appeared. This section will look to explore such 
contradictions in further detail, particularly issues around making work pay, Universal 
Credit, conditionality and benefit eligibility, and what the consequences of such 
paradoxical processes might hold for the future. 
 
5.4.1  Making work pay (better) 
Much of the policy rhetoric is framed around making work pay as a mechanism for 
incentivising work over benefits. Yet, despite indicating that everyone will be better 
off in work than on benefits, in reality it appears this may not necessarily be the case: 
“Obviously the concern is the transition into work for people is quite a 
dramatic change. If you’re talking about all of a sudden needing childcare, and 
if you haven’t been in work, especially if you’re a lone parent households who 
haven’t been in work potentially for a number of years, they may have just 
finished being on income support. That transition and the cost impact can be 
quite significant. I guess I don’t quite buy the idea that there is a calculator 
that can tell everyone how much better off they will be because when you take 
into account things like transport and childcare, you can get some pretty 
serious calculation differences … I think a lot of the time it will still depend on 
personal circumstance, I think if you had three young children and you 
couldn’t find a job, people saying I’ve got to drop my kids off at nine and pick 
them up at three, now if you can’t find a job which kind of fits in the four hours 
you’ve got between after travelling, then you’ve got an issue. And so it’s very 
unlikely even if you insist a family get into work and they manage to, the 
chances are they are going to have some child care requirements on top of 
that. So I think in my view is that individual circumstances are far too complex 
to say all families will be better off in work.” (Research Fellow, Policy 
Exchange) 
This is an important temporal consideration, because in the short term the 
consequences of forcing people towards the labour market, especially those who 
have been unemployed long term, may have negative consequences. It means that 
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people may not be better off in work right now, but will eventually reap the rewards at 
some point in the future. The lack of available jobs, coupled to the limited flexibility 
within the labour market and the benefits system, means that people may struggle to 
adapt to the transition to work (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014). Thus taking on extra work 
to meet additional conditionality criteria might mean a need for extra child care or 
additional costs associated with having to pay extra Council Tax and other charges 
associated with being in work. In this way, the financial incentives of being in work 
may become extremely diminished or even not existent to the extent that taking on 
extra work, or perhaps even entering the labour market in the first place provides no 
additional financial benefits. For example, one member of the family being in work 
might bring in as little as £73 a week additional income compared with benefits, and 
that may be even less if extra costs such as transport and child care are factored in 
(JRF, 2014a). This goes against the suggestions of the sociologist Wacquant (2003) 
that the combination of market and the state would force people to accept low wage 
work in poor working conditions. However, it appears that the opposite is in fact 
occurring if the transition to work is too punitive, with people preferring to remain on 
benefits because there is no clear advantage of moving into work. 
This represents a contradiction with government policy rhetoric, which automatically 
assumes that the transition into work represents a positive step change towards 
greater responsibility and henceforth less dependency on the state, and fails to take 
into consideration the role individual circumstances might play in determining how 
the advantages of being in work might play out in reality for individuals and families 
within the benefits system and therefore it may have the total opposite effect and 
actually encourage dependency (Hirsch, 2013). 
Another key trait which has therefore come out of the interviews is that dependency 
is very much attributable to individual circumstances, especially when it comes to 
employment, and at present the welfare-to-work policies of the Coalition Government 
offer relatively poor incentives for people to work more than the sixteen hours 
needed to be eligible for in work support, and a similar situation exists for earning 
more than the Income Tax threshold: 
“If you mean by dependency not working at all then certainly helping people to 
work a few hours a week will in some cases - subject to the work being 
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available and appropriate for that person - help them. But once you work a 
few hours, what the ‘new’ system says to you if you look at it closely is you 
don’t have much incentive if you’ve got children to work much more than a 
few hours, particularly if you have to take on extra child care. And if 
dependency is also defined as not doing as much work as you might do and 
having to get large transfers from the state to support that, then there are 
some situations where it could increase dependency. One of the reasons for 
that is strangely because it is a much more transparent system. Making it 
transparent will make it evident to people that by working an extra hour they’re 
not going to be much better off.” (Spokesperson, Centre for Welfare Reform) 
When factoring in travel and child care costs, or even more simply having to pay 
more in tax or rent, people generally will not take on the extra burden or stress of 
additional work if the benefits of doing so do not justify the additional effort on their 
part. In this way, even if full time employment opportunities with slightly better wages 
were available in the current climate, it is unlikely people would be inclined to take 
them unless the financial incentives were significant. This is because the benefit 
system that the Coalition has presided over only incentivises work to a certain 
extent, and not universally. What this infers is that there is no economic gain from 
such policy rhetoric, meaning that the introduction of a make work pay agenda is 
more politically derived than economically necessary. Furthermore, the changes to 
welfare-to-work policy have led to the system becoming much more transparent than 
it has been in the past, meaning that it is now much easier for those both in and out 
of work and in receipt of some form of benefits to structure their behaviour around 
maximising their benefit entitlements and not putting themselves in situations where 
their entitlements could reduce.  
The situation is much the same with employers; with the existing structure of the 
benefits system and the conditionality that is placed on recipients to find additional 
work, employers are now far more likely to offer vacancies which are low paid and 
part time, usually sixteen hours, because these are the positions they are most able 
to fill (Unison, 2013). Social inclusion researchers Tarr and Finn (2012) confirm this 
when pointing out that government policy works on the basis that people will 
progressively take on more hours of work or more pay if offered it as a route out of 
poverty. However, this policy neglects the fact that a large number of people in these 
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situations would be just over the thresholds, making the incentives minimal or even 
non-existent, and therefore encouraging the maximisation of benefit entitlement 
rather than increasing earnings through work. 
Hence instead of incentivising individual responsibility and ‘helping’ them achieve 
independence (as opposed to forcing them to do so), government policies around 
the dependence of citizens on the state are instead leading to higher costs of welfare 
provision which is shifting the nature of dependency and conditionality from 
Jobseekers Allowance to the active workforce. In so doing it appears to be 
embedding and socially engineering a stubborn relationship of dependency between 
the state and its citizens - exactly the opposite of what the rhetoric is aiming to 
achieve. 
 
5.4.2  Dependency 
In addition, what also appears to be taking place is that whilst people are being 
forced towards the labour market, it does not necessarily lead to a lowering of 
welfare dependency on the state due to the prevailing socio-economic conditions: 
“I think the worry is that for all the good things it might do to encourage more 
people into work, and they expect it will be around three hundred thousand 
more people will move into work as a result of that, it might actually 
accentuate some of the problems in the lower wage labour market, because it 
encourages these kind of mini jobs, which are renowned for being very low 
paid, are dominated by women, and have very poor progression 
opportunities.” (Senior Official, Resolution Foundation) 
Whilst the idea to make work pay has solid intellectual foundations for encouraging 
people into the active labour market, the push to make people take any job at any 
wage is actually increasing reliance on welfare benefits because many of the jobs 
involve limited hours or low pay (Taylor-Gooby, 2015). Indeed nearly 80% of all jobs 
created in the UK between June 2010 and June 2013 were low paid (TUC, 2013). 
The result is that citizens are still dependent on the state to top up their earnings, or 
it might even discourage them from taking on employment altogether through fear of 
losing valuable income from their benefit entitlements. This is confirmed by Oakley 
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(2012), who notes that whilst increasing numbers of people are finding work, the 
number of people who are actually becoming less dependent on state benefits is 
falling at a much lower rate, because the financial gains made by being in 
employment are far lower than the benefit thresholds set out by the government, who 
are increasingly having to replace out of work benefits with costly in-work support for 
those on low incomes, and this situation will continue to intensify in the future under 
Universal Credit. 
This presents a clear contradiction in the policy agenda of the government’s welfare-
to-work rhetoric; the whole idea of making work pay is to progressively lower the 
amount of money the government has to pay out in benefits as people replace 
benefit income with earnings through employment. However with the current frailty in 
the economy many of the employment opportunities available to those now being 
forced into the labour market do not adequately replace the income attained through 
benefits, and so many are still reliant to some extent on benefit income. It also 
encourages the type of behaviour that government policy has intended to deter in 
that the potential loss of benefits for working beyond the sixteen hour threshold 
discourages people to firstly take on any additional hours or even may dissuade 
benefit recipients from taking a job altogether. 
There also appears to be an issue with the way sanctions are being utilised as part 
of the welfare-to-work rhetoric, with the ability of policies to use work as a route out 
of poverty proving problematic, as noted by one interviewee: 
“I think it will reduce the number of people [claiming benefits]. If they’ve not 
got the appropriate carrot in place, i.e. jobs, I think they’re just punitive 
because I think the whole logic behind having sanctions is that you push 
people into work. But the work’s not there. They keep quoting this [one] million 
new jobs created, but some of them are reclassified and quite a lot are part 
time. So the jobs aren’t there in the economy and especially up in the North or 
the North West. So if you’re sanctioning people, reducing the amount of 
people that can claim benefits back, to me the need is still there. It’s not like 
people are being lazy and don’t want to work.” (Spokesperson, SARF) 
This conveys that the Coalition welfare-to-work agenda is actually making people 
increasingly reliant on state support rather than gradually being weaned off it and 
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using work as a route out of poverty, and the situation is being made increasingly 
difficult by the strength of the economy not only offering fewer jobs in the private 
sector than those numbers lost in the public sector, but also because it is creating 
the propensity for employers to only offer positions of part time or low paid work to 
the detriment of the government’s welfare policy around dependency on the state; 
the outcome of all these factors is a continuing cycle of dependency of citizens on 
state support. This is also suggested by Johnston et al. (2011:352), who note that 
“employers’ may also share an interest in welfare preservation, particularly if they 
benefit from social programmes which shift employment costs towards the state.” 
In addition the increasing use of sanctions to push people into work represents a 
significant policy problem in that the jobs must be available for people to move into. 
In reality, without those job vacancies being present, the sanctioning of people to 
lower the level of benefit take up fails to actually reduce the level of need, because 
people are unable to replace their income from social security with that of paid 
employment. The inherent contradiction is that without the carrot of employment 
opportunities matching up smoothly with the stick of benefit sanctions, welfare-to-
work policy simply does not work and will not achieve its basic objectives of lowering 
spending on social security. Newman (2011) conveys that the inappropriate use of 
sanctions could serve only to push those already marginalised further from the 
labour market and actually therefore increase reliance on the state. 
The other key aspect which has been raised by a number of people interviewed is 
that one of the areas of entitlement which has seen funding seriously curtailed is 
care provision: 
“Obviously it’s going to reduce the people who can get the benefits. But if 
people aren’t getting those sort of benefits, then what effect it has on carers 
and the rest of the family, that’s the other issue...I know people who give up 
part time jobs because they need to devote more time to providing care to 
somebody who previously had care provided by the council. That might be an 
issue…people might actually withdraw from part time work because of that 
and then they may be involved in getting carers allowances themselves.” 
(Spokesperson, Merseyside Disability Charity) 
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This elucidates upon the issue of displacement, in that the goal of pushing people 
into work at the same time as withdrawing benefit entitlements in some instances 
may have the opposite effect and actually push people out of work and back towards 
benefit dependency. This therefore means that the political goal of forcing people to 
take responsibility for their own welfare is leading to the overall economic goal of 
reducing benefit payments as part of wider deficit reduction being compromised. 
Grimshaw and Rubery (2012:108) suggest that the agenda to force people into the 
labour market to minimise the responsibilities of the state may have unintended 
corollaries elsewhere because: 
“new social needs are emerging that call for more rather than less state 
intervention at key life transitions as alternative sources of support through 
employers and families become less reliable.”  
Yet again therefore the reality of individual circumstances bears little resemblance to 
the government welfare-to-work rhetoric around means tested benefits and the 
objectives it is supposed to achieve of lowering dependency through work incentives, 
because it creates more problems than it solves. 
Another contradiction which has presented itself during the interview process is that 
the welfare-to-work policies the Coalition Government has implemented do not solve 
the issue of welfare dependency, but instead shift it from one area of the labour 
market to another: 
“My big worry about Universal Credit is what will be the consequences of 
making it easier to go in and out of work? How will employers begin to think 
about how they need to employ people? Will they offer less permanent 
employment, I presume they might offer more temporary contracts because 
it’s easier to get people come and do temporary work than go back on the 
benefits system? … So it might break that down a little bit, but it might mean 
that you pull a lot of people who are in permanent employment out of that and 
put them in this new grey world of in-between employment. So it might seduce 
employers who employ people full time to think a little bit more about how they 
might employ people on a more part time basis and then pick them up and 
drop them as they use them.” (Manager, Voluntary Sector North West) 
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What is more, pushing people into employment through deliberate welfare-to-work 
policies is supposed to benefit both the state and the citizen, but the overwhelming 
presence of low paid employment opportunities suggests a much greater benefit for 
employers in terms of minimising wage demands. 
Far from the policies being utilised beginning to tackle the problems associated with 
reliance on social security support by actively encouraging people into sustained and 
worthwhile employment, this suggests they are pushing the problem from one 
section of benefit recipients to another. This is clearly driven by a political motive to 
massage the unemployment figures to give their plan credibility, but in reality the 
problem is simply resurfacing with in-work benefit recipients. Standing (2011:37) 
conveys that in some circumstances benefits can look more appealing than work: 
“Workfare is intended to override the standard poverty and unemployment 
traps… [but] poverty and unemployment traps will remain as long as means 
testing and flexible labour remain … The more wages fall at the lower end of 
the labour market, the higher the income replacement rate will be if benefits 
are maintained at adequate levels.” 
In effect then what the government has attempted to achieve has been trying to 
restore the importance of individuals taking more responsibility for their own welfare 
through work incentives and at the same time minimise the level of involvement 
required by the state acting as a bottomless pit of provision, even if long established 
support structures within the system have been eroded and citizens are effectively 
being left to fend for themselves at a time when they frequently need more support 
from the state than ever before (Newman, 2011). The result is that people are 
becoming more not less dependent on benefit support, the opposite of what the 
welfare-to-work rhetoric is intended to achieve. 
 
5.4.3  Contributions 
Another key concern that has arisen is that one of the founding principles of social 
security provision, the idea of it being a contributory system or put more simply, a 
lifelong social security, has been eroded by the agenda of the Coalition Government: 
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“I think it is very clearly about a safety net for people, I think it’s very important 
that we have a system in place that helps people at the most difficult times of 
their lives…So for me it’s a whole range of services that we all need, that we 
all contribute to at different times, and that we all gain a great deal out of. In 
terms of how things have changed, I think that the welfare system has been 
under pressure for a long period of time and that’s to do with changes within 
our society in terms of an ageing population, in terms of people having to 
make choices about what they want to actually put money into and the difficult 
choices that are then made if we actually don’t fully fund things, but I think 
there has been a shift which has happened in terms of a particular focus on 
welfare and welfare reform” (Manager, Locality, a National Community 
Network Organisation). 
The whole idea of national insurance is that of paying into the system whilst in work, 
such that in times of hardship where income is reduced, such as is the case for 
many in the current economic climate, people have rights to protection through the 
state based on how much they have contributed. Such an idea has been upheld 
throughout the existence of the Welfare State, but under the present set of welfare-
to-work initiatives it is beginning to be undermined by the ferocity of means testing 
and conditionality. Whilst it could have been foreseen that the long term unemployed 
and young would have been easy to coerce onto a system of means testing because 
of their limited contributions, what has been far more surprising are the unforgiving 
restrictions now being applied to those recently finding themselves out of work 
following the economic crisis having been in a job for many years and therefore 
having also contributed a significant amount to the public purse through tax and 
national insurance over that time. 
The final point to make about the contradictory nature of the current welfare-to-work 
arrangements is that the difference between rhetoric and reality may well be creating 
problems and difficulties now, but they stand to pose far more consequences in 
future: 
“The danger is obviously that the more that you move away from a universal 
Welfare State where everybody has a stake in it, the less acceptance you 
have of the Welfare State. At different times of their lives most people will be 
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net contributors and then net beneficiaries. Then there are some people, 
they’ll contribute more than they benefit and some people will benefit more 
than they contribute. That’s always been live. But as soon as you get to the 
stage where the people who have been big net contributors and they fall on 
hard times and they don’t get the benefits, I think then you get the less 
acceptance of the Welfare State. So you know it isn’t the Welfare State that it 
used to be.” (Professorial Fellow, Institute of Employment Research) 
What this indicates is that post-2008 austerity can be best viewed as a tipping point 
in the rights and responsibilities argument, in that an individual who has met the 
requirements to work for their welfare entitlements does not necessarily retain the 
right to welfare support due to the (re)new(ed) conditionality strategically placed 
within the welfare system. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that far from 
a system of entitlements existing, it is one premised more on scrutiny and suspicion, 
with claimants having to go to great lengths to justify their entitlements to support 
regardless of their individual circumstances. In the future this means that people who 
have contributed significant amounts to the welfare system may become 
marginalised as they find their entitlement to benefits support curtailed to the same 
extent as those who have been dependent on benefits their whole lives. Whilst this is 
grossly contradictory in the fact that work is supposed to pay, not only whilst in a job, 
but also at times when citizens find themselves unemployed (because working and 
pay taxes suddenly seems like a miscarriage of justice rather than an advantage 
over a life on benefits), the real issue here is what the future holds.  
There is likely to be much less acceptance of the Welfare State going forward if it 
fails to deliver on its core values of providing an adequate safety net for those that 
pay into it in times of need, and so there is likely to be much more resistance to the 
continual extension and intensification of welfare-to-work policy as citizens begin to 
disregard the notion that a life in work will pay dividends compared to a life on 
benefits. This is in accordance with the thoughts of Baggesen Klitgaard and 
Elmelund-Praestekaer, (2013:1092) who indicate that the general attitude and 
acceptance of negative changes to welfare provision becomes a lot more pivotal 
when institutional retrenchment takes place, because it implies that such process 
merely forms the basis for “significant changes in the organisational structures of 
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political programmes likely to facilitate Welfare State contraction in the future.” 
However, Vis et al. (2011:241) contest this assertion, by arguing that: 
“the crisis did not undermine public support for the Welfare State’s core 
institutions and the role the institutions play in mitigating the domestic impact 
of the whims of the global (financial) markets.” 
 
5.5  Perceptions: attitudes towards welfare-to-work 
Another important factor which has come to prominence from the interview data is 
the tone of the public reaction to the austerity and the reforms: 
“I think the rhetoric has become stronger against people who do claim 
benefits. There’s more negativity towards it. I think there’s probably, for 
people who aren’t impinged on it themselves by worklessness or the need to 
rely on the Welfare State, less acceptance of it.” (Professorial Fellow, Institute 
of Employment Research). 
Previous periods of recession have led to cuts and the inevitable consequences for 
vulnerable members of society, but there had been a general public perception of 
feeling pity and sympathy towards those suffering the costs of being marginalised as 
a result. However, in this instance what has been unusual is the distinct hostility in 
the general public domain towards people afflicted by the impacts of austerity and 
the cuts to welfare provision. Whilst in the past people on benefits were deemed to 
be the deserving poor, necessarily falling back on the safety net provided by the 
state as a result of an economic downturn and through no fault of their own (Vis et 
al., 2011), throughout the latest downturn there has been far more hostility and 
animosity towards such groups and this “deservingness heuristic” (Petersen et al, 
2010, cited in Vis et al., 2011:342). This has been fuelled by government rhetoric 
around fairness, the labelling of benefit claimants as ‘scroungers’ and ‘skivers’, and a 
“strong anti-welfarism” (Mooney, 2011:4), and that those who are out of work are 
effectively stealing from those who have worked hard and paid into the system all 
their working lives: 
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“So that’s what the welfare system was, it was about we paid some money 
into an account that looked after us, national insurance contributions you 
know. The clue is in the title. And I think we’ve gone a long way from that now. 
The whole kind of rhetoric is that it is somebody stealing. This is somebody 
taking your money, not that it’s a system that supports us all when we need it 
… but it’s a support structure not a punitive structure, and that’s what we’ve 
gone away from. It’s now seen as some kind of punitive structure. It’s not an 
entitlement it’s something that you’re lucky to get. And that’s just not the case. 
The vast majority of people who at some stage in their life claim benefits have 
paid into that system far more than they ever claim out of it. That’s the reality 
of it. And we need to just start saying that again, that it’s not an eighteen year 
old with three children living in a council house who is the main beneficiary of 
that system. It’s our people, it’s working people who have worked all their lives 
who are entitled to claim back what they’ve paid into the system.” (Senior 
Official, TUC in the North West of England) 
On this basis it appears that the explicitly negative attitude which has arisen towards 
social security claimants, particularly those out of work, is the outcome of deliberate 
political engineering to marginalise and disenfranchise those who are reliant on state 
support, particularly if they do not have a job (Gregory, 2014). 
This is confirmed by the urban geographer Chris Hamnett (2014) who suggests that 
there is now a clear emphasis on the need for cuts to be shared out across the 
population, regardless of whether they are in work or depend on benefits in order to 
live. Similarly, economic theorists Peck and Theodore (2010:171) point out that 
policymaking, particularly around workfare, has a formatting function to develop: 
“a causal relationship between welfare dependency and worklessness to 
enforce ideas around the responsibility to find work and the justification of 
enforcement measures.” 
However, Royall (2009:117) suggests that this idea brings with it a great deal of 
complexity, because it has meant that those who have worked for a long period and 
have only become unemployed for a short period of time are being categorised the 
same way as people who have been unemployed long term. He notes that “the 
unemployed themselves have become marginalised actors within the very structures 
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that act in their name or on their behalf.” The indiscriminate nature of the policies 
now being implemented mean that hard working people who have paid into the 
system all their working lives and have become unemployed as a result of the 
current weakness in the economy are finding themselves targeted and scrutinised in 
the same way as the long term unemployed, and appear to have limited entitlement 
to welfare support to which they have contributed. Thus it suggests that the Welfare 
State is now increasingly becoming a selective club for those who are in 
employment, more another form of what can be classed as ‘work-first welfare.’ 
In addition, there has been a decreased emphasis on the importance of income 
transfers, with much more impetus being put behind fairness and responsibility: 
“In the last two years the present administration has changed its tone 
considerably from one that was not that easy to distinguish from the previous 
one, to one which is a lot more frugal and certainly de-emphasising income 
transfers. They are also going from having said that what is fair is the most 
vulnerable should be getting the most protection against the effects of the 
economic downturn, to one where they actually tried to redefine fairness. The 
language of fairness now is ‘well it’s not fair if people who are in work are 
having real term cuts in their incomes if it doesn’t happen to people who are 
out of work as well.’ It’s almost saying the poorest should take their fair share 
of the pain rather than the poorest should be protected from the worst effects.” 
(Spokesperson, Centre for Research in Social Policy) 
This implies that many of the reforms and the ideas that they are based upon are a 
politically conscious decision by the government to impress the need for austerity in 
the welfare budget. They have been justified through the idea of fairness and playing 
off a sense of justice for those in work versus those who are not, regardless of their 
circumstances. This is supported by Hirsch and Valadez (2014) who indicate that 
there is much more of an emphasis on sharing the burden of austerity amongst 
those out of work. 
Government rhetoric is a very deliberate attack on the most exposed members of 
society, using the unemployed and disabled as scapegoats (Roulstone, 2015), and 
in turn the consensus achieved with the wider public to continue pushing through the 
programme of reforms (British Social Attitudes Survey, 2013). Thus whilst wealthy 
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bankers in the South East are the root cause of the financial crisis, the emphasis is 
now on the most vulnerable in society being the problem, especially those in the 
North and West. This narrative provides the government with an adequate incentive 
to apply tighter and more punitive scrutiny on people to move them from welfare to 
work. However, this thought process is rejected by Newman (2011) who argues that 
the increased use of sanction and compulsion actually serves to only increase social 
exclusion and therefore push vulnerable citizens further from the labour market and 
the support services in place. This is the opposite of what the policy intends to 
achieve. 
The key point here then is that welfare reform and the use of welfare-to-work policies 
more specifically is a political choice which is generally supported both from within 
the political community and the wider citizenry. However, it should also be noted that 
such policy rhetoric would be far less likely to come to fruition if the government felt 
that they did not have the political support behind them. It is for this reason that such 
groups as the unemployed and in-work poor have been targeted by policy processes 
as opposed to other groups such as wealthy pensioners and big business who have 
made up a core component of the Coalition Government’s (especially for the 
Conservatives) voting base and support. 
 
5.6  Summary 
This chapter is important because it has explored the question of whether the 
austerity politics of the Coalition Government have been an economic necessity or 
more of a politically driven strategy. It has questioned the extent to which welfare-to-
work rhetoric has been the same or a renewal of the policies which came before, or 
whether in fact there has been a qualitative shift towards something entirely new. 
Crucially, the discussion has also assessed whether the current raft of welfare-to-
work policies are premised on a sound economic mandate or whether in fact they 
have been driven more from a political ideological bearing. It also addressed the 
contradictions in government welfare-to-work rhetoric that cuts have been made 
harder and faster than before for political rather than economic reasons. 
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A number of key points have emerged from the chapter as a result. It appears that 
for the most part we are seeing a clear renewal of policy strategies seen before, with 
the Coalition Government simply having overlain its own ideas to extend and 
intensify such policies in the wake of the financial crisis. Indeed the welfare reforms 
seem to be cutting harder and deeper than ever before, and are more punitive 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2012a), but are still essentially the same welfare-to-work policy 
ideals adopted by its predecessors. However, there are certain aspects of its 
welfare-to-work rhetoric which do not neatly conform to this process, namely in-work 
conditionality, which appears to be an entirely new conceptual approach to benefit 
entitlement compared to what has preceded it, and which has created an epilogue of 
questions requiring more analysis. This could have significant consequences for the 
future structure of welfare provision in the UK given the level of scrutiny now afforded 
to those in work as well those who are unemployed (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
Furthermore, whilst the Coalition Government has vociferously attempted to justify its 
policies based on the pressing economic need to reduce spending, particularly within 
the benefits budget, the reality appears to be that much of the rhetoric has been 
politically driven and heavily influenced by the Conservative element of the 
government and their desire for a lesser role for the state in providing for its citizens 
by pushing people towards the labour market. This is at the same time as satisfying 
the neoliberal prerogatives of market-led growth to which they subscribe 
(Swyngedouw, 2011; MacLeavy, 2014). There is a particular issue around the idea 
of making work pay, incentivising work as a more lucrative option than benefits, but it 
has become clear that this has been more about meeting ideological goals for 
reducing the number of people in receipt of state support and satisfying core voters 
than the economic advantages it delivers due to the diminutive amount of money that 
has actually been saved (MacLeavy, 2011). Such ideological factors not only create 
contradictions in the objectives of welfare-to-work policy, but they also raise 
questions about the merits of austerity politics as a whole. 
It also found that some of the main issues lay with pushing people back towards the 
labour market at a time when they may not be ready for work or when the jobs 
needed to accommodate them simply are not available (McCollum, 2012). It 
challenged the economic virtues of the policies because their punitive nature, whilst 
seemingly rhetorically strong, in reality have led to greater dependency on state 
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support, with the neoliberal fix advocated by the Coalition Government leading to 
dependency shifting from those out of work to those in generally low paid 
employment (Newman, 2011; Peck, 2010). Another facet uncovered is a deep-
rooted sociological concern for the future of welfare provision in that people who 
have paid into the system have as little entitlement to claim from it as those who 
have been labelled and marginalised by the rhetoric for lifelong dependency on it. 
This lack of discrimination contradicts the dichotomy between those in work and out 
of work, deserving and undeserving, and has led to people beginning to challenge 
longstanding perceptions of the Welfare State and its role as a societal safety net to 
which they are entitled (Bennett, 2012; Hamnett, 2014). In turn this has created more 
questions about the validity of austerity and welfare-to-work policies of the Coalition 
Government, and whether the impacts can really be justified by an economic 
necessity or whether policies have been driven along political lines regardless of the 
outcomes which have resulted. 
The next chapter builds on these ideas and questions by examining the strategies 
being employed to facilitate, implement and respond to the specific nuances of 
welfare-to-work policy and the material effects that are coming to the fore as a result. 
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Chapter 6: ‘Creaming’ and ‘Parking’ – Examining the 
Strategies and Tactics Employed by the Conductors, 
Implementers and Recipients of (Re)new(ed) Welfare-To-
Work Policies 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Building on the findings of the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is to move 
beyond the rhetoric of welfare reform under austerity politics to begin examining the 
material effects which result from it. To achieve this, the chapter examines the roles 
of the major stakeholders in the welfare reform process: 
i) Conductors of austerity politics (i.e. the state) 
ii) Implementers of austerity politics (i.e. private welfare providers and 
employers) 
iii) Recipients of austerity politics (i.e. citizens and employees) 
Making such distinctions allows the investigation to progress in various chronological 
stages of a (re)new(ed) policy transfer from central government down to the people 
who actually experience austerity politics. 
This chapter focuses on some of the specific political strategies and agendas which 
have been pursued by the Coalition Government through austerity. It will assess how 
these strategies have been played out at national, regional and local scales and how 
the responses to austerity politics have varied to show how the interactions between 
all the stakeholders involved in the production and consumption of a (re)new(ed) 
welfare-to-work discourse have come together to annunciate the political debate 
geographically. It will argue that the politically driven rhetoric which surrounds current 
welfare-to-work policies in the UK is subject to the tactics and strategies of key 
stakeholders in the welfare-to-work process (the conductors, implementers and 
recipients), which can give rise to contradictions between rhetoric and reality of 
policy implementation. 
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The chapter begins by examining how the state as the conductor of austerity policies 
has been facilitating the development of contradictory and politically driven effects of 
a (re)new(ed) welfare-to-work agenda (Section 6.2). It will then go on to assess how 
stakeholders have been going about implementing these politically driven welfare-to-
work policies and if the effects are qualitatively new or simply more of the same, and 
if there are any contradictory issues which have come to the fore (Section 6.3). 
Section 6.4 then asks if the recipients of such welfare-to-work policies have been 
experiencing and responding to them on a day to day basis in qualitatively different 
ways to the past, and again, if any contradictions to experiencing these policies have 
arisen. The chapter finishes with a brief summary to clarify the key findings 
elucidated in the chapter around the strategies and tactics that have been utilised by 
conductors, implementers and recipients of welfare-to-work in the UK and how they 
inform the intellectual and practical debates about austerity inspired welfare reform 
(Section 6.5). 
 
6.2  The conductors of welfare-to-work: the changing role of the state 
The role of conductors is to devise policy aims and the facilitation of strategies to go 
about achieving those aims. In this instance, welfare-to-work policies are conducted 
almost exclusively by the state. It is the role of the government to formulate policy 
objectives and then act as the facilitating agent in the process of policies being 
implemented at various scales. The Coalition Government has assumed the position 
of economic efficiency and a need to use welfare-to-work policies to cut spending 
and lower the burden on the state of welfare and benefits in particular. It has 
identified employment (either making work pay or applying conditionalities for 
unemployment) as the mechanism for achieving this. 
 
6.2.1  Incentivising work 
The main strategy which has been used to incentivise work is by encouraging people 
out of work towards the labour market. This means that it not only reduces the 
amount necessarily being paid out in terms of social security benefits, but it 
simultaneously encourages people to take greater responsibility for providing for 
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themselves and their families (Vis et al., 2011). This is a changing role for the state, 
because in the past the benefits system has been operated in a much more 
generous manner, making the incentives to work more negligible. In this way, 
Coalition policy of ensuring people are better off in work than on benefits has 
operated around a principle of the average wage of employees in the UK. Thus 
because the majority of benefit recipients in the system frequently earn well below 
the average wage, being in work does not necessarily lead to them being 
substantially better off than on benefits: 
“To work you need to be substantially better off. Now if you think that most 
people’s wages, the wages they could get if they’re not on welfare are 
modest. I mean the idea that something terrible is happening because we’re 
capping benefits at average wages, the vast majority of people on benefits 
would never get average wage jobs. If you were serious about making work 
pay, you wouldn’t be talking about £25,000 you would be talking about 
£11,000, and capping benefits there. And this is the difference, the jobs 
people can get.” (Labour MP, Merseyside) 
Poorly paid employment essentially removes a large proportion of the incentive 
involved with being in work as opposed to being unemployed as dependency on 
social security handouts remains high, and this means that there is still a substantial 
incentive to remain on benefits (Wright, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2014). It also raises the 
question of whether benefits should be capped at an even lower level than the 
Coalition Government has intended (£26,000 at present) to create significant enough 
incentivisation to work. 
Although the government’s agenda to make work pay has in theory incentivised the 
move from benefits to the active labour market, the fact that most of the job 
vacancies available have likely paid well below what might be deemed as the 
national average has meant that the difference between the rhetoric and the hazy 
reality of applying it to the labour market has made the intended behavioural change 
far less likely. In 2013, the number of people in low paid jobs in the UK had reached 
a record 6.4 million (TUC, 2013). Such an approach fails to consider the whole point 
of social security in the first place, to supplement the income of those in low paid 
employment to allow them a greater standard of living than would otherwise be 
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possible, however the current benefit regime still enables a reasonable standard of 
living (adequate access to amenities such as food, energy, transport, education and 
healthcare amongst others) whilst completely reliant on benefits, and so the 
incentive to find a job is perhaps not as significant as the welfare-to-work rhetoric 
has intended. This rationale around the incentivisation of work has also been noted 
by Wright (2012), who suggests that behaviour is heavily controlled by the potential 
for individual economic gain, and so if the incentives of being in work compared with 
benefits are not sufficient this encourages less desirable actions on the part of 
benefit recipients. In this way, the state acts to essentially facilitate the impulse of 
neoliberal market conditions and push people into low paid work. This marks a 
decisive change in the role of the state, which previously supplanted benefits 
dependency in areas of weak economic performance such as the North West of 
England, with significant investment in the public sector, and in turn, well-paid public 
sector employment. Such a lesser role for the state has also been identified by Dale 
(2012:6) who, when analysing the relationship between the state, society and 
neoliberal market forces, suggests that: 
“the state, deprived of its former regulatory functions and evacuated from 
substantive economic activity, takes on a narrow, ‘night watchman’ role as 
enforcer of the rules of the market.” 
Another concern raised from the interview process is that Universal Credit will lead to 
less red tape in the labour market, creating situations where the types of full time 
employment needed to move away from benefits dependency become less readily 
available: 
“I think that is part of the challenge of Universal Credit and some of the 
reforms generally that we’ve got, there seems to be this issue that people can 
easily get a few more hours here and there, or can make decisions about 
doing this or doing that or doing the other. And I don’t think that the labour 
market is strong enough to offer those kinds of opportunities to people. So I’m 
not really sure how the Universal Credit will pan out in reality. I think the fact 
that it’s operating in a difficult labour market will probably make it, the benefits 
won’t be there to the same extent as you might have thought theoretically had 
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it been in a somewhat more what we used to term average labour market 
context I think.” (Professional Fellow, Institute for Employment Research) 
In this paradoxical way then rather than encouraging both employers and employees 
to view work as a route out of poverty and dependency on the state, it simply forces 
them to articulate their behaviour differently to maximise the amount of state support 
they can be in receipt of. If anything, rather than lessening the social security burden 
on the state, Universal Credit actively encourages the cost to be continually 
increased. It also raises concerns about the increasing frequency of employers to 
utilise part time and temporary work contracts. Between 2008 and 2013 employment 
in the UK rose by 328,000, of which 279,000 (85%) were part time jobs taken by 
women (ONS, 2013b), suggesting that Universal Credit is adding to the difficulties 
around making work pay instead of promoting and increasing the uptake of suitable 
employment opportunities. This will have a detrimental effect on the success of 
welfare-to-work initiatives because earnings are generally too low to have a positive 
influence on benefit entitlements. However, what might be even more concerning is 
that it is not just those who have previously been unemployed who are taking up 
these temporary and part time contracts; people who previously have been working 
full time and maybe were not in receipt of benefits are now being drawn into the 
benefits system as an unintended consequence of applying strict welfare-to-work 
policies in a neoliberal context which has enabled employers in particular to 
strategically exploit this niche in the market-led welfare-to-work rhetoric of the 
Coalition Government. 
This is not all that surprising according to Taylor-Gooby (2012b:126), because 
welfare policies are now necessarily being implemented in “a globalised world in 
which the national state is no longer master of its economy.” Therefore the desired 
outcomes of welfare-to-work policies are far from guaranteed. 
In a similar way therefore, whilst on the one hand Universal Credit might simplify the 
benefits process and clarify the entitlements that people have, therefore enabling 
them to maximise their income, on the other it can make it obvious to people exactly 
the financial implications of moving from benefits into work. This is highlighted by 
Patrick (2012), an expert in social policy, who infers that those in low paid and 
insecure work may miss out on the supposed rewards of being in employment, and 
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could even have a negative impact on the quality of life of those who have decided to 
find a job instead of relying on benefits: 
“a political discourse that simplistically promotes all work, generalising about 
rewards supposedly available to all those in employment, neglects the reality 
for badly paid workers who are often simultaneously struggling to remain in 
employment and to cope with life below the poverty line.” (2012:7-8) 
If this therefore shows people that the move into the labour market will result in 
minimal financial gains through lower benefit income, then the process is far less 
likely to encourage the behavioural change required for people to move into work for 
only a small additional income. 
Universal Credit as a policy appears to be a very deliberate attempt to simplify the 
benefits system such that it becomes much clearer that people are better off in work, 
and therefore actively encourages the transition from welfare to work. However there 
are potential challenges going forward as to what being better off in work actually 
means. 
Whilst many of the political strategies which have been implemented by the Coalition 
Government have been devised and articulated centrally at the national level, the 
majority of the effects and impacts of welfare-to-work are emerging at the local level 
(Lindsay and Houston, 2011). In the case of the effects coming to fruition at the 
regional level, and what is proving to be particularly pertinent in the North West of 
England, the agenda to make work pay and encourage people into the labour market 
appears to have met a number of stumbling blocks related to the availability of work 
within the region: 
“I think the regime of forcing people into lower paid work I suppose, into 
underemployment, I suppose it will intensify. But the truth is in the North West, 
in most parts of it, the number of people chasing available work is very high. 
You know, the number of people who are claiming benefits of published 
vacancies is a significant mismatch.” (Senior Official, Unison North West) 
Clearly in order to pursue an active agenda to make work pay and therefore diminish 
the dependency of citizens on the state for income support, there is a reliance on 
there being the jobs available for people to move into from the benefits system. 
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Under the previous Labour Government employment levels were upheld by heavy 
investment in public services and public sector employment, particularly in areas with 
weak economies such as the North West of England. More recently under the 
Coalition Government, the role of the state has changed significantly to one which 
facilitates employment in the private sector. More specifically, it has seen the 
transformation of the role of the state from one of a provider of jobs, into one which 
supplies employees for low paid, private sector jobs through their welfare reform 
processes. Much of the government’s strategy for the social security system is now 
heavily geared towards both incentivising work compared with a life on benefits and 
conditionally supporting those people into the workforce through up-skilling and job 
search activities (Newman, 2011). However if the necessary jobs are not available 
(there appears to be an increasingly significant mismatch between the number of 
vacancies and those looking for work) then it becomes increasingly difficult for the 
Coalition to justify their political strategies. Between April and June 2014, there were 
2.08m people unemployed in the UK compared with 653,000 vacancies available 
which equates to 3.2 people per vacancy (ONS, 2014d). People are being 
increasingly penalised for being out of work despite their best efforts to find suitable 
jobs as Newman (2011:99) conveys: “by themselves supply side measures can only 
have a limited impact on overall employment and unemployment rates.” 
Indeed in areas such as the North West of England, a significant percentage of both 
the economy and the overall workforce reside in the public sector. In the first quarter 
of 2014, 19% of total employment in the North West was in the public sector, 
equating to 602,000 workers and 11% of all employment in the UK (UK Parliament, 
2014). This has meant that the lack of available jobs in the private sector deemed 
part of the “economic miracle” (Murphy, 2011:32) of the market to compensate for 
the widespread losses seen in the public sector is making it very difficult to ensure 
that work will pay for everyone. This also raises the issue of a deeply politicised 
undertone running through government welfare-to-work policy. For instance, in the 
North West of England, 83,000 public sector jobs (11.4%) were lost between May 
2010 and September 2013, whereas reductions in London and the South East of 
England were only 9% and 8% respectively (ONS, 2013c). This is supported by the 
comments of Viebrock and Clasen (2009:306) who question the interpretation of 
unemployment figures conveying that: 
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“lower unemployment rates do not necessarily imply employment growth but 
possibly rising non-employment, involving high social opportunity costs in 
terms of productivity losses and additional strains on social security systems.” 
The changing role of the state towards forced movement of citizens from benefit 
receipt to the labour market coupled with the lack of suitable job opportunities has 
made the widespread achievement of the making work pay agenda in the current 
economic climate far more difficult in reality than those foreseen by the Coalition 
when they devised their policy strategy. This has been highlighted by the feminist 
geographer MacLeavy (2012:251) who notes that it is especially pertinent given the 
“commodification of place” and the continually increasing - rather than decreasing - 
influence of markets over cities and their social and economic functions (Peck, 
2015). The outcome is that areas in the South and East where much of the 
Conservative electorate reside have seen the advantages of being in work over 
benefits, at the expense of the areas such as the North West of England which have 
been the substantial losers of welfare-to-work policy to date under the Coalition. 
 
6.2.2  Encouraging work through conditionality 
A further issue which has been raised with the government’s welfare-to-work rhetoric 
is the way in which they have coupled such a policy strategy with punitive 
sanctioning processes to force people back towards the labour market, especially 
those who are long term unemployed and so are the most difficult cases to tackle: 
“Well I think certainly they’re scaling back the extent of welfare, the safety net 
if you like, with a view of moving people into work…But I think they’re not 
taking account of geographical differences in the UK really, in that it’s alright 
saying we’ll reduce benefits to make work pay where there’s work, but in 
certain parts of the country there isn’t that work and then obviously what 
happens to those people, so Merseyside is a good case in terms of the lack of 
jobs that there are.” (Senior Official, St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council) 
The intention is that by using tactics which simultaneously incentivise work and 
increase the punishments for being unemployed through sanctioning, it should 
create a significant difference in both the social and financial benefits of being 
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employed compared to being reliant on social security handouts. This is conveyed by 
Newman (2011:91) who states that under the current raft of welfare-to-work policies 
“people in the UK are being mandated into highly conditional welfare-to-work 
programmes.” 
However, the outcomes so far indicate that the contrary is happening. This is 
primarily because the jobs are either not available, so people are being unfairly 
sanctioned for non-compliance, or because the incentives to be in work are still not 
sufficient enough, because many of the jobs being created by employers which 
welfare recipients can take are low paid and temporary (Unison, 2013). So whilst in 
the short term it may well pay for people to be better off in work, in the longer term 
they will be at a distinct disadvantage (Taylor-Gooby, 2014). Rose (1991:5) also 
highlighted this some two decades ago, observing that implementing policy is 
essentially about “whether programmes can transfer from one place to another; it is 
not about what politicians think ought to be done.” In such a way, it represents a 
change to the role of the state, from one of long term support towards suitable 
employment to one of forcing people to take any job at any wage. This therefore fails 
to reduce the level of dependency as the government has intended because the 
positives of remaining on benefits outweigh the negatives of moving into work and 
losing out. 
 
6.3  The implementers of welfare-to-work: welfare providers, employers and 
the privatisation of welfare services 
The next group of stakeholders who need to be explored are the so called 
implementers. These are those groups who are tasked with actually putting welfare-
to-work policy into practice, enforcing it on the ground, and subsequently dealing 
with the material effects which inevitably arise as a result. In the main implementers 
are the welfare providers in place at regional and local scales (local authorities, 
private companies or third sector organisations) and employers. Their role is not to 
create the welfare policies themselves but to implement them using specific 
strategies and tactics relevant to the circumstances they are presented with in 
accordance with the aims and objectives outlined by the conductor – the state. 
However it is important to highlight that the state devises objectives not only based 
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on their own ideals, but on the interests of other influential stakeholders in the private 
sector. 
In the case of welfare-to-work policies, the task of the implementing organisations is 
to impose the work conditionalities devised by the government onto the populations 
they oversee. This means being proactive in pushing people towards the labour 
market (offering a ‘carrot’) at the same time as enforcing sanctions (the ‘stick’) for 
non-compliance with welfare-to-work initiatives in order to lower the number and the 
entitlements of benefit claimants. A similar situation exists with private welfare 
providers, who are equally employing tactics in search of profit and so are more 
inclined to focus resources on those closest to the labour market, leaving those most 
in need and therefore most dependent on benefits to remain in a cycle of 
dependency. In essence, the neoliberal nature of welfare-to-work policies has led to 
increasingly contradictory effects on benefits dependency as it has been fed down 
from central government to those implementing them on the ground. 
 
6.3.1  Implementing work incentives 
The widespread scaling back of the public sector has led to a much greater reliance 
on the private sector to provide jobs within the local economy, often in areas that 
previously had secure and well-paid jobs. Instead of replacing these directly – indeed 
in many cases this has not happened at all - private sector employers are frequently 
offering part time, low paid and temporary labour market opportunities in already 
vulnerable local economies. This only serves to increase reliance upon the state to 
top up sub-standard earnings: 
“I think the government would say that the Welfare State as well as doing that 
safety net bit, it’s about encouraging people to help themselves, i.e. 
encouraging people into work because work is a route out of poverty. Anyway, 
a lot of that doesn’t work even because we’re having things like zero hours 
contracts, minimum wage is not the same as a living wage…So routes into 
that kind of work will still not be a route out of poverty, it will just be a route 
into a different kind of benefits dependency.” (Manager at a Manchester CAB) 
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Whilst the intention of welfare-to-work policy is to encourage people to take greater 
responsibility for themselves through work, the neoliberalised nature of the economy 
often fails to present adequate opportunities for utilising work as a realistic escape 
route from poverty and hence dependency on the state, and instead acts to transfer 
the problem to a different section of the working age population. This is indicated by 
Oakley (2012) who has noted that incentivising people to take on employment of low 
wages or low hours will simply transfer dependency to those in work. This supports 
the work of Andre et al. (2013:12), who argue that: 
“high unemployment often leads to a fall in labour force participation. As job 
opportunities are scarce, some people find it less attractive to get involved in 
the labour market.” 
In such situations whilst government policies may make work pay a little bit for some, 
for the vast majority the level of dependency has actually increased, and has 
encouraged those implementing welfare-to-work policies (e.g. employers) to 
undertake strategies that have acted to simply transfer dependency from out of work 
reliance to one of in-work dependency, in complete contradiction of government 
austerity rhetoric and the aims of welfare-to-work policy. 
Leading economic geographers Theodore and Peck (2012) agree with this, 
suggesting that the problems which policymakers come across create the need for 
compromise between difficult choices and trade-offs of the specific contextual issues 
arising. In this way then the use of neoliberal welfare-to-work initiatives requires the 
acceptance that in return for people being pushed off benefits claims, the state must 
accept that those tasked with implementing policy will take a ruthless approach in 
their drive for profits in which people will likely be pushed into insufficient forms of 
employment and embedded deeper in cycles of low or no pay. 
An important consequence of welfare reform and welfare-to-work which also needs 
to be kept in mind is that stakeholders have had to respond to financial restrictions: 
“From the point of view of service provision, there’s definitely a risk to income 
in terms of changes to the Council Tax system. Arrears are going up so we’ve 
modelled that we could lose two million pounds in Council Tax because of 
these changes. Obviously the housing associations have got concerns about 
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getting their income streams, and we haven’t even moved to direct payments 
of the Universal Credit yet, but they’re already seeing the under occupation 
penalty.” (Senior Official, St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council) 
Local authorities are required to cope with substantially lower incomes primarily from 
the austerity cuts which have been applied by central government, but also due to 
lower revenue incomes stemming from high unemployment rates and increasing 
levels of debt brought about by stringent government cuts to public sector funding. 
This is only going to be accelerated into the future. For example, the spending power 
of local authorities in England will fall by an average of 2.0% from 2014/15 to 
2015/16, amounting to a £44.32 reduction in spending per household per year. 
However it should also be considered that the reductions for more deprived local 
authority areas, particularly in the North West, are frequently far more substantial, 
such as Knowsley (-5.8%), Rochdale (-4.2%) and Blackpool (-4.5%) (DCLG, 2015). 
Indeed concerns have been raised about the speed at which these cuts are being 
enforced in the name of cutting deficits (Callinicos, 2012), with the Coalition being 
accused of “cutting too far and too fast” (Ed Miliband, quoted in The Independent, 
2011:n.p) As a result organisations are having to adapt accordingly, deciding what 
work they can still afford to undertake, as well as how they go about doing it: 
“Well I think this government is trying to clearly signal that it sees the social 
contract as complete change and very different. I think some of that is if you 
actually start looking at localism and some of the things that have been said 
around this, it is about transferring power from central government to local 
communities and local people, some of which we would look at and say well 
actually yeah you’re right. Central government shouldn’t be the one dictating 
to people how they should actually do things, people can create their own 
local solutions if you give them the power and the money and the resources to 
do it….We see it a lot around assets, so is it that local government should 
own all of these community buildings and dictate what goes on within them 
etcetera, or should local people have the opportunity to own their local 
buildings to actually decide themselves what should happen there.” (Manager, 
Locality, a National Community Network Organisation) 
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In contrast to this, Ross (2009:66) suggests that local organisations, rather than 
becoming burdened with inefficient resources which serve to debilitate their capacity 
for providing welfare services at the local level, must accept responsibility for former 
public welfare assets: 
“[The] downloading of social welfare means that communities are increasingly 
responsible for their own well-being, and must adequately arrange themselves 
in order to find solutions to the dissolving Welfare State.” 
A final adaptation involved with the implementation of welfare-to-work is the upsurge 
in the use of analysis and quantification of the impacts of welfare reform and 
austerity: 
“It’s become our responsibility. That’s a clear impact for us as a local 
authority. And then there are obviously wider impacts for local residents as 
well that we’re starting to become aware of now. We’re working very hard to 
quantify the impact but we also work with our partners to get the softer, more 
anecdotal evidence as well.” (Spokesperson, Wirral Borough Council) 
Previously there had been very little in the way of in situ analysis of the impacts, 
which made it difficult to efficiently and effectively apply resources to where they 
could best be used. The huge upheaval which has resulted from the welfare reform 
process has meant local authorities and other organisations are now undertaking an 
ongoing analytical approach as necessary to direct resources to where they are 
needed, but also, and perhaps more importantly considering further cuts to funding 
to prepare for future demand and needs - most notably Universal Credit - with 
funding to the voluntary sector expected to be £1.7bn lower in 2017/18 than it was in 
2011 (National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), 2013). 
 
6.3.2  Implementing ‘The Work Programme’ 
The Work Programme is the UK Government’s policy to implement a radically new 
payment by results system, where those furthest from the labour market become 
valuable assets because they command the highest pay out. Invariably however, 
Work Programme providers have developed strategies that are intently focused on 
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making a quick profit and so actively target those people easiest to move into 
employment: 
“What you see here is this very strange process that has gone on where you 
see a double privatisation really, where the DWP is contracting out to large 
private sector organisations like Serco and A4E, and then those organisations 
are allowed or told to further contract out the grassroots provision of work 
support to smaller organisations. And both the reports I’ve read on this subject 
underline the fact that in the process what happens is a creaming off by the 
large private provider, who transfers almost all the risk to the small voluntary 
organisation or small provider.” (Spokesperson, Centre for Welfare Reform) 
The outcome has been that providers have developed tactics which target those who 
are either highly skilled or most recently finding themselves unemployed and will 
therefore have resources dedicated to them as they have realistic prospects of 
finding work and therefore securing financial gain for the contractor (Wright, 2012). 
On the flipside, those with a very low skill base or who are long term unemployed or 
in receipt of long term sickness payments and who require significant individualised 
support end up being churned in and out of the system in a continuous low pay, no 
pay cycle, and henceforth have few prospects in the short term of escaping benefits 
dependency. 
Hence whilst the prime Work Programme providers have been putting much of their 
effort into finding work for the small number of highly employable clients, the rest 
have been left to either help themselves or have been passed on to local voluntary 
organisations who have been forced to deal with the fallout of the Work 
Programme’s structural impacts at great time and expense to themselves, but with 
little commitment required on the part of the prime contractor (Jones, 2012). This is 
an extension and intensification of previous government work initiatives but 
contradicts the objectives of government welfare-to-work policies to lower 
dependency through work, particularly for those furthest from the labour market. This 
reaffirms how “workfare is not about creating jobs for people that do not have them; it 
is about creating workers for jobs that nobody wants” (Peck, 2001:6). Indeed, 
welfare-to-work policies are designed to target those furthest from the labour market 
and gradually move them into sustainable employment; the Work Programme 
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represents the latest manifestation of this idea yet the strategies and tactics of those 
implementing it is serving only to trap such people deeper into the benefits system. 
Mascini et al. (2009:7), by contrast, suggest that this process is not so straight 
forward, being heavily dependent on the desired outcomes of the private provider: 
“selection occurs in the implementation of workfare, but which client 
categories are favoured, depends on the way performance is measured.” 
A corollary of this is the way in which sanctioning processes appear to be being used 
as an alternative tool to active job search within the Work Programme by providers. 
A number of interviewees have proposed from their observations of the Work 
Programme that sanctioning is being ramped up despite a lack of jobs available to 
place people in: 
“Means testing is not really fair. It’s just a legal way of getting people onto 
jobseekers so that the jobcentre can be tough on them - bullying them and 
making them feel uncomfortable - and if they’re on jobseekers or ESA then 
they are eligible for the Work Programme. So I think that the tests aren’t going 
to go anywhere, and the tests are just going to keep chipping away at people 
and they’re just going to keep forcing people onto benefits that they shouldn’t 
necessarily be on.” 
They went on to provide the following example: 
“I had someone when I was working on the Work Programme at my last 
company; he had severe mental health issues to the point that he wouldn’t 
even come in the building because it had a revolving door. He came with a 
support worker, and I had to go downstairs, meet him at the front door. Me 
and the support worker had to hold a hand each and run through the door with 
him and pretend that we were going through a time warp. This person had 
done the tests and was deemed fit to work, because he was physically able. 
You tell me now, how is somebody with mental health issues that severe, that 
has a full time support worker, going to get a job?” (Project Co-ordinator, 
Greater Manchester Social Housing Provider) 
This suggests that both the government and the Work Programme providers are well 
aware that the number of jobs required to place everyone within the programme are 
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not necessarily available, making the entire sanctioning process futile for a 
significant proportion of those within the benefits system. Despite this, the number of 
people being sanctioned because they have wrongly been reassessed as being fit 
for work continues to increase. In fact, between August 2010 and June 2013, 
172,500 disabled people had their fit for work decisions overturned by DWP 
(Freedom of Information Request by Left Foot Forward, 2014). This has led some 
respondents to suggest that the Work Programme is more about deliberately getting 
people off benefits by any means possible. Standing (2011) argues that this is 
particularly an issue for the disabled and those on long term sick benefits who by 
being transferred onto different benefits such as ESA suddenly are eligible for 
sanctions and increased – as well as very deliberate - scrutiny from both public and 
private contractors to force them towards the labour market, even if such a process 
is not suitable and almost regardless of the consequences. In comparison, Beatty et 
al. (2010) imply that the issue is not people’s inability to work, but instead is about 
the disadvantage that many of them experience in the labour market which drives 
them towards benefits dependency, and which also underlines their eligibility for ESA 
over disability benefits. 
Subsequently the lack of available jobs is once again proving a major sticking point 
for the success of Coalition Government welfare-to-work policies and the push to 
lower dependency and the role of the state through welfare-to-work initiatives – 
particularly concerning those furthest from the labour market. The issue is being 
exacerbated by those implementing the Work Programme, because their tactics for 
unscrupulously applying neoliberalised welfare-to-work conditionality to push people 
off benefits and into the labour market are adding to the problem of benefits 
dependency rather than reducing it. This is confirmed by Brenner et al. (2010:330) 
who purvey that the neoliberalisation of the state and therefore welfare: 
“involves the recalibration of institutionalised, collectively binding modes of 
governance and … state-economy relations, to impose, extend or consolidate, 
marketised, commodified forms of social life.” 
However, Dean (2012:354) rejects such an assertion, indicating that “the immanent 
logic…has more to do with incremental measures to shore up a highly casualised 
low-wage labour market,” or more succinctly, implementing measures to move 
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people into more sustained employment in order for them to take greater 
responsibility for their own welfare. 
This also raises another interesting issue picked up by the interview process, in that 
because the funding is not available to provide those additional services needed by 
the most vulnerable to help them to access the skills and support required for them 
to enter the active labour market, Work Programme providers are therefore actively 
incentivised to strategically park such clients or pass them to third sector 
organisations and jobcentres who “performed better in placing more disadvantaged 
jobseekers” (Standing, 2011:40), because of the minimal financial reward gained for 
the significant time and effort which would have to be spent integrating them into the 
work force. As a result, people are also being passed on (or further subcontracted) to 
local voluntary and charity organisations who have neither the resources or the time 
to help a large number of vulnerable people being forced into job search activities 
(Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). Thus rather than dependency being lowered, 
responsibility is simply being transferred away from the central state to the local level 
and local providers: 
“Well the voluntary sector ends up supplementing their work, you know, the 
‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ that goes on. So the creaming is that they obviously 
take the ones that they can turn around quite quickly that probably would have 
got a job anyway. It is whatever they can turn around quickly and make the 
money on. Then the parking is that they either won’t do anything at all in an 
area if they don’t have any voluntary contracts, they literally park them, or 
pass them down to voluntary sector organisations and then say well we’ll pay 
you if you get this person into work.” (Manager, Locality, a National 
Community Network Organisation) 
The way the Work Programme has been created not only produces “creaming” and 
“parking”, it generates knock-on consequences for other welfare providers, which 
this interviewee goes on to explain: 
“Then the voluntary sector organisation has a choice. Because the 
assessment has already been made that this person is going to need long 
term, intensive care and support - well above what anyone is going to pay you 
for - so what you then get is the voluntary sector organisation is 
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supplementing the profits that are being made by a private company that all 
come from the public purse. And that’s the reality. Because if they do manage 
to get a person into work, the money that they get, an element of it will be 
hived off by that private company you know, and we’ve had some scary 
statistics where members have analysed the amount they are now getting 
paid knowing that the company that is doing nothing, the private company, is 
making about forty per cent profit. It’s just doing nothing, it’s just passing on 
the names. So that’s all public sector money that is not going towards getting 
someone into work, but is being taken by an organisation and simply for 
holding the contract and passing on the details to another organisation to 
actually deliver the outcome. That’s the reality of outsourcing.” (Manager, 
Locality, a National Community Network Organisation) 
Thus whilst the entire policy around the Work Programme is geared towards pushing 
the most difficult clients, the people furthest from the labour market, into sustained 
employment, such people often fall to the back of the queue as efforts invariably lean 
towards moving those who are more work-ready into employment.  
For example between August-October 2013 and August-October 2014, long term 
unemployment in the UK fell by 191,000, but still stood at 684,000, which represents 
35% of all those unemployed. In the same period the number of people who found 
work who had been out of employment for less than 12 months fell by 264,000 
(ONS, 2014e). This process involves the use of for-profit contractors to carry out the 
task of lessening the financial burden of benefit claims which is actually having a 
limited impact as such people are deliberately passed along the chain and therefore 
fall deeper into the realm of benefits dependency and possibly even sanctioning. 
This is the opposite of what welfare-to-work rhetoric and the Work Programme which 
accompanies it has intended. It also alludes to another issue concerning the 
privatisation of welfare support. 
The subcontracting of welfare-to-work services to private contractors and voluntary 
organisations is the result not only of renewed welfare-to-work, but also a renewed 
resurgence of neoliberal tendencies and the advocacy of private enterprise over and 
above that of the state (Callinicos, 2012). In this way welfare-to-work strategies are 
being subcontracted to be carried out more cheaply and more efficiently in the 
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private sector (or at the expense of voluntary organisations), and therefore lowering 
the responsibilities of the state in line with market-led economic policy. This 
neoliberal tone is confirmed by Newman (2011:93) who suggests that the rolling 
back of the state in favour of the market has led to “the replacement of welfare with 
‘workfarist’ social policies as a means of releasing productive capacity for private 
capital accumulation.” Whilst this is arguably true, it has also meant that the 
strategies and tactics being utilised by those charged with implanting welfare-to-work 
rhetoric have been more concerned with making profit than meeting the specific 
needs of clients in order to get them into work. The outcome has been that far from a 
holistic approach to tackling benefits dependency as is needed, private providers 
have simply attempted to ‘cream’ off the most employable individuals in order to 
maximise profits in as short a time as possible, leaving those hardest to place to fall 
deeper into a cycle of welfare dependency at the mercy of the neoliberal whims of 
the labour market (Rees et al., 2014). By contrast, MacLeod and Jones (2011:2458) 
point to the work of Fairbanks (2009), purporting that the transferring of responsibility 
away from the state actually benefits voluntary organisations because: 
“fiscal retrenchment and purported state withdrawal, rather than hoisting a 
lumbering state ‘off people’s backs’, can actually precipitate a myriad of 
biopolitical investments designed to redistribute the disciplines of government 
through the interstices of the social body.” 
In addition the introduction of the Work Programme has also enabled the 
government to purposefully challenge the very definition of what it is to be vulnerable 
in society during a period of austerity, and this is creating challenges for welfare 
providers: 
“They will also decide who they think is vulnerable. I think what we want to do 
is match who we consider is vulnerable, because there’s going to be an issue 
where they’ve got a list and we’ve got a list and they’re not going to marry. So 
there are some who are going to fall in between and it’s how we just pick 
those people up.” (Senior Official, Rochdale Borough Council) 
The result is that a significant number of people previously protected within the 
welfare system are now being found fit for work and are finding themselves being 
churned through the Work Programme as a result of this redefining of benefit 
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eligibility (Andre et al., 2013). Often many of these people who were previously 
deemed unfit for work are now being forced, through implementation strategies, 
particularly heightened conditionality, to undertake job search activities in return for 
benefits receipt and so become more marginalised than ever. In addition other 
providers such as local authorities and voluntary organisations with already 
overstretched resources have had to pick up the pieces left by the nefarious side 
effects of the Work Programme agenda by constructing strategies and tactics of how 
to support those people cut off from the benefits system and help them into 
sustainable employment. This redefinition represents a clear shift from previous 
policy, as for the first time some of the most vulnerable members of society are being 
forced to accommodate work requirements to maintain their benefit entitlements as 
part of state welfare-to-work policy and the strategies used by welfare providers to 
implement them. This confirms the thoughts of Ross (2009:65) that: 
“while attempting to disinvest themselves of the responsibility to meet 
people’s social and economic needs, states have engaged individuals, private 
enterprises, and communities to recreate institutions of social support.” 
A number of interviewees have questioned the integrity of the welfare-to-work 
policies in terms of what they are actually trying to achieve through the Work 
Programme; are they actually attempting to get people into sustained and 
meaningful employment or are they simply more concerned with getting people off 
benefits to lessen the pull on the public purse, and instead leave them to take 
responsibility for themselves: 
“I’ve just done two years at a prime provider on the Manchester Work 
Programme and I’ll tell you what we were told. These people will either get a 
job, or you’ll get them in to do as much as you can until it gets to the point 
where they’re not even going to bother claiming anymore. You know, that’s 
the ideology behind it; either they get a job or you bully them to the point 
where they sack off the whole thing.” (Project Co-ordinator, Greater 
Manchester Social Housing Provider) 
Whilst the tactics providers have been using often remove people from the benefits 
system, they do not actually lower dependency. Rather, it lessens the government’s 
accountability for providing for basic every day needs. It appears that the primary 
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mandate of private Work Programme contractors has been to force people off social 
security support, regardless of whether they have a job going forward or not. Many 
people complete the Work Programme and still find themselves without a job, 
however it must be said that there is a significant incentive for organisations to find 
jobs for those unemployed because of the payment by results structure which they 
must adhere to (Oakley, 2012). 
Local labour market conditions are also making the task of implementing welfare-to-
work policy effectively more difficult, which leads us to question the overall 
effectiveness of any active labour market policies which are being implemented in 
the name of austerity, and may actually be having the opposite effect of what the 
policy intended: 
“Well there are obviously not enough jobs. We’ve had a look at the Work 
Programme and a number of people speaking to us, and quite clearly they’re 
not … the number of people they’re placing in work just isn’t keeping pace 
with the number of people who are entering the Work Programme at the other 
end. So that says it all really. I think it’s just an obvious point. What you’re also 
finding is increasing numbers of people in zero hours or low hours contracts, 
and we’re looking at a case at the moment where, they’re a recruitment 
agency and they are employing people, seven hundred people on seven hour 
contracts. Seven hundred! And they’re working in factories because they’ve 
obviously been placed there. It seems that work placement programme 
claimants are being referred increasingly into that agency. So you can see 
what’s happening. Some people are coming off the employment register but 
they are underemployed, and it’s a massive national issue, but it’s an issue in 
this city.” (City Councillor in Liverpool) 
This is proving to be especially prevalent in those towns and cities which already 
have a history of structural deficiencies in their labour markets over a long period, 
and is certainly not reducing the level of welfare dependency on the state through 
effective welfare-to-work policy as anticipated when first devised. For localities within 
the North West region which have been depressed in recent years as a result of both 
the impacts of the financial crisis and the subsequent and rather more deliberate 
austerity protocols implemented by the Coalition Government, this has made the 
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efficient implementation of Work Programme initiatives and strategies by providers 
more difficult. Put simply, labour markets formerly reliant on public sector 
employment now have far fewer suitable private sector vacancies than the number of 
people in the Work Programme system. Indeed, the latest figures show that between 
March 2012 and March 2014 employment in the North West increased by an 
average of 4.3 per cent annually, at the same time that public sector employment fell 
5.2 per cent (ONS, 2014f). 
Indeed the tactics used to implement the welfare-to-work policies simply transfer 
dependency from an issue of unemployment to one of underemployment. It also 
becomes inherent that benefit recipients, especially those in public sector 
employment “will have no choice but to alter their behaviours as a result of these 
benefit modifications” (Levine and Scorsone, 2011:212). This adheres to the 
thoughts of Mascini et al. (2009:6) who suggest that the capacity for the 
“marketisation of public policy” through the private sector to supply the number of 
suitable jobs required to move people from out of work towards in-work benefits is far 
outstripped by the number of people wanting such employment, which is in direct 
contradiction to the welfare-to-work policies which have been implemented. This 
inadequacy in the labour market has been picked up by Grimshaw and Rubery 
(2012:120), who point out that: 
“public sector employment is being portrayed as parasitic on the private sector 
and taxpayers … [but] a key flaw in this policy framework is that it 
underestimates the linkages within the UK’s mixed economy, such that 
significant share of private sector (and voluntary sector) business depends on 
public spending.” 
A number of interviewees have noted that not only have people previously exempt 
from the labour market because of their entitlement to disability or sickness benefits 
been forced to undertake often unsuitable job search activities when they have little 
prospect of actually getting a job, but equally they are now also susceptible to the 
conditionality that comes with active labour market policies: 
“What I’m actually seeing is, when I was working on the programme, we knew 
when we were working with ESA customers that was going to be one of the 
big things, helping people on ESA to continue their training. But I didn’t 
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actually realise myself how much the jobcentre was going to target these 
people. What is shocking to me is the amount of people that are sent down to 
my place who are long term unemployed - not worked for twenty years, been 
on ESA for God knows how long, have never been on jobseekers. All of a 
sudden they’re being told right, from next week you’re on jobseekers: now you 
need to do this, you need to do that, you need to get a computer, you need to 
get a CV together, and if you don’t by our next appointment you’ll be 
sanctioned.” (Project Co-ordinator, Greater Manchester Social Housing 
Provider) 
It appears that by strategically targeting people who have been moved from disability 
benefits onto Jobseekers Allowance, those implementing government welfare-to-
work ideals can essentially lessen the cost to the public purse as well as people’s 
ability to rely on state support, because it enables them to be forced towards the 
labour market, and if this is not possible, impose impinging sanctions based on the 
work-first conditionality agenda which forms a core part of the political consensus for 
the welfare reforms and in turn the Work Programme, and may even allow them to 
justify removing people from the benefits system altogether. Between May 2010 and 
May 2013, over 156,000 fewer people were claiming out of work benefits (DWP, 
2013c). 
Not only are welfare-to-work policies dependent on jobs being available for people to 
move into, but are also dependent in the case of in-work conditionality on employers 
making additional opportunities available to increase the number of working hours to 
employees: 
“I can say that to you as a trade union person, but what do you think Tesco 
are going to say to the government; what the hell are you doing here? It would 
be interesting to see whether they’d actually contacted any employers before 
to ask them if it was feasible. Often you get incredibly a trade union and an 
employer saying to a government, where’s this come from? I don’t have any 
extra hours to give. Why are all these people suddenly asking? If the 
jobcentre assessor says to the individual you’ve not been seeking as many 
hours as you should, I recommend that the working tax benefit is now 
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suspended for three months, the employer will say well that’s crazy, I haven’t 
got any hours to give them.” (Spokesperson for USDAW) 
Henceforth because the economy is still relatively weak as it continues to recover 
from a period of economic downturn, along with the increasingly neoliberal 
undertone of welfare-to-work initiatives, not only is the availability of work proving 
challenging, but also the number of hours worked by those already in employment 
who fall under the new in-work conditionality mandate. For those who are required to 
implement such welfare-to-work policies, difficulties are now arising in terms of 
finding jobs for people who do not have them, but also finding additional working 
hours for those who already have jobs. To put this in context, in-work conditionality 
affects approximately 1.2 million people in the UK (Resolution Foundation, 2012). 
Thus despite employers suggesting that it is not economically viable to make extra 
hours available to their staff, benefit recipients are continually becoming subject to 
sanctions for failing to secure additional hours of work which is now a requirement of 
their benefits conditions, even though it is unrealistic to expect them to do so. In 
2013, the number of people in part time employment looking for full time hours had 
risen to 1.43 million, the highest figure at any point over the past 10 years (New 
Policy Institute, 2014). 
This indicates a significant contradiction in the welfare-to-work rhetoric in that the 
tactics of the state to reduce their responsibilities by forcing people to take on 
additional work do not synthesise with the neoliberal principles of a market economy 
and private business. In turn this means that employers and welfare providers are 
undertaking strategy processes which are proving relatively unsuccessful in moving 
people into greater levels of work and therefore a lower reliance on the benefits 
system, the outcome being that people are being forced to look for work which just is 
not there or cannot be provided, and in turn leads to them being sanctioned on their 
benefits entitlements. Focusing on this issue of social inclusion/exclusion, Tarr and 
Finn (2012:4) confirm the presence of this mismatch by noting that: 
“the move towards a tougher sanctions regime and the introduction of in-work 
conditionality need to be accompanied by sufficient, appropriate support to 
help people meet the terms of their entitlement.” 
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6.3.3  Implementing Personal Independence Payments and Disability Living 
Allowance reforms 
A further key aspect of the reforms surrounds the issue of the government agenda to 
retest disability claimants and the medicalisation of the entire concept of disability, as 
highlighted by one interview respondent: 
“We’re very concerned about DLA being medicalised through PIP. It’s going to 
move into a system very much like ESA, with a medicalised assessment and 
that hasn’t worked at all well to date. So we’re quite alarmed that that’s going 
to be quite pessimistic.” 
They went on to convey that: 
“We think it’s going to be quite difficult to make it work in the future. We’re 
also really quite alarmed at what’s a shift in theoretical understanding of 
disability through PIP. And what we mean is that at the moment with the 
disability living allowance, when it was introduced in the nineties it was very 
much about saying to disabled people, people with disabilities, you are the 
best judge of your ability to cope or your need for adjustment. We allow you to 
be the experts of your condition and your living, that’s why it’s disability living 
allowance. It was about people saying this is how my disability impacts on my 
life, and it was judged by how things happen to your life, how you can do 
things or not do things. This is being rolled back into this medicalised 
moderate understanding of disability. Doctors, or medical assessors who don’t 
know the person saying we think that somebody with multiple sclerosis will 
behave or will have the following needs, instead of it being about the person 
describing their illness for example, and then using a very crude points 
system to assess that. So that’s quite worrying for us.” (Senior Official at a 
Manchester CAB) 
It has quickly become clear then as the Coalition Government’s welfare reform 
programme has got into full swing, that many people who have been classed as 
disabled all their working lives are now being found fit for work by welfare providers 
as the definition of disability is challenged and questioned as a tactic for pushing 
such people towards the labour market (Roulstone, 2015). This means that they are 
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being transferred onto ESA and Jobseekers Allowance and therefore becoming 
subject to the devices of welfare-to-work conditionality (Lindsay and Houston, 2011). 
This is something qualitatively new, and in the main is the result of a strategic 
medicalisation of disability benefits as part of the wider welfare-to-work discourse, 
whereby people are now being assessed in terms of their physical ability to perform 
work rather than being based on the symptomatic analysis of the individual 
(Roulstone, 2015). 
The contradictions consequently arise when such people are unable to secure 
employment of any kind because employers are not willing to take them on due to 
their lack of capability for doing the job, and so they retain their dependence on the 
welfare system. 
By devising strategies to force people off long term sickness and disability benefits, 
those implementing welfare-to-work initiatives are not solving the problems of long 
established sickness benefits claims. Instead they are transferring it from one area of 
the social security system to another, from disability benefits to those who are 
dependent on unemployment benefits with little prospect of finding a suitable job. 
However Mead (2011:281) contests this view, stating that disability benefits 
recipients are “unemployed rather than truly incapacitated.” This implies such people 
are in fact making rational decisions to remain in the benefits system, and so their 
lack of activity in the labour market is a result of individual volition instead of a lack of 
jobs, and provides justification for the increasingly strict welfare regime being 
advocated. 
The crude medicalised approach now being applied does not effectively consider the 
conditions of those with less tangible impairments (for example mental health), and 
therefore does little in the way of reducing spending and welfare dependency 
amongst a heavily reliant group in society by welfare implementers actively trying to 
move them into employment they are not capable of undertaking. It may even 
increase the cost to the state as such decisions are successfully challenged at great 
expense. This has been noted by Lindsay and Houston (2011), who state that 
welfare-to-work policies for those claiming disability benefits misunderstand the 
nature of the unemployment problem because depressed labour markets often do 
not have jobs suited to workers with health issues, nor do employers seek to employ 
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them. Furthermore, such people are some of the furthest from the labour market in 
terms of their work readiness, and so imposing strict conditions upon them to try and 
force them towards the labour market is the wrong policy in the wrong situation. 
In the main then it is those who have been classified as disabled or who are on 
sickness benefits that appear to be suffering more than others as they are passed as 
fit for work: 
“The question is where are they going to find the employment? All other things 
being equal, being someone who has been on incapacity benefits for five 
years, even if government wasn’t saying these are all scroungers, it’s not a 
good advert for a business to take on in times when we know that businesses 
- even at the best of times - have not taken on disabled people because it’ll 
cost me money, and they’ll all be off sick every day and things like that; 
arguments that we can refute, but that’s not the point. The whole business 
about shifting people from welfare to work and employment, presupposes 
there is employment for people to go to.” (Spokesperson for a Merseyside-
Based Disability Charity) 
This group in particular have always been at a significant disadvantage when it 
comes to securing work, but now with the increasingly neoliberalised economic 
conditions the ability of disabled people to find suitable forms of employment is more 
difficult than ever, and so the intended mandate to make work pay is not necessarily 
coming to fruition (Weston, 2012; CAB, 2011). In addition, the situation for such 
people has been compounded even further by the increasingly strict and medicalised 
nature of social security entitlements, with many people who have had disability 
support for a long period of time now being told they are fit for work and have 
subsequently had their support reduced or removed altogether (Lindsay and 
Houston, 2011). This medicalisation of security entitlements is something 
qualitatively new and different from the situation observed under Labour. 
Furthermore there are wider implications such as those for family members who may 
have to decide to leave employment themselves to care for a relative who has been 
unfairly deemed fit for work and has had their support removed. There are 6 million 
full time carers in the UK, and in 2011 31% had had to give up full time work to take 
on the care of disabled or sick relatives, up from 17% in 2009 (Carers UK, 2012). 
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This again points to a serious pit fall in the make work pay policy, because with many 
people formerly classed as unable to work now being pushed towards finding 
employment, the suitability of roles within the present labour market make it 
incredibly difficult to find work of any kind, let alone jobs which would enable such 
people to earn more than they would have previously received from social security 
payments. This idea has been picked up on by Wright (2009:206-207) who points 
out that: 
“welfare-to-work policies may just result in the substitution of one group of 
disadvantaged workers [the workless] for another in low-paid and 
unsustainable jobs, cycling between temporary work and claiming benefits.” 
These sentiments echo the suggestions of Lindsay et al. (2007) that the work first 
nature of welfare-to-work initiatives leads to claimants being pushed into low paid 
jobs at the expense of long term skills and personal development. 
 
6.3.4  Implementing housing benefit reforms 
The main issue which has arisen and has been readily picked up on by a large 
number of the interview participants regards the Spare Room Subsidy, or Bedroom 
Tax, and that with the policy being devised and implemented centrally it fails to 
account for differences in the housing structure at the local level: 
“The problem we’ve got is that we’re over-subscribed with three bed family 
accommodation, but then we’ve got three bed multi’s that we’ve had to re-
designate into two beds…At any one time we might have a hundred odd one 
or two bed flats available; well if we’ve got three thousand people wanting to 
move, it doesn’t stack up does it? So we’re trying to target it as best we can, 
so the cases where they’re in high arrears, or they’re under-occupied by two 
or more rooms. They’re the ones we’re really trying to target, because they’re 
the ones where it’s financially a real hit for them to stay where they are.” 
(Senior Official, Knowsley Housing Trust) 
They went on to convey that: 
178 
 
“We had three thousand people hit by the Bedroom Tax. So in that group the 
people that suffer the most tend to be single people in a three bed house, with 
two spare rooms who are just on Jobseekers Allowance. They’ve got no kids, 
no other income, so they’ve got a weekly income in the region of seventy 
pounds per week. They’ve got a weekly shortfall of twenty odd pounds on 
average per week, and it’s very difficult to see how people in those 
circumstances can budget and actually afford it.” (Senior Official, Knowsley 
Housing Trust) 
Whilst central government has demanded that people are moved to more suitable 
properties, local authorities and housing associations are struggling to deliver 
appropriate housing and therefore many people are unable to move even if they 
want to, and end up being fined largely through no fault of their own (JRF, 2014b). 
This represents a major contradiction to government policy, because the 
conditionality being applied centrally does not necessarily correlate with the regional 
and local scales and the nuances in housing provision which exist. In turn the extra 
financial cost of being stuck in particular accommodation and unable to move may 
almost totally negate the benefits achieved by moving into work from benefits, or 
even taking on further hours on top of those already being worked. This conflictual 
situation created by a neoliberal welfare-to-work agenda juxtaposed to much more 
localised social challenges and costs can be viewed conceptually because: 
“Neoliberalism itself is a form of contentious politics, conceived and 
operationalised in an antagonistic relationship to various (local) others, such 
as specific forms of the developmental or Keynesian state (Peck et al. 
2010:104). 
In this way therefore the Coalition Government agenda to make work pay may in fact 
be contradicted by other policy strategies. Despite this, the objective must always be 
to focus efforts on getting people into work, because that is the only way to lower 
dependency as benefit withdrawal and sanctioning starts to bite. However in many 
instances in towns and cities in the North West, this is proving to be more difficult 
than it seems, since depressed local labour markets make it increasingly difficult to 
find the type of work needed to escape this cycle of dependency and its associated 
problems (Wright, 2012). 
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The other significant housing benefit reform which has also affected Universal Credit 
is the change to Council Tax benefits. In the past people in receipt of social security 
benefits have not had to pay anything towards the cost of their Council Tax bill, 
however now this has changed and whilst dependent on individual circumstances, 
everyone now has a responsibility to pay at least a small proportion of their Council 
Tax bill which is adding complexity to the system: 
“We’re quantifying groups and numbers of people, so we know for example 
the changes to Council Tax benefit, there’s a whole group of primarily low 
income working age people, low income workers, who are now liable for an 
element of their Council Tax that they wouldn’t have been before. So they’re 
clearly feeling that impact. They’re having to pay at least maybe twenty two 
pounds per week extra I think in some cases, but they wouldn’t have had to 
pay before. They are primarily working people as well, not just unemployed 
people.” (Spokesperson, Wirral Borough Council) 
Whilst for the majority of people, paying Council Tax is just another household cost 
that has to be accounted for, for those people on the breadline on the lowest rung of 
the ladder in society, particularly those in low paid work, suddenly being expected to 
pay part of this cost, however small, is an extra cost that they cannot afford. For 
example, apart from pensioners, every ratepayer in Manchester will eventually be 
required to make at least a 15% contribution to their Council Tax bill, (around £137 
per year) (Manchester Evening News, 2013). In addition, for many it becomes an 
issue of survival, from which they must find tactics and strategies to overcome the 
additional financial stress; their income is already so heavily squeezed that they are 
constantly having to make difficult decisions between paying bills and putting food on 
the table or heating and lighting their home. In this way therefore, many people see 
Council Tax as an important but not essential expenditure, and often decide to put it 
off in order meet more essential needs and instead run up debts and arrears to the 
local authority. Thus this actually inserts an extra layer of complexity into the system 
as noted by Sam Royston (2012:81), Head of Policy and Public Affairs at the 
Children’s Society, who suggests that: 
“Universal Credit is built on two major principles of simplifying the welfare 
system and introducing clear work incentives. The localisation of Council Tax 
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Benefit undermines this, adding a second means test into the welfare system, 
and potentially recreating the extremely high marginal deduction rates it was 
designed to avoid.” 
This is a significant shift in the nature of social security provision; for the first time 
even those dependent on benefits are being forced to take responsibility and 
shoulder the burden for their own welfare as a way of encouraging them to look for 
work (or more hours and better forms of employment) and lower reliance on the 
state. Yet the reduction in cost to the state is minimal, with people instead getting 
into significant arrears to avoid paying Council Tax requirements instead of taking 
responsibility to lower their reliance on the benefits system. 
 
6.4  The recipients of welfare-to-work: people and employees on the 
receiving end of austerity-fuelled welfare reforms 
The final and arguably most important stakeholders are the recipients of welfare-to-
work policies and who are the people that directly experience and respond to their 
material effects. In the instance of welfare-to-work policy, these are citizens in direct 
receipt of benefit support, be they entirely dependent on the state (unemployed or 
unfit for work) or in some form of employment (employees). The role of recipients is 
that of consumers of welfare-to-work rhetoric; they have little or no say in how it is 
planned or implemented, but instead have influence over the way they choose to 
experience such policies by way of tactics and strategies for dealing with the material 
effects of incentivised work and conditions of benefit receipt. 
 
6.4.1  Experiencing work incentivisation policies 
Another issue that has arisen during the interview process is that there are a number 
of flaws with a strategy of making work pay which lead to a significant minority of the 
working age population actually being better off on benefits long term: 
“I think those people who are in that low pay, no pay cycle are going to be the 
other group that are really affected by it. What’s the point of taking a job for a 
couple of weeks if you’re going to have complete disruption to your benefits? 
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It’s supposed to be a seamless system; it isn’t seamless. I think those people 
will be … less inclined if you know that by taking a job for two weeks you’re 
not going to get your benefits for another four at the end of it.” (Senior Official, 
TUC in the North West of England) 
As a consequence it is becoming apparent that people are being forced to take on 
work that is of a part time or fixed-term capacity, and in turn claimants try and avoid 
such jobs in favour of full time employment, which is becoming less frequent. By 
2013, 5% of benefits claimants were being sanctioned each month for failing to do 
enough to look for work (DWP, 2013b). Between October 2012, when the stricter 
sanctions were introduced up until June 2013, 0.58 million adverse sanctions were 
made (where recipients have their benefit income reduced or stopped for a set 
period of time), around 70,000 per month. Furthermore, the number of sanctions 
stood at 0.9 million for the whole of 2013 and 0.6 million for 2014, or 75,000 and 
50,000 per month respectively (DWP, 2015b). Comparing these figures with those in 
the past, between April 2000 and October 2012 under the old system, 4.97 million 
adverse sanctions were made, around 30,000 per month (DWP, 2013b), which is 
significantly lower than the number under the Coalition. The result, as noted by 
Standing (2011:36), is that “the situation is such that growing numbers of people 
cannot afford to take low-paid casual or part-time jobs and have little motivation to 
look for them.” The use of these tactics to retain benefits income is because whilst 
the short term positives of being in work represent a step forward from income 
received on benefits, in the slightly longer term they represent a loss of income 
between the time the employment ends and the process of reapplying for benefits, 
within which people are likely to be worse off than they were under their original 
benefit status – therefore contradicting the aims of the welfare-to-work rhetoric to 
make work pay. 
 
6.4.2  Experiencing the implementation of Universal Credit 
Whilst at a central level Universal Credit appears to be fairly straightforward in terms 
of what it intends to achieve, at the regional and local scales the rhetoric does not 
necessarily fit with the prevailing socio-economic conditions: 
182 
 
“Well it does because it might make them say well all this thing about being 
better off in work; I’m in work and I’ve just lost a load of money. I’m quitting, 
stuff it, just let me go and watch Jeremy Kyle.” (Spokesperson, USDAW) 
Where the jobs and the employment opportunities do not exist it makes it very 
difficult to incentivise work sufficiently as people end up being sanctioned through no 
fault of their own and as a result they may perceive it to be a better option to remain 
on or go back to benefits rather than lose out financially for being in work (McCollum, 
2012). The result is greater rather than less dependency, and the very deliberate 
political strategy to lower dependency through work is actually having a contradictory 
effect because people develop strategies to maximise income, and in the long term 
taking a part time or temporary job may lead to a loss of income compared to 
remaining on benefits. 
In this way therefore, Universal Credit is intended to simplify the benefits system and 
subsequently encourage work over dependency; however it also creates the issue of 
people becoming more creative in maximising their benefit entitlements: 
“I think it compounds the problems of the Welfare State by increasing 
employer and employee dependency because people do actually fit their 
actions to maximise benefits. And that’s as true of employers as employees. I 
mean they divide their jobs up so that people can get [the] maximum what 
was tax credit and will be Universal Credit. It’s a deeply destructive force.” 
(Labour MP, Merseyside) 
It appears then that this behavioural aspect of Universal Credit adds a different layer 
to the matrix of benefit claiming which already existed under the previous system; 
rather than those implementing welfare-to-work strategies applying policies to 
encourage people into the labour market and lower the burden on the state, many 
are actually using the simplified system to maximise benefit entitlements both for the 
recipients and from their own perspective. Indeed private welfare providers, 
employers and even local authorities gain from maximising citizens welfare 
entitlements, because it provides justification for promoting low paid employment and 
therefore low input of resources on their part. As Johnston et al. (2011:352) have 
suggested: 
183 
 
“‘employers’ may also share an interest in welfare preservation, particularly if 
they benefit from social programmes which shift employment costs towards 
the state.” 
Furthermore, local authorities are using tactics to work with citizens to maximise 
entitlements in order to negate some of the adverse material effects of welfare-to-
work policies because it eases the strain on their already overstretched resources for 
welfare support and provision. 
In addition, the successful implementation of Universal Credit is dependent on the 
symmetry between the work citizens are expected to accept and what they are 
actually willing to take on: 
“[Universal Credit] should always make work pay a little bit. There’s then a 
question about how much does work have to pay to make it worthwhile … If 
you move towards the kind of basic income thing that Universal Credit moves 
us towards, that’s much less of an issue because people can decide for 
themselves what the minimum is that they are willing to work for.” (Professor 
of Geography Specialising in Austerity and Welfare Reform) 
Thus whilst welfare-to-work policy is designed to place incentives on work by 
elucidating its rewards over living on benefits, what policy makers have somewhat 
failed to grasp is that making work pay will not automatically incentivise it above and 
beyond benefits receipt. Indeed the Coalition Government appears to have assumed 
that even if Universal Credit shows that work pays only a little bit it will encourage 
people to move into the labour market, whereas the real question is how much does 
work have to pay for people to view it as more worthwhile than living on benefits. 
Similarly, if the jobs on offer are part time, low paid and involve poor working 
conditions, then the advantages of employment might be so minimal that people do 
not view it as worth their time or effort to undertake, particularly if their quality of life 
is going to suffer as a consequence. As a result, those in receipt of benefits will tailor 
their strategies and tactics around balancing income from work and benefits based 
on their opinions of whether the financial gains of work are large enough for them to 
alter their behaviours and lifestyles to which they have become accustomed on 
benefits. 
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This is considered by the public policy academic Wright (2012), who suggests that 
the behaviours and actions of those in receipt of benefits are moulded by the social 
environments with which they interact, and therefore are a response to the nefarious 
effects of welfare-to-work policies. This then presents a major challenge to the 
welfare-to-work policies of the Coalition Government because the neoliberal nature 
of the labour market is serving to muffle the ability of work to lower benefits 
dependency due to the minimal financial gain which low paid work provides. Thus 
whilst work is supposed to encourage people to become more responsible for their 
own welfare, it is in many cases having the opposite effect, as people begin to 
display more resistance to finding work because of nominal gains and even potential 
drawbacks that it presents. 
Despite this, a number of interviewees have contended that far from encouraging 
greater individual responsibility, the structure of Universal Credit will have the 
contradictory effect of actually increasing dependency on the state, both from the 
perspective of the employer and the employee: 
“It [the Welfare State] creates a dependency based amongst individuals and 
families, but also amongst employers. I mean we’ve moved from what were 
family income supplements costing four million a year to tax credit proposals 
which cost twenty six billion a year. And the employers have shaped their 
labour market to maximise their effect on welfare, and it works for employers 
and it works for individuals, deeply distorting the effects.” (Labour MP, 
Merseyside) 
In a similar guise to the issues around making work pay, the simplification of the 
benefits roll not only clarifies the income disparities between employment and 
benefits, but just as crucially it increases the transparency of the benefit taper rates 
both to employers and employees. In this way then, both parties can therefore 
produce tactics and strategies to ensure maximum benefit entitlements for welfare 
recipients, which limit the effectiveness of welfare-to-work policy in lowering 
dependency on the state. Indeed, people will actively seek to work the exact hours 
needed to maximise their benefit income (currently around 16 hours per week (CAB, 
2014)), beyond which they would begin to lose benefits and therefore the incentives 
of working extra. In a similar way, the more entitlements employees have to support 
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from the state, the less requirement on the employer to provide that extra provision 
in the form of pensions and wages. Many therefore create jobs to this effect, with 
much more emphasis being placed on part time and temporary, low paid work which 
provides greater profit margins to satisfy their neoliberal ideals (MacLeavy, 2014). 
Such a situation subsequently deeply opposes the objectives of welfare-to-work 
policy to move people into work as a strategy for lessening benefits claims. In 
contrast, Universal Credit might actually have the opposite effect and encourage 
people to increase their benefits claims because the boundaries of income 
entitlements have become a lot clearer under the agenda of welfare reform. This 
endorses the thoughts of Theodore and Peck (2011) who convey that the local level 
is crucial for people devising coping strategies to neoliberal welfare policies, because 
it is the level at which stakeholders reside and experience the changes, and so 
naturally is the place where solutions to reforms can be devised. 
Welfare-to-work policy aimed at the disabled is also taking a distinctly more 
medicalised approach, particularly where the need to justify their entitlements is 
becoming much more pronounced: 
“I see a very similar thing happening sometimes with welfare policies, so I 
spoke about the changes to ESA and making people justify that they are sick 
a lot more than they used to do.” (Volunteer at a Liverpool CAB) 
Indeed it is those with mental health issues who, according to a number of 
interviews, appear to be losing out the most, because not only are such disabled 
people now being asked to justify that they are searching for work having been 
moved to ESA, in many instances they are also now being asked to justify that they 
have a genuine disability that prevents them from working. This is becoming 
increasingly difficult to achieve, and many of these people are finding themselves 
losing their entitlements or being sanctioned as a consequence. On top of that, 
prevailing disabilities are frequently preventing people devising ways of finding work 
in their local labour market despite the government insisting that they are fit to do so. 
This justification is qualitatively different from earlier policies, as the disabled have 
previously been largely exempt from such scrutiny, which they are now being hit with 
greater ferocity than at any other time under the Welfare State. Henceforth there has 
been a significant mismatch between the objectives of Coalition Government rhetoric 
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and the reality of moving disability claimants onto job search status in regional and 
local economies. This is because it only leads to their benefits dependency being 
transferred from outside to inside the labour market. Conditionality for the disabled is 
“the wrong prescription” and a “blunt instrument” (Patrick, 2011:275) because people 
with disabilities are not making a choice to exclude themselves from the labour 
market, but instead are constrained by social barriers to their participation in work. 
The conditionality being applied to those out of work is increased under Universal 
Credit so that people are actively forced to search for work and take responsibility for 
their own welfare, and equally the punishments for not doing so reflect the 
government’s intention that nobody should be better off on benefits than in work, an 
idea which has been at the forefront of Coalition Government work initiatives for a 
long time, but which has never effectively been translated from rhetoric to reality: 
“Universal Credit will be an enormous change. Universal Credit should in 
theory change household and people’s decision making to some extent. The 
rhetoric is it’s not now worth being on benefits for those people who might 
have said well if I’m better off on benefits than going into a temporary job that 
is poor working conditions, poor wages.” (Professional Fellow, Institute for 
Employment Research) 
In this way the incentives of moving into work become far more appealing to people 
who have previously been content to live on benefits. This has also been noted by 
Newman (2011:95) who points out that: 
“there is no evidence of a ‘culture of worklessness’; most people want to work 
but in so far as people choose a life on benefits it is often a rational decision 
to avoid debt and harming the quality of their family life.” 
Whilst Universal Credit does not completely solve the issues of low pay and poor 
benefit incentives for being in work, it should in the longer term make a life without 
employment far less appealing by making much clearer definitions between social 
security entitlements in and out of work. However, it may not have the desired effect 
on changing people’s attitude to work and benefits, as it clarifies exactly how much 
work will actually pay. In this regard Universal Credit effectively contradicts its 
intended objectives, because benefits recipients will realise that there is virtually no 
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advantage of taking a job with poor wages and poor working conditions, and 
therefore may actually be persuaded to find strategies to remain on the benefits roll 
and in turn protect their standard of living. 
A further aspect of the issues arising from the changes to Council Tax benefits 
relates to the changes to non-dependent charges, which are now allocated at a flat 
rate to all Council Tax payments. This is a charge levied on households with more 
than one person in work in the household, who is therefore earning an income and 
thus is eligible for Council Tax charges (Manchester City Council, 2014): 
“They’ve flattened out the non-dependent charges so it’s just a flat rate of 
sixty five pounds per month. That’s a good change because that will benefit 
some people, and it will encourage families to stay together for longer, 
because we find non-dependent charges a right headache to be honest, 
especially as the son or daughter gets to earning a little bit more and you get 
the higher charges. They never want to pay it, and then we have to pursue the 
tenant. Whereas I think if it’s a flat rate, because we’ve actually had people 
openly say well I’ll have to tell him to quit his job then or move out. And then 
he gets a flat on his own and can’t manage or he quits his job. So at least now 
there’s an incentive for them to carry on working, contributing towards the 
household, you know, they stay at home that little bit longer which makes 
them a little bit more prepared for their own place once they get it. So I think 
that’s a positive move, the flattening of the non-dependent charges.” (Senior 
Official, Knowsley Housing Trust) 
This was echoed by one interview respondent: 
“I think there might be big changes that are linked to some of those changes 
in the housing benefits and how they stack up against other things, and 
people’s decision making about do they stay, do they move, what’s the 
housing stock like and all of that. That all does impinge on people’s decisions 
about work, issues about benefits, issues about whether if people move out of 
an area do they have the support networks that enable them to go into work 
and stay in work.” (Professional Fellow, Institute for Employment Research) 
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In this way households who are in receipt of benefits and who might have a lodger or 
a child in full time work, have actually benefitted from the policy change, because in 
the past the more individuals in a household have earned, the greater the non-
dependent charges have grown (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). The insertion of a flat 
rate tax now however, means that the policy actively encourages people to not only 
get a job, but search for additional hours once in that job, in essence in line with the 
make work pay objective of the Coalition Government’s welfare-to-work agenda and 
encouraging less dependency on state support because in this instance being in 
work will actually prove advantageous. This therefore represents a good example of 
where deliberate government policy measures have changed the existing rhetoric 
around making work pay in a way that makes it more extensive and intense than in 
the past and, as indicated by one author, develops a “discourse of culpability” 
amongst those in the benefits system (Wright, 2012:318), and therefore effective in 
altering behaviour and strategies towards securing income through employment. 
 
6.5  Summary 
This chapter has investigated how the theory being presented around (re)new(ed) 
welfare-to-work policy is being played out in reality in the UK, and the material 
effects and contradictions which are coming to fruition as result of their 
implementation. In this regard, the chapter has analysed the tactics and strategies 
being utilised by key stakeholders in the transfer of welfare-to-work policy from 
central government down to those who experience it at the local level. This is 
important because it argues that the politically driven rhetoric of welfare-to-work has 
become subject to tactics and strategies of key stakeholders, which has in turn given 
rise to a number of contradictions between the rhetoric and reality of policy 
implementation in terms of the material effects emerging. 
The first stakeholder analysed was the conductor of welfare-to-work policy, which in 
this instance is the state. The state has developed a number of strategies based 
around making work pay and conditionality for benefits recipients both in and out of 
work. These operate on the premise that people can be incentivised into taking 
employment by highlighting the rewards of being in work compared to living on 
benefits, coupled with strict sanctions and conditionalities for non-compliance with 
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welfare-to-work initiatives (Standing, 2011). What is crucial is that this has created a 
number of contradictory material effects to the desired objectives of welfare reform 
due to the lack of suitable jobs and unnecessary conditionalities applied to those 
who cannot find work, such that benefits dependency and the burden on the state is 
sustained or maybe even increased. This therefore brings into question the viability 
of some of these strategies for achieving welfare-to-work objectives. 
The next stakeholders assessed were the implementers of welfare-to-work policy, 
which are local welfare providers (local authorities and private enterprises) and 
employers. These stakeholders incorporate particular tactics and strategies into their 
work to implement welfare-to-work policies passed down from the state. These 
include processes to force people into the labour market and imposing sanctions for 
non-compliance, as well as supporting those furthest from the labour market to move 
away from benefits dependency. From the perspective of employers, it has also 
involved strategies for creating work opportunities for people to move into, but which 
also maximises profitability in a neoliberal market place (Johnston et al., 2011). As 
with the state, these stakeholder strategies and tactics are interesting because they 
have also led to a number of material effects which contradict the welfare-to-work 
agenda. These include forcing people into low paid and unsuitable work, sanctioning 
people for non-compliance with unrealistic job search targets, ‘creaming’ and 
‘parking’ respective benefits recipients to maximise profits (Wright, 2012:321), and in 
terms of employers manipulating the labour market to suit their position in the 
welfare reform process in order to maximise income. The outcome has been 
continued reliance on state support, often when dependency has been transferred 
from those outside of employment to those in low paid work, which itself raises 
questions about the nature of welfare-to-work policy for those already in some form 
of employment. 
The final stakeholders evaluated were the recipients of welfare-to-work policy, the 
claimants themselves who experience the material effects on a day to day basis. It 
became clear that recipients of welfare-to-work policies have developed their own 
tactics and strategies to counteract the divisive nature of the neoliberal tendencies 
which are embedded within them in order to maximise their income by balancing the 
trade-off between work and benefits receipt (Standing, 2011). Such techniques 
involve working the exact number of hours to entitle them to the highest level of 
190 
 
benefit income, and only taking on work which leaves them in a significantly better 
financial position than they would otherwise be on benefits. As a result there are a 
number of contradictory material effects which again begin to come to the fore, 
including welfare-to-work policy actually disincentivising work, significant arrears in 
the payment of rent and Council Tax, and the transfer of dependency from disability 
benefits to the unemployed and even to those in work who are under some form of 
welfare conditionality. It has therefore been important to critique these tactics and 
strategies to determine the effectiveness of welfare-to-work policies. Furthermore, 
such effects have led to the adoption of specific behaviours to resist and adapt to the 
welfare-to-work policies being implemented in order to maintain income and an 
expected standard of living, which themselves have received scant attention in the 
wider academic literature so far, and which raise additional questions about the 
nature of the Coalition Government welfare-to-work agenda. 
The final empirical chapter will subsequently focus more succinctly on the reactions 
and responses of the organisations and individuals experiencing welfare reform at 
the regional and local levels. In particular it will focus on forms of co-operation and 
resistance to welfare-to-work policy implementation and how this dictates the 
success or failure of such policies from the perspectives of the key stakeholders 
involved in the process. It will also concentrate on the coping strategies which are 
being adopted to overcome and mitigate the impacts of austerity and welfare reform 
for such stakeholders. 
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Chapter 7: Co-operation, Conversion and Coping 
Strategies – Responding to Austerity and Welfare-To-Work 
 
7.1  Introduction 
Whilst the current raft of welfare-to-work policy is geared towards encouraging 
benefits recipients to move into the labour market and thereby lower their 
dependency on the state to sustain an acceptable standard of living (MacLeavy, 
2011), the material effects of these policies have had a number of somewhat 
contradictory and unexpected effects due to the politicised and arguably mis-guided 
nature of the initiatives that have been implemented. As a result, the co-operative 
and resistive behaviours and responses which have come to the fore from those 
people and organisations which are actually experiencing the effects are frequently 
intended to mitigate and overcome the negative impacts on income and living 
standards (Thane, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012b). However these responses might 
themselves contradict those expected from the implementation of a stricter welfare-
to-work regime as the attractions of work coupled to the threats of conditionality and 
loss of income make those experiencing welfare reform more reluctant to respond to 
the policy rhetoric by finding work (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012), and might even be 
qualitatively different to anything seen before. 
Consequently, it is vital to explore these interesting and potentially unique responses 
to the material effects of welfare reform - and in particular welfare-to-work initiatives - 
and discover exactly how specific forms of behaviour emerge from these policy 
effects. Responses can vary widely, so the chapter will reflect the range of 
responses which are emerging from three groups: citizens, employees and 
organisations. Section 7.2 addresses adaptations emerging in response to austerity 
politics. Section 7.3 goes on to look at forms of innovation coming to fruition in 
response to austerity politics. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 tackle issues around co-operation 
and resistance to austerity politics, and finally Section 7.6 examines the coping 
strategies which are developing as a result of these austerity politics being 
implemented. 
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As with the previous chapters, making distinctions between the types of material 
effects and the subsequent responses will enable clearer distinctions to be made 
about the transfer of (re)new(ed) welfare-to-work policy from central government into 
the reality of its implementation locally. 
The chapter argues that the current welfare-to-work rhetoric is politically driven and 
therefore has created specific material effects which themselves are unintended and 
perhaps even contradictory to the objectives of austerity politics and welfare reform. 
Henceforth, these material effects have led to particular responses by those 
experiencing the reforms in order to mitigate the negative effects on income and 
living standards, but which might also contradict the intended behavioural outcomes 
of welfare-to-work and be qualitatively different to those which have preceded them. 
 
7.2  Adaptation: responding to welfare-to-work 
The first response to the material effects of welfare reform has been from 
stakeholders adapting to changes. Austerity reforms to welfare policy necessarily 
requires behavioural change both as a response to government rules but also to 
mitigate, where possible, the negative effects. This adaptation to austerity, and the 
inherent need to adjust to a situation of less resources coupled with meeting a wider 
range of needs, has taken different forms for the different stakeholder groups dealing 
with specific issues and quandaries relating to their role in welfare-to-work policy 
processes locally. 
 
7.2.1  Financial adaptations 
An intended consequence of public austerity is that locally oriented welfare-to-work 
initiatives are still being undertaken despite less money being available for doing 
them. This ensures people are still being pushed towards the labour market at the 
same time as spending is being reduced. Austerity politics are forcing many local 
authorities to think more critically about how they do things, which in some instances 
the impacts arguably have had a positive effect: 
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“It’s created the need for some change in delivery and sometimes in quite 
sensible ways. So I think when local authorities are sharing back office 
functions, we’re not doing that at the moment, but that’s sensible I think. I was 
just having a conversation with someone who was in the Labour 
administration in the 1980s, and they said they never really tackled the central 
costs of local authorities for example, whose central charges are ridiculous 
when you look at things; what it costs to run buildings and the recharges and 
some of that doesn’t really make sense to be honest. So some things you can 
look at and say ok some things need to change, and I think you’re looking at 
different innovative ways of delivering things and delivering things in a slightly 
better way.” (City Councillor in Liverpool) 
Voluntary organisations now play a more central role in the welfare provision process 
due to their ability to provide services more cheaply and effectively compared to the 
local authority through the use of volunteers and their presence in the local 
community (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). This not only involves the outsourcing of 
services to voluntary organisations, but potentially also transferring assets over to 
them as well. This gives voluntary organisations some more autonomy than has 
been the case previously. This process has also been identified by Peck (2012:647) 
because: 
“austerity urbanism is driving new waves of institutional transformation, 
governance reform and public-service restructuring – with long-run and 
potentially path-changing consequences for both its winners and losers.”  
Again this is exactly what Coalition Government rhetoric has intended, as it lowers 
the costs of welfare-to-work provision for local government as well as reducing their 
responsibility for getting people into work. Whilst this response is also not 
qualitatively different from before, the current austerity politics being employed 
means such responses are far more extensive and hard-hitting than have been 
utilised in the past. However, whilst the process of outsourcing welfare-to-work 
support to the third sector might well lead to better and more efficient results, it still 
fails to completely satisfy the issue that to some extent dependency is being 
transferred from one stakeholder to another, and actually does little to resolve the 
perceived problem which government policies are supposed to address. 
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There have also been a number of ways in which private and third sector 
organisations have had to adapt simultaneously to the increased level of need and 
the increasing scarcity of resources in response to welfare reform. The first to note is 
the greater financial burden being placed on such organisations, particularly where 
responsibility for implementing welfare-to-work and the responses which result are 
being transferred away from the state towards alternative providers: 
“We’ve had some brilliant experiences of asset transfer, that’s where a local 
authority will transfer the assets for each building or land or huge assets and 
things, to local communities who then decide themselves what they want to 
happen there and run it. And they can be quite creative. But we have a big 
issue around is it an asset or is it a liability - the dumping of expensive 
buildings that are an important local resource but are never going to fully be 
able to cover their own costs. But then being given to local communities who 
find what they’ve got is a huge liability that they actually can’t provide the level 
of services that used to be provided there, but also just can’t afford the 
building.” (Manager, Locality, a National Community Network Organisation) 
The research reveals that local government appears most ready to hand over assets 
which are the highest cost to run, and transfer the most challenging welfare-to-work 
cases and hence the cost to those in the private sector. This creates policy 
contradictions because despite the costs of welfare-to-work being alleviated from the 
responsibility of the state, they are simply being transferred to other organisations 
which, especially in the case of voluntary organisations, have far fewer resources to 
undertake welfare-to-work initiatives. The result is that rather than the most 
challenging individuals being moved off benefits and into work, inevitably the high 
cost of supporting these people through the employment process means they are 
parked or passed on. In short, their dependency moves from one stakeholder to 
another. 
Another significant challenge facing many providers is a cut in government funding 
either partially, or in many cases, completely. As a result they have to find alternative 
funding streams or cease operating: 
“I think the biggest effect I’m seeing is that because not only is that having an 
effect on the people that it’s happening to, it’s also having a knock on effect 
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on projects like ours, who are spending a lot of money trying to help people 
into employment, but our resources are now being used up trying to help 
people keep their homes and stuff like that.” (Project Co-ordinator, Greater 
Manchester Social Housing Provider) 
Many organisations involved in welfare-to-work delivery are facing extremely 
challenging situations in terms of what is expected from them and the need to adapt 
to such situations (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). This is particularly acute in the 
least insulated cities where the greatest proportions of people becoming increasingly 
dependent on welfare service provision are located (Smith, 2010). 
Whilst local organisations and groups can create solutions if they are given the 
resources through a community-led response to austerity and cuts, more often than 
not they are being overlooked in favour of a for-profit private company imposing an 
external plan of action which may not work sustainably for that locality (Dodds and 
Paskins, 2011). The result is that as local voluntary organisations start to disappear 
because of a lack of funding, while the capacity of a local area to support people to 
enter the labour market or to claim their entitlements from the state is being reduced 
and placed under increasing restraint (TUC, 2014a). This creates an unintended 
consequence of government policy because whilst the agenda has been to reduce 
public expenditure on welfare-to-work by transferring the cost away from the state, 
the removal of funding to third sector parties coupled with the increased requirement 
to mitigate the impacts of other austerity measures and welfare reform initiatives is 
making it more difficult than ever for voluntary organisations to support claimants into 
work and thereby lower dependency. This is supported by Dale (2012:20) who states 
that “the market system...negates authentic individual responsibility, undermines 
community and systematically obstructs moral behaviour”, suggesting that the shift 
to a market-driven welfare agenda is presenting considerable difficulties for those 
organisations attempting to adapt to the impacts of welfare reform they are facing. 
 
7.2.2  Adaptation to Universal Credit: digital-by-default 
Another major adaptation that is going to be required is the response to the digital 
agenda pursued by the Coalition Government. With Universal Credit coming in 
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before the end of the 2010-2015 parliament, the Coalition Government has insisted 
that all social security claims be made through their online system, which has so far 
been problematic in how it has transferred down to the local level (TUC, 2014b). 
Local authorities and benefit claimants alike have had to adapt significantly, with 
organisations having to provide the services needed for people to be able to carry 
out welfare-to-work requirements in order to receive their entitlements: 
“We’ve also monitored how many people are coming into our library services 
and our information services. Again you can see the spikes of when the 
Council Tax bills went out and when the reminders went out.” (Senior Official, 
Rochdale Borough Council) 
It is often the most vulnerable members of society who are applying for this social 
security support, so this agenda poses a number of issues, including the level of IT 
literacy, access to computers, and that staff at the organisations themselves may not 
be adequately trained to assist when problems arise. The system has therefore 
made it more difficult to claim benefits rather than simplifying the systems as the 
policy supposes, partly because the widespread adaptation required to deliver the 
support services needed is struggling to keep pace with the growth in demand for 
accessibility and support in such matters (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013).  
Indeed, the interview responses indicate that many organisations are responding by 
increasing the number of staff they have dealing with specifically targeted impacts of 
welfare-to-work policies to meet with the increased level of demand and dependency 
on support services, at a time when they can barely afford the running costs of their 
existing operations. Again this is only going to increase with 85% of voluntary 
organisations expecting demand for services to rise by 2018, and 35% expecting a 
dramatic rise (Guardian Voluntary Network Survey, 2013). Far from simplifying the 
transition from welfare to work, austerity politics are actually increasing the cost and 
complexity for local authorities who are having to dedicate additional resources to 
assist people to negotiate the nuances of the latest welfare-to-work protocols. This 
process is also qualitatively different from before because the effects of welfare-to-
work are forcing local authorities to adapt by being more proactive in supporting 
people through the updated welfare-to-work process. Shaw (2012:1) recognises this 
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agency and resilience of assigning extra resources to meeting welfare reform 
objectives, suggesting that: 
“local authorities – and crucially, local communities, have enhanced their 
adaptive capacity, within existing powers and responsibilities…some of the 
barriers to the development of resilient local, government are not 
insurmountable, and can be overcome by ‘digging deep’ to draw upon existing 
resources and capabilities, promoting a strategic approach to risk, exhibiting 
greater ambition and imagination, and creating space for local communities to 
develop their own resilience.” 
 
7.2.3  Adapting to advice and support demands 
Increasing demand for advice and support services has meant that additional staffing 
has also been a requirement for organisations dealing with the fall out of changes to 
the financial responsibilities of those not just out of work but also those who are 
employed but are on low pay, particularly the latest requirements for at least partial 
payments of Council Tax and housing payments: 
“Particularly with debt clients, we will see them trying to juggle their food 
budget, their household shopping budget and things like that in order to pay 
their creditors. That’s one of the reasons money advice works, because you 
turn that on its head, you do a budget for their day to day living costs without 
getting them further into debt, and then you deal with the debt from what 
they’ve got left. The problem we are seeing now is not debt, is not money 
advice needs, it’s the fact people haven’t got enough money to live on in the 
first place.” (Manager at a Manchester CAB) 
In the past, local authorities paid these housing and Council Tax costs for those who 
simply could not afford to pay because of their marginal income. However, as part of 
the Coalition Government agenda to force people back towards the labour market, 
everyone is required to contribute at least a small proportion of these costs from their 
income (LGA, 2012). For those on very low incomes, this has put immense strain on 
their finances, which were already at a bare minimum, and so many voluntary 
organisations are now finding themselves inundated with demand for advice and 
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support around financial issues such as debt, fines and court summons. This is of 
course on top of the advice and support these organisations are having to provide for 
new welfare-to-work initiatives now in place. Furthermore, these requirements to 
contribute for those on low pay or who are even unemployed present problems to 
organisations across the public, private and third sectors, because people’s inability 
or even refusal to pay these newly levied fees leaves organisational income streams 
threatened which in turn threatens further their ability to deliver welfare-to-work 
services already being squeezed by the government’s austerity mandate. Such 
difficulties in the face of a relentless neoliberal policy agenda correlate with the ideas 
of Peck (2010:109) that: 
“exploiting crisis conditions … has been a hallmark of neoliberal governance, 
even if the recent pattern of events seems less and less like a ‘normal crisis.’” 
These organisations are therefore having to adapt to the changes confronting them 
and provide the support and advice needed in order to help people to manage their 
finances in a way whereby they can pay such fees in order to avoid being 
marginalised from society further, but also to protect their funding streams to deliver 
core services. Such threats make supporting people into the labour market 
increasingly difficult, as resources are increasingly stretched whilst demand 
continues to grow. 
Another important consideration is the need for organisations to respond effectively 
to the challenge of support and advice provision, especially for people in the towns 
and cities least insulated from the changes, and is becoming a pivotal factor in the 
ability of organisations to mitigate and manage the impacts of the reforms and cuts 
effectively: 
“The individual clients that we work with, they were struggling anyway, and 
when you hear on the news they might talk about “the Bedroom Tax” or they 
might talk about the fact that everybody’s now got to pay something towards 
their Council Tax, or they might talk about disability living allowance reform, it 
makes it sound like separate changes and they’re not. Our clients are being 
clobbered with multiple changes all at once. And the reason I think they are 
invidious is that most of these are retrospective, particularly the housing 
benefit ones. So you can have been put in a house and told you were entitled 
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to that house and that amount of space, and now all of a sudden you’re not.” 
(Manager at a Manchester CAB) 
Organisations with a history of providing advice and support to benefits recipients 
have had to adapt to a changing landscape of demand. Whilst in the past support 
might have concerned people’s entitlements and how they could apply for benefits, 
more recently the focus has had to shift towards encouraging people into work, as 
well as emphasis on financial responsibility and budgeting, issues around the 
Bedroom Tax or digitalisation, or even educating people about less desirable forms 
of income such as loan sharks and pay day loan companies. In fact the reforms to 
welfare-to-work have often had such wide ranging impacts for those affected that 
many organisations are being presented with people with multiple problems who are 
much more difficult to assist and who require significantly more contact time and 
resources to deal with. This fits with the view of Lang (2012:286) who suggests that: 
“it is more a question of adapting than of responding to new conditions. It is, 
further, a question of governance, highlighting the diffuse and multi-actor 
character of decision making beyond state-centred hierarchical forms of 
government.” 
Whilst some of these issues might have been expected, the interviews suggest what 
is unexpected is the sheer volume of demand coming as a consequence of the cuts 
and reforms. The Coalition Government has been concerned with encouraging 
people to take responsibility for their welfare through work, but the multiplicity of 
issues being observed appear more about finding alternative ways of accessing 
benefits and sustaining their dependency on the state rather than accepting 
responsibility to find work. Even though people living on benefits doing all they can to 
maintain their benefit entitlements is nothing new, what is qualitatively different are 
the wide variety of issues which are coming to the fore and the amount of emphasis 
placed on adapting to a greater need for advice and support services by 
organisations assisting them. This also raises questions about the scope of welfare 
service delivery to meet the rapidly growing demands of welfare-to-work. The 
increase in demand subsequently requires the need to take on extra capacity into 
advice and support services, as well as providing training for existing staff to be able 
to provide advice: 
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“I know of two or three groups that used to have employed workers who are 
now only using volunteers. I think that might be the case with more in the 
future. And of course once you get below a certain minimum it’s difficult to 
then get back up again because if you have volunteers you may not have the 
capacity to react quickly when there is something happening.” (Spokesperson, 
Merseyside Disability Charity) 
Adapting in this way serves to make existing provision more relevant and improves 
the overall response organisations are able to provide in the face of an increased 
volume of need where the challenges of welfare-to-work requirements being faced 
are greater and so the contact time required with clients is longer (Peck and 
Theodore, 2015). However, in reality such adaptations are proving difficult for many 
as a result of austerity, particularly in the North West which previously had extensive 
funding from the state, with many now having to utilise volunteers more effectively to 
cope with the growing demand, as well as tapping into alternative sources of support 
and provision which already exist in the private and third sectors. 
Again this adaptation to additional demand aligns with the government ideals around 
austerity - that scarcer resources are being channelled more effectively into areas of 
delivering welfare-to-work reforms where they are needed most and are put to best 
use. This means that people and organisations are automatically expected to do 
more work to deal with the impacts of austerity and reform, at the same time that 
these policies and ideas are diminishing the resources available to carry out such 
work (doing more with less). Unlike the past where resources were plentiful and 
demand for these services remained relatively low in comparison to today, under the 
policies implemented by the Coalition Government there is now unprecedented 
demand for support services which have limited resources available to be channelled 
into, and so requires a level of adaptation not seen before under the Welfare State, 
particularly the reliance on voluntary provision to bolster professional welfare-to-work 
structures (Hills, 2011; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). 
In this way then processes of adaptation mean applying resources most effectively to 
the contexts with which they are presented, as Lang (2012:288) has also surmised: 
“Processes of governance must be seen as social processes that are shaped 
in a tense atmosphere of structure and agency…Such selection processes 
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depend on individual, collective, or organisational capacities based on the 
ability to learn from applied strategies and tactics in other contexts and at 
previous times.” 
Lowndes and Pratchett (2012:25) on the other hand see this necessity to innovate 
more as an opportunity for local governance structures, because despite fewer 
resources it provides the opportunity to put their own blueprint on the way they feel 
welfare services should be prioritised and delivered: 
“While local authorities and other bodies at the local level will not have as 
much money, they will have much greater freedom to be innovative in the way 
that they work with and support their communities.” 
Besides adapting to the challenges, success can only be achieved if more is done 
with less. It relies on people and organisations having to be innovative in how they 
respond to the reforms and cuts that are being made. 
 
7.3  Doing more with less: innovation in response to welfare-to-work 
Another set of important responses sees stakeholders innovating to overcome the 
difficulties arising from austerity measures. One important innovation is the need to 
support frontline staff in delivering the support and advice services on a daily basis 
by supplementing their work with background and planning processes around 
welfare-to-work protocols: 
“We’ve been planning for this for a very long time. We first drew up a strategy 
for financial inclusion in 2008, and then revised it about eighteen months ago, 
and the action plans have been in place then for over eighteen months now. 
So all the planning and things, as much as we could have done without the 
government deciding to change things at the last minute, a lot of the 
preparation and planning is already underway. Even for Universal Credit, it 
came out that it was going to be digital by default, claims online, so they need 
a bank account, there are not going to be Post Office accounts. The amount 
of work we’ve been doing…trying to make sure that every customer has got a 
202 
 
bank account. So there’s always stuff going on to help and prepare 
customers.” (Senior Official, Calico, a Burnley-Based Housing Association) 
This planning process involves the upskilling of both staff and clients in readiness for 
the digital-by-default claiming system and the change to monthly budgeting, e-
learning projects for people to improve their employability, raising awareness of the 
welfare reforms and their impacts on individuals and communities through 
information on websites, letters, or even going out and doing roadshows. It also 
requires frontline staff to work in a more flexible and proactive manner. What we are 
seeing is staff, instead of waiting for clients to come to them for the support they 
need, attempting to mitigate the negative aspects of the reform process at an early 
stage by actively going out and contacting those who are going to be affected and 
assist them in doing all that they can to prepare for the changes (Hartfree, 2014). 
This is qualitatively different from before when actions have been reactive rather 
than proactive.  
Austerity politics and constrained resources means pre-emptive and proactive 
responses are necessary to support people through welfare-to-work and into 
employment. It is hard not to escape the feeling that in welfare-to-work discourses, 
“resilience planning should…be concerned with re-establishing natural market orders 
through planning and policy-making” (Raco and Street, 2011:5). That said, despite 
the prudence of such responses, local authorities are once again faced with the 
same significant policy contradiction in that local authorities can provide as much 
support and advice, and undertake as much planning as they want, but if the jobs 
are not available for people to move into then the response is a futile attempt to 
move people off benefits and in turn dependency on the state (Taylor-Gooby et al., 
2014). Stated bluntly, the success of one policy (austerity) is actually restricting the 
success of another (welfare-to-work). This has been noted by Newman (2013:5), 
who suggests that: 
“local authorities can be viewed as both subjected to and as the promulgators 
of ideologies of the unassailability of the market and its capacity to determine 
local political economies. Yet they are also implicated in strategies associated 
with other ideological forms, including the valorisation of ‘the local’ within an 
overarching anti-state ideology” (original emphasis). 
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The struggle to do more with less is especially the case with support and advice 
services: 
“Other organisations that we work with are in a pretty similar boat. The 
rhetoric is that we are having to do more with less, but you can only squeeze 
things so much before either quality suffers or the amount of people you can 
work with suffers or both.” (Manager at a Manchester CAB) 
In this way the increased conditionality and the use of sanctioning has meant people 
are turning to their local authorities and associated voluntary sector organisations 
more than ever (Dodds and Paskins, 2011). Many organisations have been forced to 
innovate, finding ways to manage their significantly reduced levels of funding, and 
with commercial income now representing 55% of voluntary organisation income 
compared to 39% from grants and donations (NCVO, 2012). That said, many 
organisations are anticipating that the quantity and quality of the services they 
provide will suffer a gradual decline, because they can only do more, or the same, 
with less up to a certain point. This is reflected by Hills (2011:607) who notes that: 
“the more important issues in the way welfare activity evolves further may lie 
in the details of the ways in which particular services are run – whether by 
public or by private providers -  and of who gains and who loses as the ways 
in which they are paid for are reformed.” 
Many of the people interviewed noted that under conditions of significantly 
overstretched resources there has been much more innovative working around 
taking a joined up approach to service delivery, and there are a number of instances 
of welfare reform partnerships coming together, especially to deal with the 
challenges facing welfare-to-work providers from the introduction of Universal Credit: 
“There needs to be significant investment in the IT infrastructure, within this 
building and within the borough. We’re lucky we’ve got an IT suite that’s 
under-utilised at the moment, but we’ve talked about giving the advisers 
locally, not just ours, other organisations’ advisers, the training and the skills 
to be able to support people with their online Universal Credit claims or 
whatever the case may be when we get to that stage. So they can then work 
with a group of people as opposed to one person for an hour at a time to help 
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them navigate their way through that process.” (Senior Official at a 
Merseyside Employment Charity) 
Innovation in working practices includes the sharing of facilities, staff and training. It 
includes investing in up-to-date infrastructure (such as IT facilities) to meet with the 
needs of clients under the current swathe of reforms and for the future. It also 
involves closing down expensive or redundant buildings. In doing so resources can 
be amalgamated to meet the aims of austerity-driven welfare-to-work reforms. This 
drive to share instances of good practice in the face of declining government input 
into welfare-to-work policy discourse has been recognised by Theodore and Peck 
(2011:31) who convey that: 
“public-private governance is expected to deepen the receptivity of local 
actors to the ‘right’ policy lessons, both vertically and horizontally, thereby 
facilitating the spread of innovations between jurisdictions.” 
Such a shift appears qualitatively different from what was seen prior to the reforms, 
because local authorities and other groups were much more reluctant to work 
together, preferring instead to work on their own projects independently. However 
now that resources are stretched, far more stakeholders are inclined to pool those 
resources in order to achieve a more effective response to the cuts being made 
(Brenner and Schmid, 2015; Peck and Theodore, 2015). 
Besides the need to adapt and innovate, other responses are becoming equally 
crucial, particularly around the behaviour of people and groups involved in the reform 
process. 
 
7.4  Forms of co-operation in response to welfare-to-work policies 
One of the main methods of overcoming the material effects of welfare reform and 
austerity involves stakeholders co-operating to pool resources and ideas to bring 
about the most effective response to addressing welfare-to-work objectives. With 
resources heavily constrained and strict policies around welfare-to-work to be met, 
co-operation and co-ordination between organisations offers a prime opportunity (or 
necessity) for responding to welfare-to-work changes under conditions of austerity. 
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However the most crucial aspect of any co-operative response to assess is whether 
they are being framed on the basis of opportunity or necessity. 
 
7.4.1  Localised co-operative working 
A point consistently put forward has been the enormous overhaul of regional 
structures by the Coalition Government. Interviewees highlighted that the dissolution 
of many government quangos - including the North West Regional Development 
Agency (NWDA) and their replacement with 5 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) - 
has presented a number of issues and difficulties for implementing welfare reforms 
locally and regionally. In particular there is no longer a formal concerted approach to 
policymaking at the regional level: 
“One of the reforms that this government made was to say there is no 
regional. We are about localism. So what they did was they stripped out all 
regional structures – the Regional Development Agencies and regional 
government offices. So that would have been your regional platform, and that 
all got stripped out and closed down. To be fair, people still tend to work with 
some sense of regional, but of course you’ve got things like the LEPs which 
are a completely different size…so by stripping out that regional structure 
there was a real loss to what was actually going on locally supporting regional 
area activity and actually understanding what’s happening on a regional 
basis.” (Manager, Locality, a National Community Network Organisation) 
Despite the need to co-operate, the outcome of this shift from a very strong regional 
level co-ordination to more localised working arrangements means that there is very 
little joined up work and co-operation within the North West region, particularly with 
regards to implementing welfare reform and especially welfare-to-work agendas. 
One consequence is that the ability to successfully transfer central policy to the local 
level is not being honed as well as it has been in the past due to the loss of the 
specific and dedicated ‘regional’ support in areas such as the North West. Thus the 
argument can be made that the more efficient pooling of resources in response to 
austerity has been contradicted by the loss of regions and with it their integrity, since 
in the North West, one region has been replaced by five LEPs (Department for 
206 
 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2015), and has therefore brought with it a 
necessity to co-operate locally. However, it should be noted that there is some 
opportunity for the development of regional level co-operation between organisations 
through LEPs, although with the focus being very much locally orientated this is not 
nearly to the same extent as their RDA predecessors, but there does remain scope 
for this to be expanded in future to supplement the co-operative and innovative 
working being encouraged in individual localities (Pugalis and Townsend, 2010). 
The removal of the NWDA and other regional organisations, means co-operative 
working and formal partnerships are more likely between local stakeholders, such as 
within city regions or between town or city councils and other organisations, rather 
than at the regional scale: 
“One of the conversations we’ve been involved in locally is we have a city 
region strategy, and we have a city region team within the six boroughs of 
Greater Merseyside…There’s a move towards having a regional council, and 
that’s going to come, because again it’s about dismantling (for want of a better 
phrase) the amount of infrastructure that surrounds local authorities. But 
you’re right, there’s nothing between central government and local 
government.” (Senior Official at a Merseyside Employment Charity) 
“Pulling away one institution and inserting another is all obviously disruptive 
and replacing it with something that well we don’t know how much power is 
going to happen. But I mean there have also been some more interesting 
innovations along asymmetric devolution lines, where you’ve had things like 
City Deals which are quite interesting, where cities have effectively applied to 
central government for specific powers, specific responsibilities and specific 
pots of money.” (Spokesperson, IPPR North) 
This concern is what Bunt and Harris (2010:3) refer to as the importance of local 
solutions when implementing national designed policies, because “they reflect the 
needs of specific communities and engage citizens in taking action.” Nationally the 
Conservative-led Coalition has seen regions as an obstacle and barrier to this, but in 
the North West interviewees pointed to a co-ordination vacuum at the local level 
resulting from the removal of regional structures. The result is an unintended 
consequence whereby individual towns and cities are acting independently to take 
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responsibility for protecting their own interests because regional scale structures 
intended to support them have been all but removed. Thus despite a clear 
opportunity for co-operation to take place, Coalition austerity policies in certain 
instances are encouraging less rather than more co-operative working as the 
Coalition Government has desired. 
 
7.4.2  Co-operative funding arrangements 
Another issue which has arisen during the interview process is the reduction or even 
complete withdrawal of area-based grants. Respondents noted that in the past there 
was a substantial amount of co-operative working in the North West region because 
there were significant finances made available to meet regional, social and economic 
objectives: 
“The difference is that before, because of the nature of St Helens, we had 
pots of money, and we did for example our area-based grant and there were a 
lot of programmes under that which involved all sorts of different agencies, but 
I guess the difference now is that you could pull people together because 
there was that pot of funding to attract them. There was something in it for 
people to do that. Now that funding has gone it’s how do we sort of keep 
those groups together?” (Senior Official, St Helens Metropolitan Borough 
Council) 
Hence the removal of these grants has subsequently dramatically reduced the level 
of co-ordination between organisations at both the regional and local scales because 
much of the joint working only came about because there was a financial incentive to 
do so. In Liverpool for example, by 2011, Liverpool City Council had lost over £100m 
in area-based grants from the government since Coalition austerity measures were 
implemented (Liverpool Echo, 2011). Without such an opportunity, many 
organisations are more inclined to work independently. This suggests there is 
adaptation taking place, but contradicts other Coalition policies of local authorities 
working together because there is no innovation or real coping strategies being 
formulated by local authorities collaborating to meet demands and resource needs. 
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This reduction in grants is clearly part of austerity politics. At one level it can be seen 
as a necessity to involve more innovative working at the local level with fewer 
resources – collaborate to do more with less (MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson, 
2013). At another level the loss of funding removes the incentive or opportunity to 
co-operate (Hadis, 2014). One consequence, noted in the previous statement, has 
been a shift towards co-operation to meet very specific, individual, objectives. This is 
therefore a much less holistic and joined up approach than before. Ross (2009:67) 
argues that this is not necessarily the case because “rather than being bound by 
relations of authority and dependency, communities become bound together by 
relations of reciprocity and co-operation.” 
 
7.4.3  Collaborative monitoring and analysis 
A number of interviewees also stated that constrained resources has meant the 
monitoring of impacts has become a necessity for where local authorities target 
resources in order that they can be used most appropriately. In this way, the 
development of effective partnerships enables more widespread monitoring to take 
place and provide stakeholders with a greater breadth of information with which to 
judge where funds are best focused: 
“They also get, and are monitoring, the welfare reform impacts. So they get it 
on a quarterly basis the changes and what’s happening out there, which will 
help those organisations change should they need to depending on what 
comes out of that impact.” (Senior Official, Rochdale Borough Council) 
Evidence of the impacts and consequences of welfare reform is often stronger 
coming from a partnership of organisations rather than one on its own, and this wider 
encompassing monitoring enables more effective planning for future impacts and 
material effects (Rees et al., 2012). This process of sharing information has been 
picked up by Bunt and Harris (2010:5) who suggest that “policymakers should create 
more opportunities for communities to develop and deliver their own solutions and to 
learn from each other.” Again this form of co-operative working is different from what 
has been seen in the past; organisations have often undertaken their own monitoring 
focused solely on the specific aspects of welfare support which they are concerned 
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with. In recent years the prerequisite for a more holistic approach in providing 
support and advice, coupled with far more constrained resources, has created the 
need for better monitoring of impacts and with it the inevitable need to share 
information with others and collaborate in order to achieve targets under austerity. 
One of the preferred solutions which has become apparent through the interviews is 
the importance of providing good, concrete advice on welfare reform issues to those 
being affected by them. There are clearly a number of organisations in a position to 
provide advice and support to people implicated by government welfare-to-work 
rhetoric, but the number and variety of cases presented to support services has 
meant the quality of the advice and support being supplied is inconsistent at best, 
and completely misleading at worst: 
“The quality issue, this is something we have discussed in terms of we’ve got 
lots of people that are providing advice and support, but we’ve got no 
consistent approach. I think that’s one of the things that worries me at the 
moment: how do we get a consistent approach so that if somebody comes to 
a council officer or goes to somebody at a Citizens’ Advice Bureau or a 
housing provider or a voluntary organisation, are they all saying the same 
thing? Are they all giving the same, consistent level of advice? So we’re 
looking at whether there’s something we can do across the borough that 
might look at joining that up together. We’ve looked at whether we could 
utilise the same training course, training provider, but that will be quite difficult 
for us to pull together but we are looking at it at the moment.” (Spokesperson, 
Oldham Council) 
Many local authorities are focusing on working with partners to give consistent 
advice. Furthermore many believe that the most appropriate method of achieving this 
is for organisations to train their staff to have multiple skill sets in order to deliver a 
more complete range of support. It is also necessary for organisations to pool 
existing resources (such as digital access points) which they themselves may not be 
able to provide. This denotes the importance of local authorities in facilitating the 
economic consensus around welfare-to-work policies as noted by Newman (2013:5) 
that: 
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“local governments are deeply implicated in the knowledge-power nexus, 
promulgating a succession of new governmentalities of citizenship and 
community. Local governments play an active role in strategies for governing 
populations by installing ‘economic’ logics of calculation and strategies for 
promoting ‘self-governing’ subjects.” 
However, under conditions of austerity and resource limitations the capacity of local 
authorities and their partners to provide suitable advice and support around welfare-
to-work becomes much more of a challenge, particularly with the increased use of 
volunteers over full time paid employees. 
In the past organisations with similar aims and objectives were extremely protective 
of their activities and were happier to operate independently in favour of their own 
interests. However in recent years, many organisations have found themselves in a 
sink or swim scenario whereby fewer resources are available, and so the increased 
use of partnerships and co-ordination with other organisations undertaking the same 
sort of work has become a necessity in order to avoid rapidly going out of business: 
“What’s happened is that some services have closed and there’s no way that 
they can actually provide a quality service with the funding they have left. So 
they have simply closed and that is a reality across the board. Whole charities 
have closed, but also whole areas of provision have had to stop because you 
just get to a point where you simply cannot do it up to a quality standard, to a 
standard that makes a difference so that you have to stop delivering.” 
(Manager, Locality, a National Community Network Organisation) 
“If you don’t get your house in order you will have to close, and many 
organisations have closed across the borough. But because of our willingness 
and ability to do things differently and to support a local authority going 
through some difficult times themselves without bowing down to everything 
they want to do, that’s the difficult bit, finding that balance, we hope that we 
will be in a position as an organisation but also with our partners to respond to 
that need in the future.” (Senior Official at a Merseyside Employment Charity) 
This has especially been the case with voluntary third sector organisations, which 
are inherently more reliant on the funding support which is rapidly diminishing. Early 
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figures suggested the 12 months after the Coalition Government formed more than 
2,000 charities had lost some or all of their funding from local councils (False 
Economy, 2011). They are necessarily having to work together and pool resources 
to continue undertaking the quality and quantity of work done in the past, and maybe 
even for their very survival. This need to merge ventures by voluntary organisations 
in order to achieve similar objectives confirms the thoughts of Ross (2009:64) who 
states that under a neoliberal political rhetoric: 
“individuals must arrange themselves and their communities to find solutions 
to the dissolving Welfare State. Thus, the voluntary sector, rather than the 
state, now plays a primary role in the development of social and economic 
rights for people.” 
 
7.4.4  Co-operation around contract bidding 
What has also been cited is the cultural change towards contract bidding. A major 
response to cuts to funding for local authorities from central government has been to 
outsource key welfare-to-work services as much as possible (Standing, 2011). 
Mandated to sustain the quality and quantity of support with less money, many local 
authorities have offered contracts out to bidding from private and voluntary 
organisations for efficient delivery of services they are no longer able to provide: 
“It may well be in some of the work that’s going on that we can provide it 
cheaper than the state sector and potentially the private sector, because 
we’re not looking to make a profit and any money we make covers costs and 
goes back into the organisation to deliver other services. So there is a sense 
that we can do things cheaper than the services that we’re replacing, but the 
reality is if we’re not receiving any money to do that or a limited amount of 
money to do that, there is only so much you can do.” (Manager, Locality, a 
National Community Network Organisation) 
“Other areas are thinking about how they might use the cheapness of out-
sourced provision and where they’re doing a bit more advanced thinking is in 
some of the community budget thinking - of which there are two community 
budget whole place areas in the North West - one in Cheshire West and the 
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other is in Greater Manchester. So thinking about how they might draw in the 
additional resources that are within communities by using voluntary and 
community sector providers; relying on their pull on community volunteers, 
community assets, and seeing how they might do that approach.” (Senior 
Official at Voluntary Sector North West) 
Whilst theoretically this agenda seems to be a sensible thing to do, in reality it 
creates problems, particularly at the local scale. In many places where local authority 
cut backs have taken effect the gap has often been filled by voluntary organisations 
which have been inundated with increased demand. However far from presenting an 
excellent opportunity, cuts to funding mean third sector groups are now searching for 
alternative sources of income, which are now more frequently taking the form of 
contracts out to tender (Thompson and Williams, 2014). In this way, many voluntary 
organisations which have little or no experience of writing or compiling competitive 
bids for welfare contracts are being forced out of necessity to jostle with large private 
companies to secure contracts. The outcome is that such large private institutions 
are beginning to win contracts and implement their own generic blueprints for 
provision in places for which they have no local knowledge at all. Thus, as Standing 
(2011:41) conveys “the responsibility lies with government, in choosing an 
inappropriate instrument for delivering what it claims is a social service.” As a result 
problems inevitably arise where there are significant gaps between rhetoric and 
reality, and as a consequence private companies more interested in profit than 
meeting the requirements of benefit recipients and who often devise strategies 
unsuitable for the local economy, are tasked with implementing welfare-to-work 
initiatives. The outcome is that austerity politics are creating challenging conditions, 
the responses to which are making the task of meeting welfare-to-work objectives 
increasingly difficult. 
This contrasts with the more nuanced provision undertaken by local third sector 
organisations which are capable of taking a much more personalised approach, yet 
are unable to secure funding after being outbid by larger private contractors: 
“I think the problem now is that it’s sometimes the bigger organisations who 
are better at writing funding bids and are better at doing the monitoring who 
might not be delivering the highest standard of service. They seem to be the 
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ones surviving more than those real grassroots organisations that run 
essential services to their communities that aren’t so good at the funding 
bids.” (Spokesperson, SARF) 
Whilst many contracts so far have been won by private companies, there has 
recently been a concerted growth in coalitions of local voluntary organisations 
perceiving opportunities for getting together to undertake shared bidding in order to 
compete with the propositions put together by private enterprises. In a similar way 
public sector organisations offering out these contracts are coming to realise that the 
most successful solution to service provision under austerity is to utilise the 
experience and know-how of local organisations, rather than granting contracts 
exclusively to large private sector companies with one-size-fits-all methods (Rees et 
al., 2012). Many are now taking the opportunity for a mixed approach of larger 
companies working in partnership with smaller but better informed local third sector 
groups, which has created a win-win situation for the Coalition Government by 
achieving a balance between the profit interests of private companies and the more 
philanthropic values of third sector groups. This is qualitatively different from before 
as voluntary organisations are now realising that they must work together in 
partnership to not only achieve common objectives, but also in order to secure the 
funding needed to do so. 
This is of crucial importance because an unintended consequence of this argument 
is that there may be contracts available in future for consortiums of third sector 
organisations, but lack of funding at present may mean many of these organisations 
no longer exist by that point, or would be incapable of presenting a suitable contract 
or funding bid. Smaller groups therefore have little chance of securing limited funding 
unless they form umbrella organisations. In this regard, Lobao and Adua (2011:433) 
have noted that: 
“the institutional capacity of local governments…becomes more critical in 
whether localities have any chance of securing external funding, in addition to 
the effective formulation and implementation of programmes and policies.” 
In summary, the welfare reforms and austerity measures implemented by the 
Coalition Government since 2010 have had a substantial effect on how people and 
organisations are co-operating, out of opportunity or necessity, in order to mitigate 
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the negative consequences of the reforms. This has particularly been the case in the 
North West which has a long established history of extensive public sector 
involvement in welfare support. The policies laid out by the Coalition Government 
have been devised centrally and then implanted straight to the local scale where 
they may not correlate with the structure of the local economy or the individual 
circumstances of those reliant on social security support, and this is creating 
difficulties with regards to delivering success through welfare-to-work initiatives, both 
regionally and locally (Lang, 2012). 
The austerity measures appear to be providing the impetus, through opportunity or 
necessity, for lots of informal cross working and co-operation to take place on the 
ground, however creating official partnerships is proving considerably more 
challenging due to the extent to which the Coalition Government has stripped out 
structures previously in place to encourage co-operative working. However, 
partnership links do appear to be stronger in those places traditionally hard hit by 
government funding cuts and which therefore have a strong background in being 
innovative and working together to maximise what they are able to achieve with 
fewer resources. In this sense then towns and cities of the North West appear 
bettered equipped to respond to the austerity and the cuts than other more 
traditionally affluent areas of the UK (Martin, 2012). This issue has been 
compounded further by the reduced amount of grant funding being made available 
for co-operative working and the forming of effective partnerships to supplement the 
welfare reform process. The outcome is that there are fewer perceived incentives 
and prospects for organisations to work together; hence without additional funding 
being made available many are quite satisfied to work independently on their own 
projects and objectives, even if they are similar and resonate with those of other 
institutions. Furthermore, any funding which is provided for working partnerships 
tends to be short term, which will have positive but minimal effects tackling the 
negative impacts brought about by welfare reform and austerity; funding must 
necessarily be much more long term in order for co-operative projects to have an 
opportunity to have the lasting impacts that the Coalition Government has intended. 
In certain ways change can be good - without the qualitative shift in policy towards 
cuts making co-operative working necessary, many local authorities would have not 
gone anywhere near as far in terms of forming partnerships, instead preferentially 
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choosing to work independently. However, policy needs to be clearer in terms of 
emphasising the importance of co-operative working between organisations in order 
for it to have the effect at the local level which not only the Coalition Government has 
desired, but also which is practical and achievable by local organisations and their 
partners. 
 
7.5  Forms of resistance to austerity and welfare-to-work policies 
7.5.1  Political resistance to austerity and welfare-to-work 
One of the main political impacts which has arisen from the austerity politics of the 
Coalition Government are the geographical consequences associated with 
resistance to the policy processes taking effect: 
“It’s really difficult at the moment for Labour councils because they don’t agree 
with it [austerity], but they have to kind of implement it because it’s coming. 
Across Greater Manchester the majority of the local authorities are Labour 
held, Manchester obviously being held quite significantly by a Labour council, 
which is why we’re looking at the impact [of austerity politics].” (Senior Official, 
Rochdale Borough Council) 
With much greater conditionality of state support and citizen entitlements being 
enforced upon people of working age, it has inevitably been those places with 
structurally depressed economies and labour markets, as well as those locations 
which have higher levels of social security expenditure, that have been hit hardest by 
welfare reforms (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). From a political perspective this has 
been quite stark, because many of these such places are distinctly Labour 
authorities, which has subsequently created a great deal of tension between central 
government and local authorities which are having cuts forced upon them. This local 
authority resistance represents a contradiction to politically driven government 
austerity rhetoric, because the justification of austerity was supposed to allow the 
Coalition to push through a more strict welfare-to-work agenda regardless of the 
prevailing socio-economic connotations at the local level as a result. The subsequent 
tensions arising therefore with local Labour councils acts as a hindrance to the 
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welfare-to-work policies being enforced and leads to people’s ability to claim benefits 
entitlements being maintained rather than diminished. 
Shaw (2012:11) argues that such resistance is perhaps unnecessary and deliberate. 
He suggests that: 
“too many councillors and officers can seem quite comfortable operating in a 
system of constrained choices where it is easy to blame government rather 
than seize control of their own destiny.” 
In this way organisations - including local authorities - are helping to resist the cuts 
and reforms by attempting to maximise the remaining benefit entitlements of those 
people exposed to the negative impacts of austerity and welfare-to-work policies: 
“So targeted communications … try and make people aware that these things 
[welfare reforms] are happening and this is where you need to go for support. 
So you see something and that will tell you where you need to go for advice, 
and then there are just some things around helping the food partnership and 
the wellness service, and maximising people’s income or as I prefer to put it, 
minimising people’s expenditure.” (Spokesperson, Blackpool Council) 
Hence by working with people and supporting them to manage their incomings and 
outgoings, they can help to mitigate the impacts of the reform process. Furthermore, 
by helping people to access their maximum entitlements, local authorities are 
actively contradicting (and therefore resisting) government policy, because instead of 
welfare-to-work policy succeeding in lowering the amount of social security funding 
that people are claiming, it is actually leading to a reciprocal process whereby the 
cost to the public purse is actually increasing through greater resistance to reform 
(both from the implementers and recipients of welfare-to-work initiatives). This is 
because the welfare-to-work measures are making people even more dependent 
than they were before, and therefore determined to claim whatever support they can 
access, including those in work as well as those who are unemployed. In this way, 
total welfare expenditure is expected to be £5.9bn higher in 2015/16 than in 2012/13, 
an increase of 2.8%, and £3bn higher for capped welfare spending (OBR, 2014). 
This process represents a decisive form of resistance to an apparently deliberate 
and contradictory government agenda to reduce the size of the benefits bill. Under 
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the current system organisations are increasingly active in working with clients to 
advise and support them in maximising the amount of financial support they can 
access, which is the exact opposite of the small state policy the Coalition 
Government has intended to achieve. Resistance to welfare reform - and claims of 
an ideological pursuit of a smaller state can be explained by the observations of 
Peck (2012:630): 
“[Neoliberalism] is interlaced with deep-seated political motivations as well, to 
denigrate the state…and to cast aspersions on the viability of governmental 
solutions, the serial underperformance of the state becoming a self-fulfilling 
condition of this wilfully malign process of neglect.” 
 
7.5.2  Challenging welfare-to-work decisions 
Another interesting form of resistance coming to fruition is the way in which the 
people affected, with support from the local authority, are repelling cuts to their 
entitlements through the reforms to welfare-to-work policy by actively challenging 
decisions through the tribunal system: 
“We’re finding clearly that lots of people are being migrated from Jobseekers 
Allowance to Employment Support Allowance and then you’ve obviously got 
the work-related assessment group…A lot of those decisions are being 
challenged. We’re then supporting individuals in the counter claims that are 
being made. We’re then supporting people to tribunal and the percentage; 
we’ve had a seventy per cent increase in the success at tribunal. So people 
are ultimately being found to be hard done by or wrongly done to six months 
ago. Their cases are being won, so the cost to the public purse is probably 
going to be greater than it would have been if they’d just left it as it was, but in 
the meantime those families are falling into poverty, and are subsequently 
using payday loan sharks, food banks etcetera to survive.” (Senior Official at a 
Merseyside Employment Charity) 
It is widely known that the changes to the benefits system and welfare-to-work have 
forced a large number of people onto Jobseekers Allowance, hence losing out on a 
great deal of their social security payments (Hamnett, 2014). However rather than 
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simply accepting these reforms, with the assistance of other agencies many are 
successfully challenging these decisions through court tribunals. For example, since 
Work Capability Assessments were introduced in 2008, 37% have been successfully 
overturned (DWP, 2013d). The result is instead of cutting the costs of welfare to the 
public purse and forcing people towards the labour market, costs are actually 
increasing because not only are people having their original benefits reinstated but 
also the court costs of the tribunal cases have to be met (Daguerre and Etherington, 
2014; Griffiths and Patterson, 2014). Similarly there used to be far more funding 
available through the legal aid budget, but since this has been all but scrapped 
stakeholders and citizens have had to find more innovative ways of funding 
challenges to welfare-to-work decisions, particularly when there is a good chance of 
them being successfully overturned (Scope, 2011). 
 
7.5.3  Resistance to austerity and welfare-to-work in cities 
What has also been noted is the role that cities play in the articulation of resistance 
to the austerity and reforms. Clearly the nature of cities makes them obvious 
locations for resistance because of the sheer number of people exposed to the 
welfare reforms coupled to the number of organisations located there aimed at 
mitigating the inevitable widespread impacts in such an intensively localised 
environment (Theodore and Peck, 2011). They therefore act as a major convergence 
points for forms of resistance to welfare reform and the wider neoliberalisation of 
spatial scales (Peck, 2013; Peck et al., 2013), such as protests and campaigns, but 
also for more subtle forms of resistance such as information and advice, or more 
active support to defy the Coalition agenda for reducing welfare entitlements: 
“There’s a website that looks to…it’s supposed to be done by the people. It’s 
not a centralised co-ordinated effort and it’s working through social media 
mostly. They did a lot of protests one week about three or four weeks ago, 
and there was pretty much every city that was affected, and I don’t know the 
scale of it, but it was an impressive turn out from what I can gather. But that’s 
very much social media driven.” (Senior Official at Voluntary Sector North 
West) 
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Thus whilst the role that cities play in forming resistance to changes to welfare 
provision and austerity remains much the same, the way by which it is being 
articulated is certainly different - matching the changing nature of co-operation and 
resistance to changes in a digital age, and although the presence of large protests 
appears to be something archived in the past, other forms of resistance are coming 
to fruition within and between cities which better match with the processes taking 
place. This links well with the ideas of Peck and Tickell (2002:395) who postulate 
that “cities find themselves at the forefront of both hypertrophied after-welfarist 
statecraft and organised resistance to neoliberalisation.” This therefore appears to 
contradict government policy intentions because the reforms are meant to engender 
an acceptance of responsibilities to find work and lower dependency on the state, 
however whilst there is a paucity of suitable employment available in the labour 
market, resistive processes offer a vital lifeline where dependency is necessarily 
higher than before. 
As well as within cities, resistance is pronounced between cities, especially cities 
within a region such as the North West of England which has been affected by 
austerity and reforms in profound ways. Interestingly it appears that such forms of 
co-ordinated resistance are driven by social media more than large scale organised 
protests as would have been seen in the past through trade unions. 
 
7.5.4  Justifying resistance: education and understanding 
Much of the anger and discontent with the reforms and cuts at the local level is due 
to a lack of education and understanding amongst those affected about the 
dynamics of how and why policies such as the Bedroom Tax are being implemented: 
“Well it’s the mis-advice that they are giving. There was this whole thing about 
the size of the room and they were quoting the 1985 Housing Act, but it was 
to do with space standards, it was nothing to do with the Bedroom Tax 
legislation. So there was a lot of stuff on social media which isn’t particularly 
helpful because it’s giving people false hope and it’s not advising them 
correctly. Then we’re having to put that right. So there was the size of the 
room, then there was well if you pay a pound per week you’ll be fine, you 
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won’t get evicted, and again that’s not right. I think the trouble is people read 
headlines and then they go off I don’t know whether it’s well intentioned or 
not, but it’s caused more problems. There’s not so far been anybody really 
that I’ve met as a protester who I think is actually helping the tenants’ cause 
really.” (Senior Official, Knowsley Housing Trust) 
Indeed many of those affected by the changes are largely unaware of exactly how 
they will be implicated until they are actually affected. Thus when individuals and 
families begin to lose entitlements or are forced to look for work through heightened 
amounts of conditionality being applied to their benefits, they immediately look to 
those who have implemented those policies (namely the local authority) to place the 
blame and are then reluctant to co-operate with them in trying to mitigate the 
negative effects coming to the fore. Furthermore, such feelings of distrust and acts of 
resistance are being compounded by mis-advice and misconceptions of how 
welfare-to-work initiatives are being implemented, such as people suggesting 
dodging or refusing payment, refusing to move homes, or refusing to take a 
particular job. Whilst such advice may well have good intentions, it serves only to 
create further difficulties for both the individual and the organisations who, contrary 
to their beliefs, are actually attempting to help and support them through the welfare-
to-work process. 
By resisting, people who are affected by the cuts and the reforms actually consign 
themselves to making their situation worse, because ultimately they cannot just bury 
their heads in the sand or constantly try and evade their responsibilities to accept the 
new welfare-to-work conditionality and hope that the problem goes away. Instead 
they end up slipping further into debt and arrears, becoming stranded deeper in a 
cycle of poverty that quite often the local authority organisations they are resisting 
are attempting to help them out of. On the flip side, the resistance or lack of 
compliance is having significant implications for the revenue streams of local 
authorities who are reliant on the income to be able to fund aspects of welfare-to-
work such as advice and support. Lower incomes mean they are less able to work 
with people exposed to the changes to give them advice and support with work and 
benefits, payments and debt management. Such issues are in direct contradiction to 
the objectives that the policies were intended to achieve when set out centrally, 
because rather than just accepting the changes and paying what is owed as the 
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Coalition proposed, there has been a great deal of resistance and opposition to the 
changes at the local level which is creating problems both for the people drawn into 
the umbrella of welfare-to-work policy and also the organisations tasked with 
implementing and sustaining such policy processes under conditions of austerity. 
Peck et al. (2010:110) have noted the contextually specific variations of resistance 
arising from neoliberalised solutions to economic crisis, conveying that 
Neoliberalism: 
“does open up the possibility of a multi-front war of position, waged across a 
differentiated terrain and through a range of contextually specific, conjunctural 
struggles.” 
 
7.5.5  Organised resistance to austerity and welfare-to-work 
In the traditional sense, the clearest manifestation of resistance to welfare-to-work 
and austerity is through protests, particularly large demonstrations organised by 
trade unions over issues which affect a wide selection of their members. What has 
been frequently noted by interview respondents is that protests in resistance to 
welfare reform and austerity are qualitatively different from those in the past, being 
more muted than they have been previously, not only at the national level, but also 
and perhaps more surprisingly, at the local level where the cuts have really started to 
have an impact: 
“Yes I think there have been minor protests haven’t there, but we’re not into 
the community tax business that we were with Margaret Thatcher. I think 
that’s because people are battered and I think people are fearful and not quite 
knowing how to deal with their own vulnerability.” (Church Voluntary Action 
Co-ordinator in East Lancashire) 
Thus whilst in some cases the impacts are even more harsh than people have 
experienced in the past, the response to such negative effects, particularly in the 
form of resistance, is far less forceful than might have been the case given the level 
of upheaval. This quite palpable change has been observed by Schulze (2010:2) 
who notes that: 
222 
 
“in times of Welfare State retrenchment it has become difficult for trade unions 
to influence social policy. They are less included in the process of 
policymaking…It seems that Welfare State crisis and trade union crisis go 
hand in hand.” 
In general the response has been quite lethargic because from an organisational 
perspective local authorities and other groups are reluctant to openly criticise their 
source of funding, whilst those affected appear to be feeling disheartened, as if their 
efforts were almost pointless and futile. Henceforth this is qualitatively different from 
what has been seen before, where there would have been significant resistance to 
reforms and cuts of the magnitude of the Coalition Government’s agenda. 
In summary, resistance to the reforms and austerity being implemented by the 
Coalition Government is taking a variety of forms, although appears qualitatively 
different to how it might have been conveyed in the past. Contrary to the expected 
outcomes of government policy, there seems to be very little acceptance of the 
changes taking place and both individuals and organisations are working to resist 
and mitigate the effects of the reforms. Furthermore, whilst the intensity and forms of 
resistance are far softer than perhaps might have been expected in the past, what 
remains to be seen is how much more austerity and reform people affected by the 
changes are willing to accept; there is likely to be some sort of trigger point beyond 
which a significant backlash to reform will ensue, which in turn could initiate a far 
more complex set of responses to government welfare-to-work policies, but which at 
this stage remain unclear. 
 
7.6  Coping strategies in response to austerity and welfare-to-work policies 
Whilst Coalition Government policy has intended that people will be able to replace 
lost income from benefits with that from employment, supported by intentional 
welfare-to-work policy, the ominous lack of suitable employment opportunities in 
many regions and localities has meant that the loss of income from benefits has 
required people to devise strategies to cope with the loss of income in novel ways. 
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7.6.1  Organisations coping with austerity and welfare-to-work 
Aside from the individuals having to undertake coping strategies to overcome the 
negative effects of austerity and welfare reform, the organisations which are tasked 
with implementing the changes themselves are having to devise a number of 
strategies in order to respond to the challenges which they are facing: 
“When the welfare-to-work changes came in we had members that didn’t get 
contracts or knew that they weren’t going to get contracts - from G4S and 
Serco and others - and decided which amount of their reserves they could use 
and how they were going to reconfigure services to try and keep things going. 
I think people are just trying to be as pragmatic as they can, to the point 
where they can or can’t continue to deliver something. I think people have 
been quite shocked at every way you turn things are getting attacked and 
shrunk, so I think people planned as much as they could and thought about 
their own resources and how they differ you know, I know we’ve had 
members sell properties, we’ve had people moving their reserves to actually 
keep funds up and keep front line services going. So I don’t think anybody 
really buried their heads. I think it was just trying to understand the scale of it 
really.” (Manager, Locality, a National Community Network Organisation) 
These responses are exactly what the Coalition Government intended; cutting funds 
to local organisations thereby forcing them to cope with maintaining welfare-to-work 
service provision at the same time as saving money and cutting the welfare budget. 
This agenda is qualitatively different from the policy in place before, where the 
Labour Government invested significant sums in the public sector in order to 
continually improve the quality and quantity of provision both local authorities and 
third sector organisations were able to provide (Smith, 2010). Under the current 
scenario such quality and quantity are expected to remain at the same time as 
resources are being squeezed. Bennett and Roberts (2004:10) support this, 
contending that such strategies are a consequence of changing power relations 
between the state, citizens and the private sector in the face of austerity and the 
process of reducing the role of the state in meeting welfare-to-work protocols. They 
suggest that challenges of moving power relations arise for policy makers “because 
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they then have to think about how to change power relations at the community, 
household or intra-household level.” 
Another important coping strategy is the enormous increase in demand for advice 
and support services at the local level on local authorities and other private and 
voluntary organisations: 
“I think we’re already noticing some people going into arrears with their 
Council Tax, because the Council Tax benefit has changed, so now 
everybody has to pay some form of Council Tax. So there are lots of people 
coming for advice and support and not really understanding what’s going on. 
There’s a need to just give them information, but also there’s a need to 
provide help around arrears and debt.” (Spokesperson, Blackpool Council) 
The high demand for advice and support is something entirely new and 
unprecedented for local authorities and their private and voluntary sector 
counterparts; in the past whilst these same support services have been widely 
available, their usage has been somewhat more conservative. Now however, when 
benefit entitlements are being progressively curtailed and additional financial 
responsibilities are being placed onto citizens previously protected from exposure to 
a neoliberalised labour market, the dependency of such people inevitably rises. Thus 
a clear policy contradiction is emerging at the local level between the needs of 
citizens and ability of local providers to support them. This paradox rejects the 
thoughts of Lowndes and Pratchett (2012:25): 
“local authorities and other bodies at the local level will not have as much 
money, they will have much greater freedom to be innovative in the way that 
they work and support their communities.” 
What this suggests is the assumption that innovative coping strategies will overcome 
a basic lack of resources appears to be false. This is also highlighted by Stoker 
(2011, cited in Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012:28), who suggests that: 
“the issue of local government finance is the elephant in the room because 
until local government gets access to a wider variety of revenue raising 
sources and funds more of its own services it is difficult to say that localism 
has arrived.” 
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Coupled with increased levels of advice and support, people are attempting to cope 
with restricted benefit entitlements by accessing alternative sources of public money 
which might still be available through local authorities: 
“They’re appealing benefit decisions with no real grounds, they’re applying for 
DHPs (Discretionary Housing Payments) and again have got no real grounds 
a lot of them. It’s still not, and I’m not saying this is a majority, but there’s a 
significant proportion of people doing all these things before, and they’ll do all 
that before they even come to thinking right I’m going to have to re-budget or 
I’m going to have to move. You’ve only got to look at the payment trends in 
our group, they’re nearly all in arrears now.” (Senior Official, Knowsley 
Housing Trust) 
Local authorities previously had a pot of money for providing crisis loans to 
vulnerable people, but the system has been progressively scrapped by central 
government since it began to instigate cuts on local authorities (Local Government 
Chronicle (LGC), 2014). As a consequence the only remaining source of funding that 
is available comes in the form of a DHP, and is a portion of money which many local 
authorities have put aside in order to counteract the effects of the Bedroom Tax and 
Council Tax payments. Thus many local authorities have seen an exponential 
increase in applications for DHP support (JRF, 2014c). Whilst this money is intended 
to provide assistance for housing payments, with many people facing substantial 
cuts to their social security income these funds are often being used not only as a 
short term coping strategy to help with rent payments, but also to help them get 
through day to day living more generally. 
Whilst this behaviour from benefits dependent citizens might well be expected, it 
does refute the intended objectives of the Coalition Government to lessen 
dependency on the state; instead of taking extra responsibility for their own welfare, 
people are simply transferring their dependency from one area of state funding to 
another, even if it is only for a limited period of time. This maintenance of 
dependency is conveyed by Lowndes and Pratchett (2012:30) who note that: 
“the move from ‘Big Government to a Big Society’ reflects the Coalition’s 
belief that depending considerably on the state has taken away individual 
personal responsibility, increased bureaucracy and led to community 
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breakdown…The overlap of the policies shows a conscious attempt by the 
Coalition Government to change the basis of communities and therefore, their 
relationship to structures of governance at the local level.” 
This is a very definitive shift in behaviour, because in the past people had more 
generous benefit entitlements and so had very little requirement for financial tools 
such as DHPs, whereas now local authorities are being overwhelmed by requests. 
For example between April and May 2011, Sefton Council saw a nine-fold increase 
in DHP applications (Inside Housing, 2013). 
 
7.6.2  Citizens coping with austerity and welfare-to-work 
One of the main coping strategies perhaps can be classified as not being a coping 
strategy at all: 
“I think it’s almost a very human reaction to bury your head in the sand and 
think it won’t affect me, it won’t be that bad, it’s not happening yet and actually 
now it is. The letters are dropping through the door and people are seeing 
kind of the liabilities and the cuts to their income. So I think even if you did 
everything you could to get the message out, I suspect until it hits people and 
they literally lose that money or you know, are threatened with homelessness, 
then it starts to impact unfortunately. And that’s what we’re seeing are people 
in crisis really when it has come to that point and it has affected them.” 
(Spokesperson, Wirral Borough Council) 
Many of the people interviewed noted that the most common way in which people 
are getting by on lower income is by burying their heads in the sand, pretending that 
the financial problems they face do not exist, and believing that they will simply 
dissipate if they choose to ignore them for long enough. The problem is frequently 
being compounded as well by poor advice people are being given by their peers who 
actively encourage them to duck and dive from their heightened responsibilities, but 
which serves only to worsen their situation in the long run. Such a response is 
understandable for people who feel they have their backs against a wall and have no 
other option; however the reality of the situation is inevitably that debts mount up 
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further, welfare-to-work sanctions hit harder, and so draws them deeper into a cycle 
of poverty and so become increasingly dependent on benefit support. 
As a result this is an unexpected outcome for Coalition Government policy intentions, 
because there is an expectation that people will just accept the changes and take on 
the additional responsibilities being placed upon them, when in reality people are 
frequently doing anything they can to avoid conforming to policy ideals. Indeed 
Martin (2010:34) agrees with this, suggesting that “social life must be understood 
and enacted by real people in real situations”, and not through a process of what 
responses are expected by policy rhetoric. This behaviour is much the same as 
would have been expected in the past, however the severity of the cuts and the 
scale of which they are taking place means that the dire situation people are getting 
themselves into by ignoring the reforms is significantly worse than has been seen 
previously (for instance the dramatic rise in the use of pay day loan services). 
Henceforth, this unexpected consequence stems from a misconception of the 
responses of citizens to welfare reform and welfare-to-work requirements, and that 
the Coalition Government has automatically assumed policies will encourage people 
to take responsibility and find work. 
Another substantial attribute which has arisen from the interviews is that despite 
attempts to increase the provision of things like advice and support, the intensity of 
the problems people exposed to the cuts are facing continues to increase, and the 
level of desperation equally amongst these people is getting worse. The result is that 
there has been a significant increase in the use of less desirable coping strategies, 
such as the use of payday loans, loan sharks and even increased reliance on food 
banks: 
“We’re seeing increased levels of people with major debt problems in real 
financial hardship turning to things like loan sharks and food banks.” 
(Spokesperson, Wirral Borough Council) 
Also emerging are less visible forms of coping such as cutting back on food and 
heating by attempting to rationalise what is deemed essential. The increasing (and 
unexpected) dependency on these tools for coping with the changes taking place 
means that people are getting even deeper into trouble, particularly with debt, 
challenging the notion of people taking more responsibility for their own welfare. 
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Such a development is not qualitatively different to the situation prior to the reforms 
being implemented, however what has changed is the extent and intensity with 
which such tools are being utilised to cope with everyday life. What is also important 
to assert is that welfare-to-work policy is designed to promote work as a route out of 
poverty and dependency, however the increasing use of such coping strategies 
negates the benefits that come from being in work, therefore meaning work is less 
likely to pay as the government has intended. Furthermore, for many who are used 
to an adequate life on benefits, work represents a coping strategy of last resort; they 
will preferentially utilise other strategies such as loan sharks and other forms of debt 
to sustain themselves and will only get a job if they have no other choice. Such 
desperation therefore undermines the idea of utilising welfare-to-work tools in order 
to improve living standards through greater responsibility and so requires a different 
approach to welfare reform. This principle has been raised by Taylor-Gooby 
(2012b:129) who suggests: 
“the defence of the Welfare State requires the political leadership to mobilise 
the political forces supporting greater social solidarity, to articulate an 
economic strategic that includes a humane valuing of citizens as more than 
worker/consumers and to combine the various arguments for welfare into a 
compelling and inclusive case that carries moral conviction.” 
An additional interesting sub plot around coping strategies relates to behavioural 
changes. Whilst some people have embraced their new level of responsibility to 
provide for themselves through welfare-to-work, many have sought any means 
possible to secure an income without having to get a job. In terms of behaviour it has 
been suggested by the Coalition Government and Iain Duncan-Smith in particular 
that people have been attempting to dodge and ignore their additional 
responsibilities (Standing, 2011), but there are many other forms of behaviour which 
are coming to fruition as part of coping strategies that people are adopting: 
“Borrowing from family, borrowing from neighbours, borrowing from loan 
sharks, using a credit union, going to food banks.” (City Councillor in 
Liverpool) 
These contrast with coping strategies being used by higher social classes, who have 
greater access to various financial instruments and can therefore make cut backs 
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around non-essential spending compared with those on benefits who are already 
pushed to their limit and who risk being tipped over the edge if any further cuts are 
imposed upon them. This is particularly an issue for single people who only have 
access to the most basic forms of Jobseekers Allowance. Moreover, a number of 
interviewees noted that aspects of people’s behaviour are also indicating that many 
are not coping with the changes, and their situations are simply getting progressively 
worse with behaviours including a heightened level of apathy towards life or even 
pleas for help in the form of attempted suicides, or maybe being extremely reluctant 
to ask for support. Increasingly people also appear to be waiting until they are in 
crisis before they ask for assistance. 
Such forms of behaviour are indicating that the political strategies which have been 
implemented by the Coalition Government are not having the intended effect. 
Instead of people stepping up and taking greater responsibility for their welfare 
through work, it is apparent that they are mostly trying to cope with the changes by 
any means other than work, if they are managing to cope at all. This behavioural 
change has been stressed by Dale (2012:17) who suggests that they are a direct 
consequence of Neoliberalism becoming more deeply embedded into social 
practices. Indeed Neoliberalism now represents “a ‘social movement from above’ 
geared to putting into place a regime of rules, policies and social practices that claim 
fealty to the doctrine.” Consequently many people who have been reliant on benefits 
in the past are simply becoming even more dependent, but instead of the state it is 
on alternative sources of income and support, which is an unexpected reversal of the 
ideals the Coalition Government has sought. However this contrasts with the views 
of Dunn (2010) who suggests that far from becoming increasingly reliant on state 
support, unemployed people with lower qualifications tend to exhibit a greater affinity 
for work. 
Furthermore, the impending introduction of Universal Credit is likely to make 
everyday life even more difficult for people, and so the coping strategies and in turn 
the behaviours exhibited are likely to become even more extreme and desperate in 
order to survive under an increasingly “punitive turn” (DWP, 2010c, cited in Wright, 
2012:319). In terms of such behaviours being qualitatively different from those 
observed prior to the austerity measures and reforms being brought in, it appears 
they are much the same. The main difference is that the behavioural patterns in 
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place before have now become more widespread and more desperate than before in 
order to survive under greater financial strain. 
 
7.6.3  Coping with welfare-to-work through employment 
The interviews have also identified very specific issues relating to how people are 
using employment to cope with the effects of the welfare reforms. Clearly the most 
obvious method of mitigating the negative effects of reform is through sustained 
employment, however attaining employment or additional hours of work is not always 
so easy - particularly within a sensitive labour market, and especially for those who 
are unskilled or lack the educational attainment to find employment which would help 
them to move away from social security dependency: 
“The unskilled working class are hit the hardest definitely. And even the bits of 
help that are available for them, they’re struggling to find their way through 
because of either their own inadequacies or lack of education. Some of these 
people are so beaten down by what life’s throwing at them; they’re losing the 
will really.” (Senior Official, Burnley Borough Council) 
As a result, the conditions of a resurgent neoliberal labour market mean it becomes 
increasingly difficult for many people reliant on social security to find suitable 
employment in order to cope with the latest welfare-to-work mandate and take 
responsibility for their own welfare through work. This leads to many becoming 
trapped in a cycle of dependency by a labour market and economy which are 
supposed to offer a clear route towards self-sufficiency, but in reality serve only to 
maintain and deepen the poverty and dependency processes which already exist 
(Johnston et al., 2011). In this way therefore, the politically driven ideals of affirming 
the prominence of neoliberal market tendencies are actually serving to contradict 
welfare-to-work by limiting the success of policies as they push benefits recipients 
towards continued un and underemployment through which dependency on social 
security becomes inevitable. Such a process is fairly similar to that which has been 
observed in the past, however the politically driven nature of the current policy 
agenda around austerity and welfare-to-work means the process of trapping people 
in low paid work and dependency has been extended and has become more intense 
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under the Coalition. This inconsistency supports the thoughts of Newman (2011:104) 
that “higher out-of-work benefits would raise self-esteem and confidence and have a 
significant impact on the ability of those who are unemployed to look for work.” 
In addition, the tapering of benefits with greater hours of work mean that people 
actually lose out on access to benefits the more they work, and so people are being 
actively discouraged from taking on overtime or temporary work through fear of 
losing benefits further down the line. This is also important when considering that 
there is a crossover period between moving in and out of the benefits system, and so 
there may be a delay in benefit receipt leading to people having periods of no 
income and therefore greater dependency and become stranded in a cycle of 
poverty: 
“There are increased numbers of people applying for local welfare assistance, 
and interestingly the single primary reason why they say they need assistance 
is because of delays in their benefits being sorted out. So there are a whole 
group of people who are sort of coming to us for assistance now for things like 
food, and the single most common reason for why they’re having to find that 
assistance is because there’s been some kind of delay in their benefits being 
assessed.” (Spokesperson, Wirral Borough Council) 
In this way therefore, taking on work as a way of coping with the welfare-to-work 
reforms which are being implemented appears to be less beneficial than the policy 
intends, because the financial rewards of being in temporary or low paid employment 
are negated by loss of benefit payments at a time when people might be more reliant 
on them than ever before, particularly if they suddenly find themselves out of work 
and face a lag time before they can find alternative employment or are processed 
back into the benefits system. Thus the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies 
temporary and low paid forms of employment serves only to discourage people to 
take on employment as opposed to living on benefits, because many fear losing the 
benefits income they already have more than the gains they receive from taking on 
work for a short period of time or which offers low pay. 
This is a direct contradiction to Coalition Government welfare-to-work policy which 
has intended to push recipients towards the labour market and lower dependency by 
making work pay, yet the uncertainty which arises from inadequate forms of 
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employment leads people to refusing temporary work as a way of coping with the 
potential loss of benefit income in the longer term. This uncertainty has been noted 
by Newman (2011:96) who conveys that: 
“work is the most important route out of poverty for working-age people, but 
not a guaranteed one. There is evidence of a ‘low pay, no pay’ cycle of 
moving from unemployment into low-paid work and back again” (original 
emphasis). 
She goes on to suggest that as a result “other routes out of poverty can be important 
– not least a rise in benefits or maintenance payments” (ibid). Interestingly then, this 
is much the same as has been the case in the past, with government policy 
attempting to ‘make work pay’, but in reality the balance between the financial gains 
and drawbacks of welfare-to-work policy make it much more difficult to justify the 
advantage of being in work, exactly what the current raft of policies were designed to 
overcome. 
The issue becomes even more pronounced when considering the effects the reforms 
have on groups hit hard by the cuts, mainly single people and the disabled. The cuts 
to benefit entitlements mean that the cost of care for the disabled has shifted 
towards the responsibility of the families, and so in many cases the cost of care rises 
exponentially. To cope with this, a significant number of people are actually giving up 
work to act as carers for disabled family members: 
“You don’t know whether people have simply said  ‘Well I’ll have to stay at 
home rather than do that part time job’, or ‘I’ll have to make adjustments like 
that.’” (Spokesperson, Merseyside Disability Charity) 
These outcomes are extremely interesting from the perspective of what Coalition 
Government welfare-to-work policy has set out to achieve. Policies assume that by 
restricting benefit entitlements to those dependent on social security support, they 
will inevitably take greater responsibility for their own welfare through work. However 
it appears that the policies implemented are actually having a contradictory effect; 
instead of encouraging people to find a job or take on additional hours to escape 
their dependency on the welfare system, people are recoiling back further into 
benefits dependency in order to avoid losing their entitlements and may actually go 
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further in the opposite direction to that intended in order to maximise their income 
through benefits (Oakley, 2012). This has been elucidated by Patrick (2012:13) who 
states that: 
“the many shortcomings of contrasting a simplistic valorisation of paid work 
with the ‘problem’ of ‘dependency’ suggests that one of the central premises 
of both welfare-to-work policy and the broader welfare reform agenda is open 
to challenge…At the same time, the government should also consider what 
messages are sent out by its implicit undermining of the many forms of unpaid 
work in which so many are engaged.” 
Qualitatively therefore, this is very similar to the situation observed under the 
previous system devised by the Labour Government, whose policies inadvertently 
incentivised lifestyles underpinned by benefits rather than encouraging work 
(Hamnett, 2010). Whilst the agenda of the Coalition aims to tackle this so called 
dependency culture and rebalance the Welfare State (Oakley, 2012), it is achieving 
very little by way of convincing those on benefits that they should be looking for work 
as a way out of poverty rather than maintain an inherent dependency on the state. 
In summary, a wide variety of responses are coming to fruition which both people 
and the organisations that support them are developing as strategies for coping with 
the austerity measures and welfare reforms. Whilst being in work is clearly the best 
way of coping with the reforms taking place, the responses of many people resemble 
more of an avoidance of work in search of alternative ways of accessing benefits 
rather than accepting the responsibilities for social security. However, such a 
process risks creating an underclass of citizens if short term coping strategies 
translate into more long term normalities. Furthermore, under the current scenario 
people can just about survive on the restricted benefit income that they receive, and 
so any unexpected or additional expenditure may tip the balance of an individual or 
family being able to cope with the everyday struggles associated with life on the 
breadline. 
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7.7  Summary 
This chapter has explored the responses emerging from the material effects of 
politically driven welfare-to-work rhetoric in the UK. It has questioned whether or not 
such responses contradict or complement the objectives of austerity and welfare-to-
work policies currently being implemented, and whether these responses are 
qualitatively different to those seen in the past. It has investigated how key 
stakeholders in the welfare-to-work discourse have adapted to the changes brought 
about by the material effects of austerity and welfare reform. The interviews suggest 
that there have been a number of contradictory and unintended impacts of 
adaptations to the material effects of welfare-to-work, primarily due to the lack of 
suitable employment opportunities and the paucity of acceptance of welfare-to-work 
rhetoric and its push to lower dependency on benefits receipt (McCollum, 2012). This 
has frequently led to benefits dependency simply being transferred from one section 
of the population (the unemployed) to another (those in low paid work). What has 
also been discovered is that much of this adaptation process is qualitatively different 
to what has been seen before due to the types of effects being responded to and the 
different ways in which these have been addressed. Innovation is seen as 
stakeholders having to do more with fewer resources. In this instance, the interviews 
have suggested that there are a great number of innovative responses to austerity 
coming to the fore as a way of sharing costs and promoting work over benefits, 
however these are being hampered by the lack of employment opportunities suitable 
to move people away from the benefits system, and as such that the welfare-to-work 
objectives laid out by the Coalition Government have proven much more challenging 
(Standing, 2011). And again, whilst welfare-to-work in itself is nothing new, the 
combined effect of fewer resources and higher demand for support have meant the 
innovative responses stakeholders are creating are qualitatively different from what 
was utilised in the past (MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson, 2013). 
The chapter then explored the forms of co-operation emerging to overcome the 
negative effects of austerity and welfare-to-work, mainly through the sharing of 
resources and information. An unintended consequence of this however is that in 
some instances, fewer resources has meant even less co-operation as organisations 
become ever more protective of individual rather that collective spending priorities. In 
turn this might also lead to the loss of support capacity at the local level due to an 
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inability to secure funds through contracted funding arrangements. Even this form of 
response was however found to have been hampered by the lack of suitable 
employment opportunities and the loss of structural co-ordination due to austerity, 
meaning the welfare-to-work responses were not as successful as perhaps they 
might have been (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). Furthermore, government policy 
actively contradicts itself in that co-operation is being hindered and even weakened 
by the removal of regional ties in favour of more localised arrangements. Again such 
forms of co-operation are qualitatively different from those seen in the past due to 
the changing structure of welfare-to-work policy and resource allocation, as well as 
the need to meet the growing challenge of a resurgent neoliberal economy and 
labour market. 
On the opposite of the equation, the next section of the chapter assessed the role of 
resistance as a response to the effects of austerity and welfare-to-work reform. It 
found that resistance has taken many forms both from individuals and organisations 
to overcome the material effects and tensions of austerity and welfare-to-work policy, 
although rarely in the traditionally expected forms of response such as protesting. 
Many of the behavioural responses to welfare-to-work policies thus actively 
contradict the agenda of the Coalition Government, because they present as 
responses to maintain benefits income as far as possible and opt for work as a last 
resort (Smith, 2010). In a similar guise the vehement failure of many to accept the 
welfare-to-work reforms being made is actually increasing the costs of welfare to the 
state in direct contradiction with the objectives of reduced spending that the 
government has championed. Whilst long-established forms of resistance such as 
protesting are nothing new, the particular nuances of austerity and enforced welfare-
to-work compliance are leading to qualitatively new responses aimed at resisting 
government objectives from both citizens and organisations. 
In the final part of the chapter, the coping strategies coming to the fore in response 
to austerity and welfare-to-work were investigated, which have taken a variety of 
forms in order to overcome the latest requirements arising as part of the current 
welfare-to-work mandate. Therefore despite the objectives of the welfare-to-work 
agenda what has become clear is that the majority of the coping strategies noted 
were to mitigate and ameliorate the effects of welfare-to-work by any means other 
than finding employment, which has been an unexpected outcome for the Coalition 
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Government from the policy agenda around welfare-to-work and forcing people 
towards the labour market and lower benefits dependency. The coping strategies 
devised in this instance are similar to those seen in the past, with the difference 
being that the stricter nature of austerity and welfare-to-work policies have led to the 
use of such responses being extended and intensified. What should also be noted is 
that government welfare-to-work rhetoric has been based around moving people into 
employment by making work pay, but the coping strategies coming to fruition mean 
the outcome on dependency is qualitative the same as that of previous policies, and 
a facet which the current raft of policies was intended to overcome. However the 
simultaneous promotion of a neoliberal labour market has presented a much greater 
challenge to welfare reform than was perhaps originally envisaged in the policy 
rhetoric (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). In this way welfare-to-work policy represents a 
significant contradiction to the policy objectives around making work pay, because 
for those confined to low paid employment, being in work does not provide a large 
enough boost to income to remove dependency on state support, and may actually 
serve to increase it. Hence benefits dependency is simply being transferred from the 
unemployed to those in low paid work, instead of being removed altogether as the 
government has intended. 
The final chapter will summarise the main findings from all three of the empirical 
chapters which in turn will allow answers to be formulated for the research questions 
originally proposed. It will then identify the unique contribution of the project to further 
the knowledge base around austerity and welfare-to-work in the UK under the 
agenda of the Coalition Government and beyond the 2015 General Election. 
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Chapter 8: Nascent Geographies of Austerity – Reflecting 
on the Implications for (Re)new(ed) Welfare-To-Work in the 
Present and Future 
 
8.1 Nascent geographies of welfare in the age of austerity: work-first welfare 
The research conducted in this thesis has investigated the impacts of austerity and 
welfare reform, in the UK, across the North West, and in the towns and cities therein. 
In particular, it has focused on the implications for welfare-to-work policies designed 
to push people towards the labour market and away from reliance on state welfare. It 
began by highlighting the different eras of the Welfare State in the UK from its 
inception in the 1940’s up to the tenure of the 2010-15 Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government. It then addressed the conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks of welfare reform which have emerged alongside austerity following the 
2008-9 financial crisis. Following on from this, it highlighted the methods used to 
tackle the research questions proposed. 
The empirical chapters of the thesis attempted to unpick the research questions 
outlined, investigating a number of different arguments which underlay current 
welfare-to-work policy processes. The first empirical chapter elucidated upon 
whether welfare-to-work discourse is economically necessary or driven by political 
ideology. The second empirical chapter went on to examine the tactics and 
strategies being utilised by the stakeholders (conductors, implementers and 
recipients) involved in the process of welfare-to-work. The final empirical chapter 
dealt specifically with the responses which have come to fruition to overcome the 
reforms to welfare-to-work policy. In particular it focused on forms of co-operation, 
resistance and coping strategies which are being used to negate the impacts of 
current welfare-to-work policy in the UK. 
In this way, it is now important to collate the findings of each empirical chapter in 
order to resolve the research questions proposed at the beginning of the thesis, and 
to identify the original contribution that the thesis has made to the existing theory and 
literature on austerity, welfare reform and welfare-to-work in the UK. 
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8.1.1 To what extent is austerity influencing the nature of welfare provision in cities? 
The research undertaken in this thesis indicates that there is a strong relationship 
between the severity of austerity measures being implemented by the Coalition 
Government and the sincerity of the welfare reforms being enforced alongside. 
Whilst austerity has been framed as an economic necessity as part of reducing the 
national deficit (MacLeavy, 2011), it has arguably been a politically conscious 
decision to target the welfare benefits of those vulnerable members of society such 
as the disabled and unemployed at the same time as protecting those of core voting 
groups such as pensioners and middle income families (Casebourne, 2010, cited in 
JRF, 2010:13). What has also come through from the research is that there have 
been disputes between the main political parties in the UK over how deep or fast 
cuts have needed to be made, and whether it has been necessary to impose such a 
heavy burden on those already significantly marginalised from society (König, 2015; 
Gaffney, 2015). However, what has also emerged is that the savings made are 
almost insignificant in comparison to the level of savings needing to be made, 
implying that the politically motivated cuts to welfare provision are symbolic rather 
than a genuine policy to save money (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). 
It has emerged that one of the key attributes of the Coalition Government’s welfare-
to-work reforms has been to make work pay (Newman, 2011). Whilst this rhetoric 
has been portrayed as an economic prerogative for encouraging citizens to take 
greater responsibility for their own welfare through work (Vis et al., 2011), there have 
been equally strong arguments that using the 2008-9 financial crisis to advocate 
welfare responsibilities over the rights of citizens has essentially been part of a wider 
Conservative agenda for a smaller state with less obligation to its citizens, and more 
obligation to the neoliberal market (Peck, 2012; Howell, 2015). The interviews 
conducted confirm that the current rhetoric appears more focused on getting people 
off benefits than into sustained and meaningful employment. 
The research has also identified a clear extension and intensification of the welfare-
to-work rhetoric which has been implemented by the Coalition Government. Indeed, 
the level of conditionality and sanctioning for those receiving out of work benefits has 
been ratcheted up since 2010 as citizens are incentivised to take greater 
responsibility for their own welfare through work (Newman, 2011). In essence the 
239 
 
safety net of the British Welfare State is no longer the right of those who are poor, 
but is the preserve of those who are poor but seeking work. The findings of the 
research suggest that securing and maintaining entitlements to benefits has become 
a full time occupation in itself under the Coalition Government. This intensification of 
welfare-to-work policy has also been extended beyond those who are 
un(der)employed to the sick and disabled, who are now required to undertake strict 
examinations in order to prove that they are entitled both to their disability benefits 
but also exemption from the welfare-to-work rhetoric in place (Standing, 2011; 
Weston, 2012). The research has unpicked this process to discover that entitlement 
to the full spectrum of disability support is now founded on a physical assessment 
around a person’s ability to perform work and takes no consideration for whether an 
individual is actually fit for work. In this way, disability and sickness have been 
redefined to fit with the political rhetoric which has been implemented (Roulstone, 
2015). The consequence is that there are now more people actively seeking work 
than before the 2010 General Election, coupled to fewer claimants of unemployment 
and disability support. This is a particular issue given the inability of the labour 
market to absorb such an increase. 
However, whilst this process is simply an escalation of what had come before under 
the previous Labour Government, there are distinctly new elements of the current 
welfare-to-work policy which have been uncovered. The main facet of this rhetoric is 
the extension of welfare-to-work to those already in some form of employment but 
who are still entitled to a certain degree of welfare support (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
The rhetoric advocated by the Coalition Government involves not only making work 
pay, but that work should continue to increasingly pay until an individual or family is 
able to take full responsibility for their welfare through paid earnings. This is a key 
point, because more is now spent on in-work benefits than is spent on those out of 
work. The welfare-to-work criteria for those in employment now apply conditionality 
which is just as strict and punitive as for the unemployed and disabled (Etherington 
and Daguerre, 2015). Benefit receipt is now based on the condition that recipients in 
work continue to search for more hours and higher rates of pay until the point at 
which they are no longer entitled to welfare support. Failure to achieve this leads to 
benefits being sanctioned. This is inherently different to policy measures delivered in 
the past where access to benefits for those in work was unconditionally provided, 
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and so this drive for all benefit recipients, both in and out of work, to take greater 
responsibility for their welfare, has formed part of a more extensive attempt to reduce 
the burden of welfare costs on the state in favour of the individual (Larner et al., 
2013). It therefore also marks a significant change to the social contract which exists 
between the state and its citizens. 
The research has also unearthed a distinctive change in attitude towards welfare and 
welfare recipients. Whereas in the past welfare and benefits were seen as a 
necessary aspect of state provision to assist those who had fallen on hard times or 
were unable to support themselves, under the Coalition Government there has been 
much more emphasis placed on the idea of fairness and that everyone in society 
should take on their fair share of the burden brought about by austerity measures 
(Gregory, 2014). The research has uncovered that there is a dichotomy appearing 
between the deserving and undeserving, with the former becoming the preserve of 
those in work but on low pay as opposed to being the right of the unemployed and 
vulnerable (Petersen et al, 2010, cited in Vis et al., 2011). Much of this rhetoric 
appears to be politically driven, with significant emphasis being placed on fairness 
and a responsibility for citizens to find work to contribute to the same extent as hard 
working members of society. In this way, a hostile undertone towards those deemed 
not to be taking their fair share of the pain associated with austerity cuts has become 
prevalent, a factor which has been seized on by the politicians and in subsequent 
rhetoric (Hamnett, 2014). 
The stakeholder interviews also highlighted Universal Credit as an important feature 
of welfare-to-work under the Coalition. Whilst appearing to be new, in reality it is the 
amalgamation and extension of policies which were already in place in the past but 
which have been reworked to suit policy objectives of the Coalition. The policy has 
been designed to incorporate a variety of political rhetoric whilst simultaneously 
simplifying the entitlements that citizens have to access benefits and providing 
greater incentives to work additional hours (McCollum, 2012). However, the 
stakeholder interviews identify that the policy process serves only to clarify the lack 
of advantage to working extra hours above the threshold for maximising benefit 
entitlements. In this way both employers and employees are subsequently designing 
work (low paid and part time) and tailoring behaviour around maximising benefit 
income rather than maximising income from employment as the policy intends. 
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Criticisms have also been levelled at Universal Credit because it has been devised 
as a way of cutting the cost of benefits on the state in favour of paid employment, 
however in the short term under the auspices of an austerity mandate it actually 
serves to cost more rather than less, with these rising costs being continually shifted 
back onto the state rather than employers and citizens (Johnston et al., 2011). 
Finally, one of the major sticking points which can be isolated from the interviews 
conducted is that the welfare-to-work policies conveyed and implemented by the 
Coalition Government have incurred a number of contradictions. The first and 
arguably most important involves the rhetoric to make work pay. The policies which 
have been implemented assert that by getting people into work and eventually off 
benefits both provides citizens with the opportunity to take greater responsibility for 
their own welfare, as well as lessening the burden on the state (Larner et al., 2013). 
However, stakeholder interviews have elucidated that making work pay for everyone 
simultaneously (both now and in times of future hardship) is a myth, because there 
will always be winners and losers depending on which groups of people policies are 
designed to help, and the Coalition Government has attempted to disregard the 
importance of income in favour of the opportunities that welfare-to-work provides. In 
a similar way, work will only pay if jobs are available for people to move into (Taylor-
Gooby et al., 2014). 
Under the Coalition Government, benefit claimants both in and out of work have 
been forced to search for jobs which are not necessarily available as the economic 
recovery from the 2008-9 crisis continues. In this way, a lack of available 
employment opportunities has led to a large number of people being sanctioned for 
reasons which are potentially out of their control. To add to this, reducing the 
dependency people have on state benefits requires them to take on sustained full 
time work, however the research has found that many of the jobs that people are 
being pushed into in order to keep their benefit entitlements are temporary or part 
time, and frequently low paid. Essentially then what has come out of the research is 
that people are being penalised for living a life with some sort of reliance on the 
benefits system, however there is no suitable alternative, making the conditionality 
and sanctioning elements of welfare-to-work punitive rather than effective (Tarr and 
Finn, 2012). This led some interviewees to assert that the welfare-to-work rhetoric 
was more about getting people off benefits than actually helping them to take greater 
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responsibility for their own welfare through employment, and that a lack of 
opportunities is as much of a deterrent to work as a generous benefits system (Peck, 
2001; MacLeavy, 2011; Standing, 2011). What is more, it was highlighted in a 
number of interviews that the current climate of welfare retrenchment and the 
predominance of low paid work could actually leave people worse off in work than on 
benefits, and this creates tension and less acceptance of welfare-to-work policies 
because people do not necessarily feel better off and more secure in work than out 
(McCollum, 2012).  
Table 8.1 elucidates these findings more clearly, asserting what I believe to be the 
aspects of the reforms which are qualitatively new, which have shown a renewal of 
characteristics already in place, and which nuances have remained the same as 
before. What it asserts is that rather than there being a distinctive post-neoliberal 
turn as has been pontificated in the academic literature, many of the welfare reforms 
and austerity measures which have come to fruition under the Coalition Government 
have sought to further embed the market-led discourse of Neoliberalism through 
welfare-to-work (Newman, 2011). Indeed it appears that the reforms have been more 
a (re)new(al), an extended and intensified version of the policies previously in place, 
which have strengthened the neoliberal prerogative and altered the dynamic of the 
state-citizen relationship in favour of the economic over the social (Taylor-Gooby et 
al., 2014; Howell, 2015). Thus the processes of welfare reform and welfare-to-work 
are less of a post-neoliberal shift (Peck et al. 2009; Peck et al., 2010), and more of a 
strengthening of the ‘actually existing Neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) 
seen in welfare geographies prior to the 2008-9 financial crisis. Despite this, there 
are qualitatively new elements within the discourse predominantly relating to the 
responses which are emerging at the local level to mitigate the impacts of such a 
(re)new(ed) neoliberal agenda. 
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Table 8.1 - Breakdown of research findings: austerity and welfare-to-work post-2008 financial crisis 
2008-9 Financial 
Crisis 
QUALITATIVELY NEW: Post-Neoliberalism?          Bedroom Tax/Council Tax Reforms                                                   
£26,000 Benefits Cap (Soon to be £23,000)          Servicing Debt         Conservative-led Governments 
Work-first Welfare: Fairness and Deservingness 
(RE)NEW(ED): Neoliberalism          Welfare-To-Work         Protection of Key Voter Groups (e.g. The Elderly)          Shrinking Public Sector         Welfare Cuts           
Protection of Health and Education Budgets         Negative Attitudes towards Welfare and Welfare Recipients         Withdrawal of State Welfare Provision                        
Exposure of the Most Vulnerable People in Society  
QUALITATIELY NEW: Universal Credit         In-work Conditionality                                                                         
Moving People Off Benefits but not always into Employment or Training         Living Wage Redefinition 
of Disability         Work Programme 
 
Austerity 
Politics – 
Economic 
Necessity or 
Politically 
Driven 
Strategy? 
(RE)NEW(ED): Active Labour Market Policies         Privatisation of Welfare Provision         Increase in Part Time, Temporary and Low Paid Work                             
Tackling NEETs         Making Work Pay         Dependency (Policy Contradictions) 
 
Strategies/ 
Tactics of 
Conductors, 
Implementers 
and 
Recipients of 
(Re)new(ed) 
Welfare-To-
Work Policies 
QUALITATIVELY NEW: Impacts on Both the Middle and Working Classes                                          
Resource Restrictions for Local Authorities and Third Sector Organisations                                                      
Responses (Adaptation, Innovation, Co-operation, Resistance, Coping Strategies) 
(RE)NEW(ED): Uneven Geographies of Welfare         Central Role of Cities 
 
Responding 
to Austerity 
and Welfare-
To-Work 
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8.1.2  What political strategies and their associated material effects are emerging in 
response to austerity? 
The research has found that the main strategy of the Coalition Government has been 
to incentivise work and greater responsibility for citizens in providing their own 
welfare (Newman, 2011). Welfare-to-work policies are intended to facilitate the 
mandate of neoliberal market forces by pushing the unemployed into low paid work 
through the use of conditionality and sanctioning (Taylor-Gooby, 2015). As a result, 
the role of the state has changed from one of demand to supply by providing 
employees for low paid work in the private sector rather than providing jobs in the 
public domain (Taylor-Gooby, 2015). This has accompanied a shift from full time 
public sector employment, towards part time, low paid work in the private sector. 
Indeed the ideological goal of the Coalition Government for a smaller, less 
accountable state has meant strategies are designed to lower entitlements to 
benefits by forcing people into work, often any work at any wage (Taylor-Gooby, 
ibid). 
What this means is that a qualitatively new situation is arising, with dependency 
being transferred from one part of the labour market to another. The stakeholder 
interviews elucidated that this transfer has taken several forms as benefit eligibility is 
tightened and scrutinised. Whilst dependency now has a significant presence within 
the active labour market through those people in low paid employment, it has also 
been altered as people formerly classified as sick or disabled are moved onto 
employment support (Standing, 2011; Roulstone, 2015). 
The research has also unpicked the strategies and nuances involved with the Work 
Programme. The Coalition Government has subcontracted the welfare-to-work 
process out to private providers, with payments made based on the number and 
difficulties of finding clients work (Wright, 2012). It has become clear that many of 
these Work Programme providers are purely interested in maximising short term 
profitability, and so frequently ‘cream’ off the most easily placed clients and ‘park’ 
those who require significantly greater investment of time and money (Rees et al., 
2014). In such instances, local voluntary organisations with considerably fewer 
resources are being left to take on the responsibility of supporting more challenging 
individuals through a cycle of low pay and no pay (Standing, 2011). The unique 
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aspect of the Work Programme which appears to be qualitatively different from 
strategies devised in the past is that it appears to reinforce neoliberal ideology with 
seemingly limited interest in getting people into sustained and meaningful work, with 
emphasis instead placed on removing clients from the benefits roster. There has 
also been an increase in the use of sanctioning as an alternative to active job search 
support. The stakeholder interviews assert that this now applies as much to the long 
term sick and disabled as it does to the unemployed. In effect what has come to 
fruition is that welfare has been replaced by workfarist social policies to conform to 
the will of neoliberal market economics, leaving the most vulnerable in society 
increasingly marginalised (Peck, 2012; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014). 
Henceforth another major political strategy which has emerged is the drive to lower 
the burden of welfare on the state, primarily by passing the responsibility for 
implementing and dealing with the impacts of welfare-to-work on to private and 
voluntary sector providers (Jones, 2012). Whilst this arguably gives local 
organisations the opportunity to implant their own blueprint for achieving their welfare 
aims (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012), the research implies that it is more about 
transferring the dependency of citizens from the state to the local level and local 
providers. And given the capacity of the labour market to absorb the unemployed, 
particularly when the replacement rate of the private sector is much lower than the 
levels of public sector employment seen prior to austerity measures being enforced, 
coupled with the increased use of conditionality and sanctioning, more assistance is 
needed for those caught up in the Coalition Government’s welfare-to-work strategy 
at a time when resources are becoming increasingly limited. This raises a key finding 
from the research in that the redefining of vulnerability and the subsequent 
disinvestment by the state in terms of its accountability towards its citizens has 
placed a large burden on voluntary organisations in particular which have been left to 
fill the void in welfare provision left by the state. The research suggests that this 
issue is most acute in those towns and cities with long standing structural economic 
problems. 
The stakeholder interviews also identified a considerable change in strategy towards 
disability. The main finding is that disability has essentially been redefined such that 
it is now based purely on a medicalised approach and the ability of an individual to 
physically undertake work. This is completely different to what has preceded it, 
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where symptomatic analysis on the part of the individual formed the basis for 
disability benefit entitlement. Consequentially those with less tangible disabilities 
have been scrutinised far more than ever before to the extent that they are now 
being forced from Disability Living Allowance to unemployment benefits requiring 
them to conform to job search conditionality (Lindsay and Houston, 2011). This is 
regardless of whether they are actually capable of taking a job at all (Lindsay and 
Houston, ibid). In line with this, the introduction of Universal Credit has served to 
affect the sick and disabled far more than most, because if people are not capable of 
taking work or even finding an employer to take them on, they will inevitably fall foul 
of the strict sanctioning which forms part of the reformed welfare system (Wright, 
2012). 
However, with these strategies come a number of unintended consequences and 
contradictions which challenge the plausibility of Coalition rhetoric and which convey 
that strategies around welfare-to-work are not silver bullet solutions to tackling 
welfare spending and dependency. For a start, the research has shown that utilising 
strategies to force benefit recipients into low paid work does not necessarily leave 
people better off than they were living on benefits. This is due to the taper in the 
value of their benefits, coupled to additional costs such as childcare and transport, 
which may only leave people marginally better off than they were before, or perhaps 
in some cases even worse off. The consequence is that the behavioural change 
intended becomes less likely because people see no advantage of giving up their 
benefits to leave themselves worse off in work in the long term (Newman, 2011; 
Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014).  
This unintended consequence has been compounded by the introduction of 
Universal Credit which has simplified the benefits system and clarified even further 
the extent to which people are better off in the low paid work compared to benefits 
(Royston, 2012). However it has also served to reduce the likelihood of employers 
offering opportunities for full time work. If genuine behavioural change were desired 
then benefits would have to be capped at a far lower level such that the only rational 
decision for people would be to look for work. In a similar manner, the research has 
elucidated that work can never pay for everyone simultaneously, and that the 
strategies of the Coalition Government have incorporated a distinctive politicised 
undertone to protect core voters and key constituencies, mainly wealthy pensioners 
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and areas of the South East of England. The result has been an uneven distribution 
of cuts, with areas of traditionally high public sector employment and lowest electoral 
significance such as in the North West hardest hit. 
Welfare-to-work and its effects are most apparent at the local level (Lowndes and 
Pratchett, 2012). The strategy therefore also falls down due to a mismatch between 
the number of unemployed and the number of job vacancies available. The result is 
that because prescribed policy strategies do not fit the specific situations seen at the 
local level, people end up being punitively penalised for being unemployed when 
there is limited prospect for them finding work (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). A corollary of 
this shown by the research is that the influx of low paid work resulting from neoliberal 
welfare reforms has led to a shift of the costs of welfare away from individuals and 
employers back towards the state, which as a result of its political strategies around 
welfare-to-work, has been left to top up the meagre earnings of a large number of 
people previously out of work, and who subsequently remain dependent on state 
benefits to one extent or another. In addition to this, a unique outcome of the 
research has been to note that welfare-to-work strategies are also drawing people 
previously working full time and independent of welfare, back into the benefits 
system, increasing the dependency on and the cost to the state.  
Furthermore, there is also a contradiction for in-work conditionality. This strategy 
intends to push people to continue to look for additional work until they earn enough 
to become ineligible for welfare benefits. The problem arises when jobs being 
created are part time and low paid, and so it frequently becomes an issue when 
employees require additional hours which are simply not available, leaving them 
susceptible to sanctioning. This again shows that the strategy has been more about 
getting people off benefits rather than into sustained work, because lower benefit 
claims do not necessarily conform to higher employment rates. 
The political strategy to reform disability entitlements has also unearthed a number 
of unintended consequences. Whilst the research indicates a clear shift in 
dependency from disability claimants towards the unemployed, it is questionable 
whether or not individuals affected by the changes actually have reasonable 
prospects for finding a job (Standing, 2011). Many do not feel capable of undertaking 
work on a regular basis, and this is being reflected in the labour market which in 
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many cases is not suited to absorbing a large influx of formerly disabled individuals 
(Weston, 2012). A further consequence is that the strategy to lower the number of 
people able to claim disability benefits has had only limited success because the loss 
of entitlements has led to others making conscious decisions to leave work in order 
to perform caring roles, which has served only to increase unemployment and 
dependency (Carers UK, 2012). 
Other strategical contradictions which have been unique to the Coalition welfare-to-
work rhetoric have involved changes to housing benefits. The research has shown 
that changes to Council Tax obligations and the Bedroom Tax have left many benefit 
recipients in difficult situations. With additional taxes to pay, significant numbers of 
people are having to make difficult decisions about which bills to pay and how much 
to spend on basic commodities such as food and heating, as they have seen the 
value of their benefit income shrink. Indeed, many people receiving only the most 
basic levels of benefit income are now being forced to pay a proportion of their 
Council Tax bill, and a lack of suitable housing provision in many localities has left 
the Bedroom Tax unavoidable to compound this. 
 
8.1.3  How are the least insulated cities acting as locations of co-operation and 
resistance to such strategies and policy processes? 
The research has uncovered that there are a wide range of specific responses to 
austerity and welfare-to-work policies taking place, many of which are qualitatively 
new as conditionality is extended and intensified and which leads to unintended and 
contradictory effects coming to the fore. Firstly, individuals and organisations are 
adapting to the strategies and policy processes taking place. Local authorities in 
particular have to adapt to lower incomes both in terms of cuts to government 
funding streams and revenue from falling tax receipts (Stoker, 2011, cited in 
Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012:28). Resources are becoming ever more stretched in 
multiple directions, particularly in towns and cities in the North West of England 
which have a high number of welfare dependents. Consequently many are 
necessarily having to prioritise which areas of spending they need to maintain above 
others, and are beginning to think critically about making efficiencies and innovations 
in service delivery and savings. 
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In this sense, private and voluntary organisations are taking a much more central 
role as services are outsourced due to their ability to provide services more cheaply 
and efficiently than the public sector (Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). In this way 
the costs of dependency are being transferred from one stakeholder to another, and 
do not really solve the problem of high welfare costs and dependency. In addition, 
whilst this transfer provides voluntary organisations with an opportunity to take a 
more pivotal role in the provision of welfare (Ross, 2009), it is not always positive, 
because voluntary and private organisations could potentially become lumbered with 
costly liabilities which they do not have the resources to accommodate, in a similar 
way to how the most challenging, and therefore expensive, people to support 
through welfare-to-work are passed along to voluntary groups.  Whilst this is nothing 
new, it is happening to a much greater extent than before as local authorities are 
required to make deeper and faster cuts to spending and thus need to offload their 
most costly assets. 
However, what has also arisen from the research is that the reality of this 
outsourcing in a number of instances is that services are being placed in the hands 
of the private sector rather than with local voluntary organisations, which has led to 
the implementation of solutions which are inappropriate to local circumstances (Rees 
et al., 2012). The result appears to be that the capacity of local voluntary 
organisations to support people through welfare-to-work is falling away due to lack of 
funding. 
Another significant finding which has arisen from stakeholder interviews is that local 
authorities as well as private and voluntary organisations are adapting to increased 
and dependency on welfare support services by increasing the number of staff to 
meet with the rising demand. This is a unique situation, because they are increasing 
the amount of resource they have dedicated to welfare-to-work at a time when 
resources are being cut. This additional staffing is required not just for those who are 
unemployed or disabled, but also for citizens in low paid work, particularly 
concerning issues around debt, fines, court summons, as well as the Bedroom Tax 
and Council Tax changes. Furthermore, for the first time these organisations are 
having to be proactive rather than reactive in order to support people before they 
present themselves with a multiplicity of issues, as well as the threat to income 
streams from resistance or the inability of people to pay. Such initiative is crucial 
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given the problem of benefit recipients appearing to frequently choose to search for 
alternative methods of accessing benefits rather than accepting responsibility to find 
work. 
The research has also uncovered that the type of advice and support that is being 
provided has also changed under Coalition welfare-to-work policy, with much more 
focus now being placed on work and financial responsibility as opposed to accessing 
benefits as was the main form of query in the past. What is most certainly 
qualitatively different from what has been seen before according to many of the 
stakeholders questioned, is that not only has the demand for support risen 
dramatically, but more importantly that the increase in demand for support from 
people with multiple problems has been unprecedented. 
With reductions in funding, there has come an inherent need to innovate and 
therefore do more with fewer resources, meaning that co-operative working between 
local authorities, the private sector and voluntary organisations has become vitally 
important and necessary in order for welfare support objectives and demands to be 
met (Bunt and Harris, 2010). With this in mind, the stakeholder interviews have 
clarified that the increasing demand for welfare support and advice has required 
many organisations to increase their capacity and provide staff with additional 
training. Another concerning trend is that many are now accommodating funding 
shortfalls with increasing numbers of volunteers in order to stretch resources further 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). However, the need to innovate has by contrast 
provided organisations with a much greater opportunity to decide how welfare 
services should be prioritised and delivered. 
Another important innovation which several stakeholders alluded to was the 
increased use of analysis and quantification to assess the impacts of welfare reform. 
Particularly in the case of local authorities and voluntary organisations, the analysis 
of impacts has enabled the more effective channelling of resources to the services 
which are in the highest demand, such as debt advice, accessing benefits, and job 
search (Martin, 2012; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). In a similar way, the 
research identified the importance of background planning processes to maximise 
the potential of resource limitations. Such processes might include the upskilling of 
staff to meet changing needs, raising awareness of welfare reforms and their 
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consequences, and being much more flexible, proactive and pre-emptive in an 
attempt to prevent issues at source and lessen the strain on already stretched 
resources as a result (resilience planning). A clear example of where this is needed 
surrounds the Coalition Government’s digital agenda around benefit claims, which 
was highlighted by a number of local stakeholders. This was because there have 
been inherent difficulties in transferring central state rhetoric down to local contexts, 
with problems concerning IT literacy and access for claimants, as well as staff 
lacking the skills to be able to help effectively. 
What has also been made abundantly clear throughout the interview process 
however is that being proactive and innovative can only be sustained to a certain 
point under relentless conditions of austerity and welfare reform, and at some point 
the quality and quantity of welfare support will begin to decline. In particular, the 
exponential increase in the use of conditionality and sanctioning processes has put 
enormous strain on advice and support services (Dodds and Paskins, 2011). The 
task of providers is being made even more difficult due to the limited number of job 
vacancies available for people to move into, and so in this way austerity can be seen 
to be limiting other policy objectives such as those concerning welfare-to-work 
(Newman, 2013). 
Another key response which has emerged from the research is the reconfiguration of 
co-operative working practices, both regionally and locally. Under previous 
governments there was a strong presence from regional umbrella bodies to co-
ordinate and manage the implementation and response to government policies, 
however under the Coalition these have been axed making it more difficult to pool 
and maximise the reach of limited resources (Hadis, 2014). Whilst regional bodies 
have been replaced with LEPs (BIS, 2015), co-operation within the remit of these 
organisations has proved to be significantly more difficult. In the North West region, 
this has meant a lack of joined up responses between organisations in different 
localities. However in contrast, there appears to have been an upsurge in co-
operation within individual local areas and within individual towns and cities, 
especially between local authorities and other private and voluntary organisations 
(Theodore and Peck, 2011; Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013). The research has 
indicated that with increasingly limited resources to utilise, there has been an 
emergence of much more joined up working practices and partnerships, especially 
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around the implementation of Universal Credit, in order to pool resources and 
maintain as far as possible their capacity to respond to the impacts of welfare reform 
under austerity. The practices include the sharing of facilities, staff and training 
programmes, alongside the closing down of expensive assets. 
There has also been a rise in the amount of collaborative monitoring and analysis of 
the impacts of welfare reform. Several stakeholder interviews highlighted that the 
ability of local authorities and voluntary organisations to target their resources where 
they are most needed has become far more effective since sharing information with 
each other because it provides each organisation with a much more holistic picture 
of the needs of the citizens their services cater for. 
Despite this, the austerity measures have had a number of contradictory 
consequences for co-operative working practices at the local level. Firstly the 
removal of regional bodies has the potential to encourage protectionist behaviour 
amongst towns and cities, which due to fewer resources, become more focused on 
protecting their own resources and in turn their own priorities and goals for welfare 
support (Pugalis and Townsend, 2010). In a similar way, the removal of area-based 
grants has served to dramatically reduce regional and local co-ordination as there is 
no longer the financial incentive in place to do so. As a result, any remaining co-
operative working that does take place is based on achieving very specific, 
individualised objectives which might overlap (Hadis, 2014). 
The research also highlighted the growing importance of alternative sources of 
income, particularly for voluntary organisations which face a sink or swim scenario 
under conditions of austerity and a significant increase in resource demand in recent 
years, especially when the voluntary sector is taking an increasingly important role in 
welfare provision as the Welfare State is progressively rolled back. In particular, 
there has been a tendency for local authorities to subcontract welfare services they 
can no longer afford to accommodate, and has meant voluntary organisations 
competing with other private entities for contracts, and hence funding, to run them 
(Standing, 2011). The interviews have indicated that voluntary organisations are 
losing out on vital funding to the private sector due to a lack of experience in writing 
and presenting service bids. This creates problems because the private sector 
generally offers generic blueprints which often fail to fit with the needs of local 
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circumstances, and provides inappropriate responses to mitigating welfare-to-work, 
compared with local actors who are more likely to offer a specific and personalised 
approach to local issues and needs (Rees et al., 2012). 
Voluntary organisations are overcoming these disadvantages by forming 
partnerships to undertake shared bidding, putting them on a stronger footing and in 
turn enabling them to compete with private sector providers. In a similar way, local 
authorities are starting to acknowledge the value of local knowledge which voluntary 
organisations offer. As a result many are now taking a mixed approach to 
subcontracting welfare services, with private and voluntary organisations working 
together to provide an efficient and effective service. However one issue that the 
research has highlighted is that when voluntary sector organisations do manage to 
secure funding, it is very often short term and therefore there is limited scope for 
what can be achieved to tackle the impacts of Coalition Government austerity and 
welfare reform. In this way then, funding provision needs to be longer term in order 
to having lasting positive effects on those affected by welfare-to-work. 
Another significant response which emerged from the research was the role of 
resistance to the reforms taking place, particularly in those areas which exhibit 
historically weak economies and high social security spending. There is clearly a 
level of tension along political lines as invariably it has been Labour controlled local 
authorities which have borne the brunt of the Conservative-Liberal Coalition austerity 
measures, which in turn only hinders the implementation of welfare-to-work policies 
in such places. Further to this, local authorities are resisting welfare reform policies 
by actively looking to maximise benefit entitlements for their citizens, therefore 
mitigating the impacts of welfare-to-work instead of encouraging acceptance of it 
(Peck and Theodore, 2015). This is also increasing the cost of welfare to the public 
purse as resistance has heightened from people determined to access as many 
benefits as possible instead of searching for work. The research has also shown an 
increasing trend in resistance through challenging welfare-to-work policy in court, 
particularly around disability entitlements and Work Capability Assessments, and the 
rising cost of welfare provision on the state due to a significant number of challenges 
being successful. However, the cuts to the legal aid budget means challenges can 
only be sought if alternative legal funding can be secured (Griffiths and Patterson, 
2014). 
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What can also be garnered from the research is that cities act as major convergence 
points for resistance, both for traditional forms such as protests but also for more 
novel forms as mentioned previously. This is because resistance is crucial in those 
places where welfare-to-work measures are punitive due to lack of jobs and high 
dependency on the Welfare State (Theodore and Peck, 2011). Cities are also 
important in terms of co-ordinated resistance whereby opposition to policy is stronger 
between cities as well as just within them (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2013). 
Whilst it has been unexpected for the Coalition Government that people are not 
accepting their new welfare responsibilities, protests and other forms of visible 
resistance are much more muted now than they have been in the past, particularly 
given how extensive the cuts and reforms have been (Schulze, 2010). Stakeholders 
have suggested that these forms of resistances seem to be less influential than in 
the past, with many people now feeling that such efforts are pointless and futile. 
However, there could still be a tipping point in future where the cuts and 
conditionalities become so severe that they are more than citizens are willing to 
accept. 
However, resistance is not always a positive facet in the face of welfare reform. 
Stakeholders assert that there is a definite lack of education and understanding 
around welfare reform and welfare-to-work, with many of those affected incorrectly 
blaming local authorities for the impacts they are experiencing. Resistance to reform 
also leads to misconceptions and mis-advice amongst peers, which can make it 
more difficult to assist those in need. People are frequently choosing to bury their 
heads in the sand and ignore the problems they face, inevitably making their 
situation worse. Resistance to welfare-to-work policies also creates issues for local 
authorities who, as a result of lower incomes, find it increasingly challenging to fund 
advice and support services. 
The final type of response to Coalition Government welfare reform which was raised 
in the stakeholder interviews were the coping strategies coming to fruition. One 
coping strategy for organisations such as local authorities and voluntary groups is to 
innovate, in order that they can maintain the quality and quantity of welfare service 
provision as far as possible despite fewer resources being available (MacKinnon and 
Driscoll Derickson, 2013). In terms of the coping strategies of the people affected by 
welfare reform and welfare-to-work, the research has found that a number of 
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strategies are emerging such as an upsurge in the demand for welfare advice and 
support services and increased applications for alternative sources of funding such 
as DHPs. Despite these, the research notes that people often seek ways of 
maintaining dependency rather than choosing to work or take on additional hours. 
Other coping strategies highlighted by the stakeholder interviews mainly concerned 
people not coping at all. Interviewees frequently alluded to people burying their 
heads in the sand, or using payday loans and loan sharks, as well as increasingly 
turning to food banks and cutting back on essentials such as food and heating. Debt 
problems are increasingly becoming an issue. 
Thus because work has a spectre of being a coping strategy of last resort, welfare-
to-work policies are frequently being undermined because they are failing to deliver 
the desired behavioural change and dependency on the state remains high, 
elucidating the need for a change in government policy approach around welfare-to-
work (Taylor-Gooby, 2012a). Subsequently this creates significant problems for the 
organisations tasked with dealing with the fallout from welfare reform and welfare-to-
work particularly, because people are waiting until they are deep in crisis before 
seeking help, and the lack of suitable work available makes it difficult to support 
people out of a cycle of dependency and low pay/no pay (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014). 
Conceptually then, it is important to gauge the outcomes of co-operation, resistance 
and coping strategies emerging. In terms of the positive outcomes, there appears to 
be an increased tendency for co-operative working practices between organisations 
within local areas and cities within the North West in response to constricted 
resources. This implies an acceptance of the need to both implement and respond to 
the impacts of welfare-to-work in a way which channels resources towards meeting 
and dealing with Coalition Government objectives. In conjunction with this, there 
have been increased amounts of innovation with organisations having the freedom to 
be more proactive and targeted in how they deal with welfare reform and mitigate the 
impacts specific to their localities (Peck and Theodore, 2015). The result is a more 
effective and resolute response to the neoliberalised processes of welfare reform 
and its impacts both for organisations and for citizens.  
On the other hand there have been a number of negative outcomes. Progressively 
greater restriction of resources has seen the growth of volunteering to replace the 
256 
 
capacity lost in the public and private sectors, and which could eventually lead to a 
decline in the quantity and quality of the response to welfare reform available to 
respond to welfare reform. Furthermore, a lack of funding is creating significant 
difficulties for voluntary organisations as the cost of dependency is being transferred 
from the state to the third sector. The situation is being made even more difficult by a 
rise in protectionist behaviour towards individualised welfare-to-work objectives as 
funding is curtailed and the incentives for organisations to work towards congruent 
goals are reduced, as well as the outright loss of virtually all regional level capacity in 
the North West to respond to welfare reform policies. In a similar way private 
organisations primarily interested in making short term profits tend to offer generic 
solutions inappropriate to the local scenario and therefore towards the efficient 
implementation of welfare reform and welfare-to-work. In addition, any funding which 
is available tends to be short term, thereby limiting the scope for responding to 
welfare reform and welfare-to-work.  
From the perspective of the individuals affected, many are failing to cope with 
reductions to benefits access they had become used to, and therefore instead of 
encouraging people into the labour market, many are finding themselves in crisis 
situations, possibly due to a lack of education and understanding of the welfare 
reform process. However the lack of suitable employment available in the North 
West which meets the criteria for making work pay also plays a significant role. 
Responses include utilising loan sharks and pay day loans, food banks or ignoring 
their welfare responsibilities altogether, processes intended to maintain rather than 
diminish dependency on state benefits. Welfare-to-work is therefore seen as a last 
resort, that policy does not make work pay, and hence a defiance of government 
welfare-to-work policy. Overall it appears that Coalition Government welfare reform 
policies have had limited effect on reducing welfare expenditure and encouraging 
citizens to take greater responsibility for their own welfare provision. Whilst there 
have been positive moves in the direction of reducing the input of the public sector 
from local authorities in North West cities, the alternatives coming to fruition have 
been relatively ineffective in achieving welfare reform objectives, especially around 
welfare-to-work and making work pay. Indeed for many benefit claimants, work is 
seen as a last resort only to be accepted when all other avenues of income are 
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exhausted, and which in turn are creating deeply embedded crisis conditions which 
make the objectives of welfare reform increasingly difficult to implement. 
 
8.2 The UK General Election: something new or more of the same? 
The UK General Election in 2015 has put the issues of austerity and welfare reform 
in a prominent position following the extensive policy discourse advocated by the 
Conservative-Liberal Coalition over the preceding 5 years. In a similar way to the 
election in 2010, all 3 of the major parties approached their election campaigns 
advocating continued economic prudence and therefore a further period of austerity 
and welfare reform as a consequence. In this way then, the manifestos of these 
parties offered much more divergence of policy compared to what was seen in 2010. 
The Conservatives pledged to continue with their economic plan, proposing a further 
£12bn worth of welfare cuts alongside freezing working age benefits for another 2 
years. This would include a commitment to cut public spending in real terms by 1% 
per year in 2016-17 and 2017-18 and freezing spending in 2018-19 in order to 
eliminate the budget deficit by this time (IFS, 2015d; IFS, 2015e). However, even 
cuts to this extent will probably not be enough to offset the deficit by this time, with 
£23.8bn worth of cuts across all departments likely required between 2015-16 and 
2018-19 in order to meet deficit reduction targets (IFS, ibid). Other cuts to welfare 
included the lower of the benefits cap from £26,000 to £23,000, and restricting 
housing benefit entitlements for 18-21 year olds (Conservative Party, 2015). By 
contrast, the Labour Party pledged to guarantee jobs for the under 25’s and the long 
term unemployed, as well as scrapping the Bedroom Tax and to cap welfare 
spending in line with inflation. They also put significant emphasis on ending zero 
hour contracts and raising the minimum wage (Labour Party, 2015). The Liberal 
Democrats devised very similar plans, with policies to cap rises in welfare spending 
to 1% per year, scrapping the Bedroom Tax, improving the welfare entitlements of 
the disabled and their carers, and being more lenient on benefit recipients before 
implementing sanctions (Liberal Democrats, 2015b). 
In terms of the prospects for the election itself, the period leading up to polling day 
indicated that voting would be extremely tight between the Conservatives and a 
resurgent Labour Party, with voters seemingly unable to decide which party they 
258 
 
could trust to run the country effectively and responsibly. The Conservatives were 
billed as the party which would continue to run the country in an economically viable 
manner, yet in doing so would continue to cut the public sector and welfare in 
particular in a deep and rapid fashion. Labour on the other hand appeared to lack the 
trust of the electorate based on their economic record from the last time they were in 
government prior to 2010, regardless of their promises to significantly upscale public 
spending and protect welfare to a much greater extent than their Coalition rivals. 
Moreover, the Liberal Democrats were being portrayed as the party which sold out 
on their election pledges, particularly around tuition fees, and despite their contention 
to offer policies of a fairer and more prosperous society for all, were expected to 
suffer a heavy defeat on polling day. 
Henceforth when the election took place on the 7th of May 2015, a number of 
interesting results came to fruition. Despite widespread predictions of a hung 
parliament with no overall victor, the Conservatives led by David Cameron emerged 
as the winners with an overall majority, although small, in the number of elected 
MPs. The Conservative Party secured 331 of the 650 seats available (51%), with 
232 (36%) going to Labour, and the Liberal Democrats as expected falling behind as 
the fourth largest party taking only 8 seats (1%) compared to that of the SNP which 
managed to secure 56 out of 57 seats in Scotland, and 9% of the vote. The result 
means a further 5 years of Conservative driven policies advocating more austerity 
and welfare-to-work rhetoric, with ideals being based on making work pay and 
incentivising work over state benefit dependency, and to “reward hard work and 
protect the vulnerable” (Conservative Party, 2015:27). Subsequently, their welfare 
policies are in the main very similar to what has come before under the Coalition, 
however now the Liberal Democrats are no longer in government to reign in these 
cuts and reforms, they are likely to go further than previously. Policies include cutting 
income tax for those on low pay, at the same time as further restricting benefit 
eligibility and continuing to strengthen welfare-to-work conditionality and 
requirements on recipients whilst simultaneously protecting the entitlements of 
pensioners. They intend to lower the benefit cap from £26,000 to £23,000 in order to 
push a greater number of people towards the labour market, as well as offering a 
new tax free childcare scheme (£0.8bn spending commitment) and the extension of 
free childcare to the low paid (costed at £350m) as an incentive to get parents back 
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into work sooner (IFS, 2015d; IFS, 2015e). They are also emphasising their Big 
Society and the increasing importance of volunteering over state-led provision in the 
future (Conservative Party, 2015). 
However, questions remain about where future welfare cuts will come from, given 
how drastically welfare entitlements have already been curtailed in the last 
parliament. With their continued commitment to protect the benefit rights of 
pensioners, along with fresh spending commitments to childcare, social care and 
higher education, and with the extension of existing cuts unlikely to fill the proposed 
void, it is possible that an entirely new raft of cuts will be announced when the 
Chancellor George Osborne reveals his second budget of the year in July 2015 (IFS, 
2015d; IFS, 2015e). Whilst it remains to be seen which areas of welfare reform will 
be targeted, it is likely that tax credits, housing benefits and disability benefits will 
face substantial reductions, having been partially protected by the Liberal Democrat 
element of the Coalition from 2010-2015 (IFS, ibid). Thus it appears that welfare and 
welfare-to-work policies can be expected to exhibit more of the same characteristics 
seen under the Coalition, but will be increased and strengthened as the 
Conservative Government look to further reduce the budget deficit by reducing 
welfare entitlements and pushing citizens further towards a neoliberal labour market 
(Peck, 2015). 
But what does this mean for the current research project? Whilst the welfare-to-work 
policies that the next Conservative Government is likely to pursue are very similar to 
those of the Coalition, they are intended to be even more strict and extensive than 
has been the case from 2010-2015. This will have significant implications for the 
responses emerging in response to this policy discourse. Many of the coping 
strategies, both for organisations and citizens at the local level, were already 
stretched to breaking point by the previous raft of welfare-to-work policies, and my 
research suggests that this latest extension and intensification could act as a tipping 
point beyond which there is a sink or swim scenario. For organisations, it could mean 
having to make difficult decisions about where to prioritise funding, and with further 
cuts to tax credits, housing benefits and disability benefits to add to existing need for 
advice and support around Universal Credit and welfare-to-work, there could be a 
large swathe of citizens who are excluded from support networks altogether. Whilst 
welfare-to-work measures will not be impossible to deliver in the next parliament to 
260 
 
2018-19, it will prove significantly more difficult (IFS, 2015d; IFS, 2015e). For the 
people affected, the intensification of the welfare reforms could lead to many slipping 
further into crisis, resulting in progressively fewer tools available to enable people to 
cope with reduced benefit income. However, from my research one problem is that it 
remains to be seen whether this will lead to people taking on work to mitigate their 
situation, or whether they will continue on a downward spiral deeper into crisis and 
dependency, especially when fewer resources are available to support them. 
Furthermore, the latest budget is likely to focus on the same social groups that have 
been implicated in the past, with the unemployed, disabled and those in low paid 
work most heavily affected by the next round of welfare reforms and welfare-to-work 
initiatives (IFS, 2015d; IFS, 2015e). Indeed, my research shows that with pensioner 
benefits continuing to be afforded significant protection from the cuts, along with a 
commitment to increase spending on free childcare to encourage parents back into 
work, the proportion of the welfare budget targeted for spending cuts becomes far 
more narrow, with the same group of working age benefits recipients bearing the 
brunt of the cuts, totalling 10% of all unprotected working age benefits (IFS, ibid). In 
this way, it is difficult to see how the public sector in the North West of England will 
be able to absorb the depth of cuts anticipated in the next parliament. Whilst the 
policy agenda intends to push more people towards the labour market and in turn 
away from dependency on state benefits towards responsibility on employers and 
individual citizens, my research shows that one problem with this in the future is that 
the reduction in benefit entitlements will not be compensated for by the increase in 
earnings from paid work. This means that the renewed austerity and welfare-to-work 
policies of the Conservative Government will serve only to maintain benefit 
dependency as opposed to enabling people to take greater responsibility for their 
own welfare. For instance, the reduction in benefit provision to the unemployed or 
low paid will not lower the number of people dependent on state support, because 
whilst the unemployment figures will appear reduced as the government intends, an 
unintended consequence is that the dependency will be transferred into the labour 
market to those in low paid work who still require state support to top up inadequate 
earnings, even if an increase in the minimum wage comes into effect. 
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8.3  “Punitive Neoliberalism”: connections with the wider theoretical debate 
The final section of the thesis looks at the connections that the research findings 
have with the wider theoretical debate and academic literature. It has become clear 
from the thesis that a form of “punitive Neoliberalism” has emerged – a form which is 
much the same from that seen in the past, however one which has been extended 
and intensified since the financial crisis of 2008-9 and the implementation of austerity 
policies by the Coalition Government. In this regard, the linkages with the academic 
theory can be separated into a number of debates concerning Neoliberalism, 
austerity, the Welfare State (and with it welfare-to-work) and the state-citizen 
relationship. 
The first question is how do the research findings fit with the wider theory around 
Neoliberalism. Much of the literature which has emerged since 2008-9 discusses 
what effect, if any, the financial crisis has had on the neoliberal discourse which has 
dominated thinking in economic and political geography for a significant length of 
time. Some academics have suggested that we have entered a ‘zombie’ phase of 
Neoliberalism (Peck, 2010) - even a period of ‘post-Neoliberalism’ - whereby the 
relentless drive of market capitalism has ground to a halt as a result of the crisis and 
marks the beginning of the end for the neoliberal era (Peck et al., 2010). 
Alternatively, it has also been questioned whether the reality of neoliberal practices 
post-2008-9 have really changed that much at all (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014). Indeed 
the empirical evidence appears to suggest that whilst on the surface there are clear 
differences in the nature of the neoliberalised austerity politics being formulated as a 
result of the crisis, in actual fact the ‘actually existing Neoliberalism’ (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002) which forms the reality at the local level especially is more of an 
extension and intensification of the established neoliberal processes already at work. 
This challenges much of the theory at the core of the post-neoliberal argument, 
because it suggests that Neoliberalism is alive and well, but simply in an alternative 
guise to how it has been conveyed in the past. Crucially, the empirical findings show 
that the key differences between the policies currently coming to fruition and those of 
the pre-crisis era before 2008-9 are that they are much more penal than before. Prior 
to 2008 there had begun a process of streamlining the public sector coupled to 
greater emphasis placed on moving people off reliance on welfare and into work. 
Under the Coalition Government this neoliberal mandate has been rebranded and 
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has become far more extensive and intensified for organisations and individuals 
alike, in what might be described as a type of “punitive Neoliberalism.” 
It is also important to gauge how the empirics resonate with the wider debate around 
austerity. As already noted, under the Coalition Government austerity politics have 
become much more prevalent than under the previous Labour Government. The rise 
of more punitive neoliberal practices has extended and intensified the reach of 
austerity in the UK, leading to significant resource restrictions being placed on 
welfare providers and in turn continual shrinkage of the public sector as the Welfare 
State has been placed at the forefront of the cuts being made. In this way, 
Neoliberalism has continued to form the economic rationale for cuts and austerity, 
through the inherent need to service the debts amassed in the crisis period of 2008-9 
and in turn reduce the deficit in public finances (Theodore and Peck, 2011; Hills, 
2011). However, this neoliberal rationale has also been underpinned by a political 
undertone, to drive through a small state ideology justified by the need to make 
extensive (yet selective) cuts to the public sector, and in particular the Welfare State 
(Peck, 2012; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2014, Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012).  
The wider theoretical debate has been very much focused on the economic 
necessity of austerity in recent years, with various arguments being put forward by 
politicians and economists in favour of the need for far-reaching austerity measures, 
in conflict with some of the academic literature which renounces the role of austerity 
completely as being one of political choice. In the main however, the discussion 
appears to surround a more quantitative approach to austerity and how much of this 
neoliberal logic can be justified based on what has been implemented under the 
Coalition Government and its austerity politics (MacLeavy, 2011; Newman, 2011; 
Newman, 2013; Hamnett, 2014). The empirical research findings annunciate how the 
depth of the austerity measures inflicted on welfare providers have led to new and 
unique responses from those implementing and responding to austerity in order to 
mitigate the negative effects coming to fruition. These build on more general themes 
of mitigating recent neoliberal welfare policies dealt with in academia (Lowndes and 
McCaughie, 2013; Theodore and Peck, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2015). Of 
particular interest is the central role that cities have to play in articulating these 
responses to increasingly market-led prerogatives, building on the ideas of Ron 
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Martin (2012) and Jamie Peck (2015; Peck et al., 2013) in the UK and US 
respectively. 
What also needs to be considered is how the results fit with the debate on the 
Welfare State. The theoretical argument surrounds the changing nature and role of 
the Welfare State, and in particular the privatisation and conditionality of welfare 
provision in relinquishing the burden on the state in favour of private and voluntary 
organisations, and the additional responsibilities placed on individuals to provide for 
themselves or to earn the right to access state welfare support through work 
(Standing, 2011; Peck, 2012; Callinicos, 2012). In this way, there has been 
increasing literature focusing on the replacement of the Welfare State as a social 
entity with that of the neoliberal market (Swyngedouw, 2011, Howell, 2015; Peck, 
2015). This includes an emphasis on making work pay and thereby transferring the 
cost of welfare away from the state towards the individual, employers and private 
welfare providers as part of a growing attachment to a neoliberalised small state 
ideology (McCollum, 2012; Theodore and Peck, 2012; Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
There is also a significant interest in the contradictory nature of privatising welfare 
provision, and how this resonates with issues around dependency and responsibility 
(Brenner et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2011; Patrick, 2011; Newman, 2013; 
Roulstone, 2015). The empirical data displays that an extension and intensification of 
active labour market policies is taking place through welfare-to-work and Universal 
Credit, with specific implications for those unemployed and claiming disability 
benefits.  
Thus whilst the number of people in receipt of benefits has decreased, there has 
also been an increase in employment, particularly in part time, temporary and low 
paid positions (Taylor-Gooby, 2015). However, a number of contradictions of 
welfare-to-work have also become apparent including a mismatch between the 
number of people moving off benefits and those finding a job, and the ineffectiveness 
of neoliberal labour market policies in making work pay enough to offset the loss of 
benefits sustained. These have created uneven geographies of welfare given the 
capacity for replacing state welfare provision with alternatives or through work under 
this new form of punitive Neoliberalism, which adds a different geographical 
dimension to existing research into the geographies of welfare (such as that of 
Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). Whilst therefore building on the existing literature base, 
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the unique aspect of the research findings in this regard relate to the specifically 
punitive nature of welfare-to-work, with conditionality now extended to incorporate 
those in low paid work and in receipt of benefits as well as those who are disabled or 
unemployed. 
A final reflection which is required is how the results link to wider discussions about 
the state-citizen relationship. In the academic literature there is general consensus 
that the state-citizen relationship has changed as a consequence of the financial 
crisis of 2008-9 (such as Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). However, the debate 
remains about whether citizens are now more or less dependent on the state than in 
the past (Theodore and Peck, 2010; Hamnett, 2014). Whilst the active labour market 
policies of the state, coupled with the extension and intensification of austerity 
measures has in theory reduced the role of the state and instead placed greater 
responsibilities on the individual, employers and others, the contradictions which 
have accompanied the implementation of welfare-to-work have arguably led welfare 
recipients to become more rather than less dependent on the state (Theodore and 
Peck, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2015). My empirical research suggests that the Coalition 
Government has advocated what might be considered to be a work-first welfare, 
whereby welfare support is no longer a right of the citizen, but has instead become 
an entitlement to be earned in return for work, (cf. Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
However, the unique findings of the research show that even being in work is not 
enough, with in-work conditionality applying to those beneath the welfare benefits 
threshold, even if measures are more punitive than progressive at getting people into 
more highly paid, full time work and moving them away from state welfare 
dependency. This in turn has created more contradictions and unexpected 
consequences for welfare-to-work and dependency on the state, a recognition that 
more work needs to be done if we are to better understand the (geographic) causes 
and consequences of an emergent “punitive Neoliberalism.” 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Draft Interview Schedule: National Stakeholders 
 
Initial Comments 
 
For the benefit of the interview, please could you give a short summary of who you 
are and what your role is in relation to X in Y (Insert theme and location as 
appropriate). 
 
Section 1: State welfare provision under austerity and the impacts of the 
economic downturn 
 
Question 1: What do you understand to be the post-2008 aim of the Welfare State 
in today’s society?  
Question 2: Have the underlying principles of welfare provision changed since 
austerity measures and the financial crisis of 2008 took hold? If so, how?  
Question 3: Welfare reform is nothing new. The UK government has been engaged 
in the recalibration of welfare provision arguably since the inception of the Welfare 
State. However, can you sum up in two or three key points how the latest reforms to 
provision in the UK under the Coalition have been articulated by the post-2008 
economic crisis? 
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Question 4: Which social classes have been most/least affected by welfare cuts? 
How so, and why? Similarly which places have been most/least affected? (Does the 
interviewee represent any groups implicated by the issues?) 
Question 5a: How is the latest welfare reform discourse altering the relationship 
between the state and its citizens? Why do you think that this is the case? 
Question 5b: How is the austerity implemented by the Coalition having an influence 
on the balance in this relationship? Has it led to any skewing of the relationship in 
favour of one group over the other? 
Question 6: Do you agree that welfare is being transferred away from the state and 
public sector towards private provision? Was this process already in motion prior to 
the Coalition-driven welfare reforms, or is it a trend which is new? Can you provide 
any examples of where welfare provision has been picked up by private interest 
groups (i.e. Companies, third sector and charities, family)? What specific issues do 
you think this raises? 
Question 7: To what extent are welfare cuts part of a conscious political strategy by 
the Cameron Government or an inevitable consequence of the global economic 
crisis?  
Question 8: Which welfare services are being prioritised given the restricted budget 
capacities most stakeholders now have (National/regional/local)? Why?  
Question 9: Which political strategies utilised thus far under the auspices of 
austerity do you think have been a success, and which have been less so? Why 
have you come to these conclusions? Can you provide some examples? 
Question 10: Have there been any unexpected impacts resulting from the 
implementation of austerity-driven welfare policies? If so, in which areas of 
provision? (Steer from a positive or negative perspective after they have 
provided their initial response) 
Question 11: Where is the Cameron government getting its inspiration/ideas/support 
(particular policy think tanks etc.)?  
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Question 12: Where in Government is this change to welfare policy being driven 
from (HMT cutting budgets, DWP, BIS, No. 10)? Is there a clear message from 
Government or do you get a sense there are different views/agendas in different 
parts of Government? Could you provide some examples? 
Question 13: What are the most noticeable national changes to welfare provision in 
cities in this age of austerity? Are the changes to welfare provision occurring 
generically across cities or are there specific local patterns? Which social groups are 
most/least affected in different locations? Do particular policies have a larger/smaller 
effect in different places?  
 
Section 2: The Welfare Reform Act 2012 and factors 
 
Question 14: Are the policies coming into force under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 
changing the landscape of welfare provision even further than the initial round of 
retrenchment and cuts? If so, how?  
Question 15: How confident are you that this latest attempt at welfare reform is the 
right solution to a supposedly deep-rooted problem in welfare dependency?  
Question 16: Which aspects of the Act in particular do you think are likely to have to 
greatest effects on the everyday lives of citizens? Why? Can you think of any 
examples? 
Question 17: In your opinion, will those individuals and families reliant on benefits 
under the previous system be better off under Universal Credit?  
Question 18: How will the changes to welfare provision ensure that people will 
always be better off in work than on benefits? 
Question 19: Do you think that these welfare reforms will have any unexpected 
outcomes, positive or negative? If so, what, and moreover, why? 
Question 20: Will the effects of the changes made under the Welfare Reform Act 
vary by social class, gender, ethnicity etc? If so, why?  
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Question 21: The welfare reforms taking place include more stringent testing and 
sanctioning processes to those used previously. How will this affect the number and 
types of people able to access welfare provision going forward? 
Question 22: Does the political rhetoric being advocated by the Cameron 
government amount to a coherent plan for fiscal recovery? What role does the 
Welfare State have to play within such a plan?  
 
Section 3: What is in store for the remainder of the current parliament? 
 
Question 23: When additional cuts are made to the ones already in the pipeline, 
who is next in the firing line? Equally, who is most likely to benefit if at all? 
Question 24: With the next General Election looming in 2015, what do you think will 
be the key agendas being debated and contested? Would you expect the approach 
of the Coalition Government to change considering this? Will they deviate away from 
their hard line stance on austerity and welfare reform?  
 
Section 4: Responses to austerity and welfare reform 
 
Question 25: Which parts of the economy are picking up responsibility for providing 
the welfare services being withdrawn by the state?  
Question 26: Are there any instances of where the Cameron government has 
changed course? If so, how and why?  
Question 27: Do resistive and coping strategies/actions undertaken by citizens 
following state retrenchment make policy decisions more difficult to 
make/implement? Do they have a bearing on how policy decisions might be made in 
the future, particularly considering the next General Election in 2015? If so, how and 
why?  
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Question 28: How has the relationship between the state and its citizens changed 
post-2008 in terms of the bargain between the rights as a citizen versus a citizen’s 
obligations to the state? Are there any good examples of this? 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
So then, just to finish off, if I was to come back in a year’s time and conduct this 
interview again, what will have changed (If anything)?  
 
Why do you believe this will be the case? 
 
Ok, thank you for your time today. Is there anything else you can think of which has 
not been mentioned in this interview which you feel would be important for me to 
include in my study? 
 
High Priority Questions to Ask: 1,2,3,6,10,14,21,23,24,25. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Draft Interview Schedule: Regional Stakeholders 
 
Initial Comments 
 
For the benefit of the interview, please could you give a short summary of who you 
are and what your role is in relation to X in Y (Insert theme/location as appropriate). 
 
Section 1: State welfare provision under austerity and the impacts of the 
economic downturn 
Question 1: What do you understand to be the post-2008 aim of the Welfare State 
in the north west of England? How does this differ with other regions of the UK? 
Why? Can you give examples?  
Question 2: Have the underlying principles of welfare provision changed since 
austerity measures and the financial crisis of 2008 took hold? If so, how?  
Question 3: We know that prior to 2008 government (not least the UK Government) 
was engaged in welfare reform. So, can you sum up in two or three points what 
impact the economic crisis and subsequent austerity have had on the provision of 
welfare services in the North West?  
Question 4: Which social classes in the North West have been most/least affected 
by welfare cuts? How so, and why? Similarly which spaces/places within the region 
have been most/least affected? (Does the interviewee represent any groups 
implicated by the issues?)  
Question 5: We know the austerity politics at the national level, but how are these 
being interpreted and implemented at the regional level? Can you give any 
examples? 
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Question 6: What are the most noticeable regional changes to welfare provision in 
cities of the north west of England in this age of austerity? Are the changes to 
welfare provision occurring generically across cities or are there specific local 
patterns? Which social groups are most/least affected in different locations? Do 
particular policies have a larger/smaller effect in different places?  
Question 7: Research has shown that cities are becoming increasingly important 
locations for social and economic interactions. Why are cities in particular feeling the 
most acute impacts of state austerity measures? Are there any interesting examples 
of this? 
Question 8: The latest data shows that cities in the NW of England are emerging as 
being in a more precarious position than others with regard to the effects of austerity 
and public sector cut backs. How much of this do you think is generic to cities? How 
much is specific to the NW? 
Question 9: Why does the North West region and its cities have a historical socio-
economic background which makes it more susceptible to the effects of welfare 
retrenchment and austerity? Can you give any examples? 
Question 10: Which political strategies utilised thus far under the auspices of 
austerity do you think have been a success, and which have been less so? Why 
have you come to these conclusions? 
Question 11: Have there been any unexpected impacts resulting from the 
implementation of austerity-driven welfare policies? If so, in which areas of 
provision? Are there any interesting examples? (Steer in positive or negative 
direction after they have given their initial response) 
Question 12: Which welfare services are being prioritised in the North West given 
the restricted budget capacities most regional stakeholders now have? Why? How 
does this compare with other regions of the UK? 
Question 13: One issue which is being picked up at the moment is the transfer of 
welfare provision away from the state and public sector to private interest groups. Do 
you agree with this? If not, why? Was this a process already set in train before 2008, 
or is it a trend which is new? Can you provide any examples of how this has 
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happened in practice? What are issues do you think this raises (e.g. privatisation of 
local democracy, asset ownership)?  
Question 14: Cities function in contingent ways both socially and economically. Do 
different cities in the North West have different welfare agendas (i.e. who/what is 
being prioritised in different locations)? What effect is this having? Any examples of 
cities bucking the trend? If so, how are they achieving this?  
 
Section 2: The Welfare Reform Act 2012 and factors 
Question 15a: When additional cuts are made to the ones already in the pipeline, 
who is next in the firing line? Equally, who is most likely to benefit if at all?  
Question 15b: It has been argued in the past that a large, inefficient public sector 
and welfare budget has stifled potential private sector growth. Therefore do you think 
the impacts of the Coalition welfare reforms on the North West region, and more 
specifically in its towns and cities, actually lead to short-term pain for long-term gain 
for its citizens? 
Question 16: Will the effects of the Welfare Reform Act differ between regions? 
Where will the North West region fit into this?  
 
Section 3: What is in store for the remainder of the current parliament? 
Question 17: With the next General Election looming in 2015, what do you think will 
be the key agendas being debated and contested? Would you expect the approach 
of the Coalition Government to change considering this? Will they deviate away from 
their hard line stance on austerity and welfare reform? 
 
Section 4: Responses to austerity and welfare reform 
Question 18: Will the quality of welfare provision be affected as well as the quantity 
of it given the austerity measures? Can you give examples of innovation and more 
being done with less?  
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Question 19: What forms of cooperation in response to these austerity strategies 
and processes are coming to fruition and why these specifically? 
Question 20: Do the forms of co-operation emerging differ between regions? 
Similarly, are there different forms of co-operation occurring within the North West 
region itself. How so? Examples? 
Question 21: Are the forms of co-operation being observed uniform across different 
groups? Or are there differences being seen depending on class, gender, ethnicity 
etc? If yes, then how are such differences manifesting themselves?  
Question 22: What forms of resistance to welfare reform are coming to fruition as 
part of a response to these austerity strategies?  
Question 23: Do the forms of resistance to the welfare reforms emerging differ 
between the North West and other regions, as well as within the region itself? How 
so?  
Question 24: Are the forms of resistance being observed uniform across different 
groups? Or are there differences being seen depending on class, gender, ethnicity 
etc? If yes, then how are such differences manifesting themselves?  
Question 25: Which parts of the economy are picking up responsibility for providing 
the welfare services being withdrawn by the state? Can you give an example? 
Question 26: In what ways are cities becoming the primary locations for these 
activities to take place? Are there any good examples of this? 
Question 27: Do resistive and coping strategies/actions undertaken by citizens 
following state roll-back make policy decisions more difficult to make/implement? Do 
they have a bearing on how policy decisions might be made in the future, particularly 
considering the next General Election in 2015? If so, how and why?  
Question 28: How has the relationship between the state and its citizens changed 
post-2008 in terms of the bargain between the rights as a citizen versus a citizens 
obligations to the state? 
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Concluding Remarks 
So then, just to finish off, if I was to come back in a year’s time and conduct this 
interview again, what will have changed (If anything)?  
 
Why do you believe this will be the case? 
 
Ok, thank you for your time today. Is there anything else you can think of which has 
not been mentioned in this interview which you feel would be important for me to 
include in my study? 
 
 
High Priority Questions to Ask: 1,2,3,5,9,12,15,16,25. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Draft Interview Schedule: Local Stakeholders 
 
Initial Comments  
For the benefit of the interview, please could you give a short summary of who you 
are and what your role is in relation to X in Y (Insert theme/location as appropriate). 
 
Section 1: State welfare provision under austerity and the impacts of the 
economic downturn 
Question 1: What do you understand to be the present aim of the Welfare State in X 
following the 2008 financial crisis?  
Question 2: We know that prior to 2008 government (not least the UK Government) 
was engaged in welfare retrenchment. So, can you sum up in two or three points 
what impact the economic crisis and subsequent austerity have had on the provision 
of welfare services in this area? 
Question 3: Which social classes have been most/least affected by welfare cuts in 
X? How so, and why? Similarly which spaces/places have been most/least affected 
here? (Does the interviewee represent any groups implicated by the issues?)  
Question 4: One issue which is being picked up at the moment is the transfer of 
welfare provision away from the state and public sector to private interest groups. Do 
you agree? If not, why? Was this a process already set in motion before 2008, or is it 
a trend which is new? Can you provide any examples of how this has happened in 
practice? What are issues do you think this raises (e.g. privatisation of local 
democracy, asset ownership)?  
Question 5: Have the underlying principles of welfare provision changed since 
austerity measures and the financial crisis of 2008 took hold? If so, how?  
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Question 6: We know the austerity politics at the national level, but how are these 
being interpreted and implemented at the local level? Can you provide any 
examples? 
Question 7: Research has shown that cities are becoming increasingly important 
locations for social and economic interactions. Why is your city in particular feeling 
the acute impacts of state austerity measures? Can you provide any good 
examples? 
Question 8: The latest data shows that cities in the NW of England are emerging as 
being in a more precarious position than others with regard to the effects of austerity 
and public sector cut backs. How much of this is generic to cities? How is your city 
more specifically being affected? Can you give any examples? 
Question 9: Which political strategies utilised locally thus far under the auspices of 
austerity do you think have been a success, and which have been less so? Why 
have you come to these conclusions?  
Question 10: Have there been any unexpected impacts resulting from the 
implementation of austerity-driven welfare policies? If so, in which areas of 
provision? Examples? (Steer in direction of positive or negative after they have 
given their initial response) 
Question 11: Which welfare services are being prioritised in X given the restricted 
budget capacities most local stakeholders now have? Why?  
Question 12: When additional cuts are made to the ones already in the pipeline, 
who is next in the firing line? Equally, who is most likely to benefit if at all? Can you 
give an example? 
Question 13: Do different cities in the North West have different welfare agendas? 
Who/what is being prioritised in your city? What effect is this having? How does this 
compare with other cities in the North West? Any examples of cities bucking the 
trend? If so, how are they achieving this?  
Question 14: Will the quality of welfare provision be affected as well as the quantity 
of it given the austerity measures? Can you give examples of innovation and more 
being done with less?  
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Section 2: The Welfare Reform Act 2012 and factors 
The Welfare Reform Act 2012 is an extension of the Welfare Reform Bill, 2010, 
which outlined how the government planned to rapidly slash spending on basic 
services for the majority of its citizens both in the short and long term. In particular, 
this entailed a loss of benefits for a large proportion of individuals and families 
earning middle income wages, a much greater emphasis than had been present 
before on the necessity to work to ensure social mobility and far greater levels of 
conditionality and sanctioning attached to the availability of state welfare. 
Question 15: Will the effects of the Welfare Reform Act differ at the local scale, both 
between cities as well as varying within cities as well? Are there any good examples 
of this? 
Question 16: Do you think that these welfare reforms will have any unexpected 
outcomes, positive or negative? If so, what, and moreover, why?  
Question 17: Will the effects of the changes made under the Welfare Reform Act 
vary by social class, gender, ethnicity etc? If so, why?  
Question 18: The welfare reforms taking place include more stringent testing and 
sanctioning processes to those used previously. How will this affect the number and 
types of people able to access welfare provision going forward? What will the 
specific implications likely be for X? 
Question 19: Many of the welfare reforms being undertaken are designed to end the 
so called ‘culture of dependency’ which the Coalition Government claims have 
emerged under previous governments. Will the latest agenda of reforms lead to 
people feeling stigmatised and unwilling to take up resources they are entitled to? 
Are there any differences in attitudes towards the uptake of benefits between social 
classes?  
 
Section 3: What is in store for the remainder of the current parliament? 
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Question 20: With the next General Election looming in 2015, what do you think will 
be the key agendas being debated and contested? Would you expect the approach 
of the Coalition Government to change considering this? Will they deviate away from 
their hard line stance on austerity and welfare reform?  
 
Section 4: Responses to austerity and welfare reform 
Question 21: In what ways are cities becoming the primary locations of the 
responses to state welfare reform enabling these activities to take place?  
Question 22: What forms of cooperation in response to these austerity strategies 
and processes are coming to fruition in X and why these specifically? Can you think 
of any examples? 
Question 23: What forms of resistance to welfare reform in X are coming to fruition 
as part of a response to these austerity strategies? Can you think of any examples? 
Question 24: Do the forms of resistance emerging differ within and between cities? 
How is this coming to the fore in X?  
Question 25: Are the forms of resistance to welfare reform being observed uniform 
across different groups? Or are there differences being seen depending on class, 
gender, ethnicity etc? If yes, then how are such differences manifesting themselves?  
Question 26: Are the forms of co-operation being observed uniform across different 
groups? Or are there differences being seen depending on class, gender, ethnicity 
etc? If yes, then how are such differences manifesting themselves?  
Question 27: Do the forms of co-operation emerging differ both between and within 
places? How so? Are there any good examples of this? 
Question 28: What types of coping strategies/actions are being developed by those 
affected by the reforms as well as by those implementing the policies, in order to 
combat the negative effects of the welfare cuts?  
Question 29: Which parts of the economy are picking up responsibility for providing 
the welfare services being withdrawn by the state?  
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Question 30: Have we seen a change in the way citizens and groups representing 
citizens have attempted to resist the austerity agenda? Are there any signs of 
success (i.e. forced political leaders to change course)?  
Question 31: Are these coping strategies/actions necessary as a result of the state 
relinquishing its responsibilities to provide for its citizens? Or are people still able to 
rely on the state to the same extent they might have done prior to the 2008 crisis?  
Question 32: Do resistive and coping strategies/actions undertaken by citizens 
following state reform make policy decisions more difficult to make/implement? Do 
they have a bearing on how policy decisions might be made in the future, particularly 
considering the next General Election in 2015? If so, how and why? Are there any 
good examples? 
Question 33: Is there any variation in the response of citizens to austerity depending 
on class, gender, ethnicity etc? 
Question 34: Will the capacity of citizens to help themselves following state 
withdrawal determine the policies i.e. pace and depth of cuts, which are eventually 
implemented?  
 
Concluding Remarks 
So then, just to finish off, if I was to come back in a year’s time and conduct this 
interview again, what will have changed (If anything)?  
Why do you believe this will be the case? 
Ok, thank you for your time today. Is there anything else you can think of which has 
not been mentioned in this interview which you feel would be important for me to 
include in my study? 
High Priority Questions to Ask: 1,2,3,4,11,12,15,22,23,29. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Nascent Geographies of Austerity – Understanding the Implications of a Renewed 
Welfare to Work Discourse 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
(To be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that this 
study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been approved 
by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, 
and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
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I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the 
statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is 
judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or 
others.  
 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
                               Date 
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Appendix 5 
 
Interview Coding Framework 
 
 
 
 
